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ABSTRACT
Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with
one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I first conduct an
extensive quantitative survey of the political budget cycle literature through a meta-analysis. I find
that overall there exists a positive, though substantively small political budget cycle effect. Second,
I examine how incumbents may use alternatives to fiscal manipulation, such as the passage of
redistributive policies, since these send a key signal to voters. Third, I examine how incumbents
may not only time fiscal manipulation, but control their placement spatially. This ties in the political
budget cycle literature with the literature on distributive politics. Although these findings call into
question some of the existing views of political budget cycles, they show that cycles manifest
themselves in alternative fashions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Incumbent politicians know that if the economy is doing well, they are much more
likely to be re-elected. When wages are rising and jobs are plentiful, workers feel
happy. Small wonder, then, that many governments attempt to manipulate the economy
to boost their political fortunes.” —The Economist1
In stable democracies, one of the greatest fears for a politician is the next election.2 Although
they may gain some satisfaction in knowing that their ideological core will most likely continue
to support them, voters at the margins are of particular concern. How does an incumbent gain the
support of swing voters needed to ensure re-election, while at the same time satisfying the needs
of their core constituents?
To answer this question, it helps to ask what voters evaluate the incumbent on. Typically, a
relative comparison is made in the eyes of voters, “am I better off now than I was in the past?”3
These evaluations are based off many factors, such as the incumbent’s success at handling the
economy, their ability to pass social policies, and how well they conduct foreign policy. While the
incumbent may be naturally gifted at addressing these issues, there may also be an incentive for
an incumbent to tip the scales in their favor through deliberate fiscal and monetary changes around
elections. Such behavior has been termed political cycles. First formalized by Nordhaus (1975),
1“String-pushers,” http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21648620-politicians-often-try-
manipulate-economy-win-votes-seldom. Accessed 01/17/2017.
2This is, of course, assuming that they desire to be re-elected, or are able to run again given constitutional term limits
set in some countries.
3This statement forms the central point of the literature on economic voting, which holds that current and previous
economic conditions are the largest driver of electoral outcomes (Fair 1978; Kramer 1983; Powell Jr and Whitten 1993;
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). In contrast to the common retrospective approach, prospective theories posit that
voters estimate their future well-being, given their vote choice. Note also that voters do not always think of themselves
when evaluating the incumbent, in what has become known as pocketbook voting. Instead, they will look at the well-
being of those around them, also known as sociotropic voting.
1
this literature has grown to cover a diverse body of topics, including the manipulation of monetary,
fiscal, and other policies over the past 40 years.4
What differentiates political cycles from true desire to tilt policy in a certain direction? Time.
The time in which elections occur changes the decision-making calculus of the incumbent. All else
equal, manipulating closer to the election will result in larger electoral returns, since individuals
tend to discount past events (as well as future ones) more than the present. Thus, in all studies of
political cycles, the election is the key independent variable that is theorized to drive changes in
policy.
An example of political cycles is shown in Figure 1.1. In Figure 1.1a, policy tools naturally
cycle up and down with the economy. For instance, increases in expenditures may coincide with
economic downturns, or interest rates might align with economic output. Such policy tools can
be classified into three broad categories. The first consists of monetary policy instruments and
macroeconomic outcomes. These include manipulating the money supply, interest rates, changes
in price levels and unemployment rates (Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Wibbels 2000; Heckelman
2001; Hallerberg, de Souza and Clark 2002; Erlandsson 2004; Ferre´ and Manzano 2014). The
second—and probably the largest body of literature on political cycles—focuses on fiscal tools
used to win re-election. For instance, taxes may fall during elections (Schuknecht 2000), while
debt, fiscal deficits, and intergovernmental grants may rise (John and Ward 2001; Block 2002;
O’Mahony 2011). Last, alternative policies that are neither explicitly fiscal or monetary in nature
might be used.5 For example, incumbents might adjust active labor market policies (Mechtel and
Potrafke 2013), start conflicts with other nations (Hess and Orphanides 1995), or employ more
public sector workers such as teachers around elections (Coelho, Veiga and Veiga 2006; Tepe and
Vanhuysse 2009).
Regardless of the policy tool used, note that during an election in Figure 1.1a, the policy re-
mains “unguided” by the incumbent. However, with the knowledge that policy tools—such as
4Below, I refer to political budget cycleswhen discussing fiscal manipulation, political business cycleswhen covering
monetary manipulation, and use the term political cycles to encompass the two (as well as any other alternative form of
manipulation).
5This is a much smaller, yet growing, body of literature.
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Figure 1.1: Using policies as opportunistic tools around elections
Election
Time
Policy Outcome
(a) No manipulation
Election
Time
Policy Outcome
(b) Pre-electoral manipulation
3
expenditures or fiscal deficits—appeal to voters, the incumbent may instead try to increase the
policy tool just before an election by explicit manipulation, raising deficit spending or decreasing
revenues, for instance. This increase is shown in Figure 1.1b. Such a policy might be popular
with voters, perhaps even enough to ensure the incumbent is re-elected. However, most policies
themselves are cyclical, and, after rising, must fall. For instance, growing deficits eventually have
to be met with either a corresponding increase in revenues or decrease in expenditures. Such post-
election busts may be acceptable for the incumbent, since it comes after the election. However, it is
still early enough in the term so voters typically forget this downturn by the time the next election
comes around. Even so, the incumbent may still face the same pressures to manipulate during the
next election, and so the cycle continues.
1.1 A short history
Theories about political cycles have become more sophisticated over time. This progression of
research can be best organized into four groups, as shown in Table 1.1. The earliest work focused on
the manipulation of monetary policy, specifically the trade-off between inflation and unemployment
(Nordhaus 1975).6 Easy monetary policy—low interest rates set by the central bank—tends to
boost nominal output, which has the effect of lowering unemployment towards its natural rate.
Unemployment is one aggregate indicator thought to enter into the minds of voters when evaluating
the incumbent. In addition, rising nominal wages reward individual voters. Such monetary policy
behavior is not benign however; according to the Phillips curve, such expansionary monetary policy
precedes rising price levels. Yet if an incumbent could time loose monetary policy to occur just
before the election, they would be able to hold off on contracting policy (thus lowering inflation at
the cost of rising unemployment) until after the election.7
While some empirical studies find evidence in support of the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve hypothesis, others find little to no evidence. For instance, Allen (1986) finds that the US
6As discussed by Dubois (2016), some speculation about a political business cycle existed before Nordhaus
(A˚kerman 1947; Downs 1957). However, these were either not empirical, or they did not make explicit the Phillips
curve tradeoff that incumbents take advantage of.
7This would also have the benefit of altering inflation expectations early on in the incumbent’s term.
4
Table 1.1: Four general movements in the study of political cycles
Expectations-
Augmented
Phillips Curve
Partisan
Cycles
Rational-
PCs/Competency
Models
Conditional
Political Cycles
Characterized
by
Pre-election
booms and
post-election
busts
Heterogeneous
Partisan
Preferences
Informational
asymmetry
between
incumbent and
public
Contexts make
political cycles
more or less
likely
Examples
Nordhaus
(1975)
Hibbs (1977)
Alesina (1987);
Rogoff and
Sibert (1988)
Alt and Lassen
(2006b);
Brender and
Drazen (2005)
Time =)
Federal Reserve provides more accommodating monetary policy around both presidential and con-
gressional elections (see also Haynes and Stone 1989). In contrast, Beck (1982) finds no support of
the hypothesis when performing an intervention analysis on monthly US data from 1961 to 1973.
A number of critiques of the exepctations-augmented Phillips curve cycle theory are easy to
make, especially in the US case. First, presidential term limits may disincentivize incumbents
from pursuing more than one expansionary re-election phase. Although strong party cohesion may
allow party after party member to win elections using the same strategy, overall, it seems unlikely
that parties could continuously overcome such a coordination problem.
Second, it assumes that Democratic and Republican parties both desire lowering unemployment
at the expense of rising prices. While such an assumption seems valid for the Democratic party,
Republicans have historically been elected on “tight-money” policies due to their support base,
their most outspoken members consisting of finance and business interests from the East coast.
Especially outside the US context, it is easy to see that political parties differ substantially in terms
of their constituent base and disposition towards worker’s interests at the cost of inflation.
Third, it assumes that voters can be tricked into thinking the economy is performing well,
when in reality it is simply an expansionary monetary policy that is creating the boom. While
5
some voters may be fooled, others, particularly sophisticated voters or “issue” voters who prioritize
low unemployment or stable price levels (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Gomez and Wilson 2001)
may be much harder to convince. In addition, while an incumbent may get away with such a
manipulation strategy once, the resulting post-election inflation would make such a strategy less
likely to work again.8
Last, early theories assumed a single actor (the president) as responsible for policy changes. In
reality, there are multiple “hands on the wheel” when steering monetary policy; these institutional
constraints may make sudden shifts in policy around elections less likely. Indeed, Franzese (1999)
finds that the balance between politicians controlling inflationary outcomes and the central bank is a
function of the degree of institutional autonomy the central bank has. Thus, pre-electoral monetary
policy shifts might only occur in countries where central bank independence is low.
In light of the second critique above, a variant of the Nordhaus theory was developed to relax
the assumption that all incumbents behave homogeneously. As shown in Table 1.1, this is gen-
erally known as the partisan cycle hypothesis, and is largely attributed to Hibbs (1977). While
still focusing on the short-run unemployment-inflation trade-off, Hibbs relaxed the assumption that
all incumbents have homogenous preferences. Instead, parties who are left-leaning ideologically
will tend to reward labor interests, while parties of the right—who prioritize stable prices—might
instead pursue the opposite strategy.9 Indeed, as Hibbs showed through a simple correlation of
12 advanced industrialized democracies averaged over 1945 and 1969 (p. 1473), the correlation
between the percentage of time a socialist-labor party was in power and the average inflation rate
is 0.74. It should also be noted that the partisan cycle hypothesis still emphasizes the importance
of time around the election; in order to please their ideological support base, incumbents will time
their behavior of certain policies.
Even with the advances that the partisan cycle theory provides, many of the assumptions that
underly theories of political business cycles still suffer from two of the critiques given above. Could
8Much of this would depend on how much voters discount the high inflation period at the start of the incumbent’s
term.
9I speak of left and right ideologies in the North American/European sense. Parties in regions such as Asia and Latin
America are often harder to place on a traditional left-right two-dimensional ideological spectrum.
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voters really be fooled—repeatedly—into thinking that the economy was performing better than it
truly was before an election? In addition, are incumbents able to exert that much authority over
fiscal and monetary policy?
In reality, neither question posed above could be answered by either the expectations-augmented
Phillips curve or partisan cycle theories. Much of that changed with the move in economics and
political science towards rational expectations. A number of papers adapted the rational expecta-
tions framework to work on political cycles (Alesina 1987; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990;
Persson and Tabellini 1990). This is shown by the third column in Table 1.1. These approaches
posit that actors behave in a rational, utility maximizing framework. In terms of political cycles, all
else equal, voters prefer a competent to an incompetent leader (i.e., they prefer an individual that
can manage the economy). Voters are treated as informed, and not easily fooled by the incumbent
manipulating indiscriminately. However, due to some information asymmetries, an incompetent
incumbent may be able to still manipulate policy so as to render themselves indistinguishable from
its counterpart, thus creating a signaling game. Although voters would like to punish the incompe-
tent incumbent, manipulation is hard to distinguish from true competency. Thus, the literature on
political cycles was far from over.
Rational business cycle theory altered many of the previous findings. While monetary policy
remained an important area of research, studies of fiscal policy gained in popularity, due to the fact
that in many of the rational political cycle models, voters are able to fully anticipate inflation rates,
rendering political business cycles impotent (Dubois 2016). Therefore, starting with works by Ro-
goff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990)—among others—scholarly focus shifted to government
spending (and revenues) around elections, and especially the conditions under which this was more
or less likely to occur. This has become known as the study of political budget cycles.
However, even rational expectations models were not without weaknesses. In reality, govern-
ments do not function as one cohesive unit. Government agencies may have at times coalescing
and diverging interests to elected officials. Moreover, rules and institutions, such as constitutions
or the level of fiscal policy transparency, may vastly restrict the magnitude of political cycles, or at
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least constrain policy-makers to use alternative tools for manipulation. Such contextualization, or
“conditional political cycles,” makes up the fourth movement in Table 1.1, and is the best way to
classify the current state of the literature.
The over-time popularity of different types of political cycles can be visualized in Figure 1.2,
which shows the frequency of Google Scholar search results, by year, using the following search
terms: “Political Business Cycle”, “Political Budget Cycle”, “Partisan Cycle”, and “Opportunistic
Cycle”. First, it is clear that, even using a relatively simple search strategy, papers mentioning po-
litical business cycles are the most common in the literature, by far. Much of this can be attributed
to the fact that political business cycles often focus on both monetary and fiscal policy, the latter
of which could be better defined under the political budget cycle label.10 Second, the frequency of
papers mentioning political budget cycles, partisan cycles, and opportunistic cycles are relatively
similar (and uncommon), until around 2000, when papers discussing political budget cycles sharply
increase, while the other two remain flat. Last, papers discussing either political budget cycles or
political business cycles experienced an incredible boom over the past 16 years, although the lat-
ter remains the dominant term used in the literature. From 2000 to 2016, the number of papers
mentioning political business cycles grew by over 140 percent. During the same time period, the
number of papers mentioning political budget cycles grew by nearly 930 percent.
The newest strain of literature on political cycles has two important characteristics. First, while
much of the early literature on political cycles offered empirical tests in the United States and
other Western democracies, there has been a recent move towards testing theoretical expectations
in developing countries (e.g., Sa´ez and Sinha 2010; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011; Sjahrir, Kis-
Katos and Schulze 2013). There has also been a new focus on testing for political budget cycles
at different levels of government, such as the national (Katsimi and Sarantides 2012), provincial
10The terminology used in articles is often vague, with “political business cycles” referring to any number of fiscal
and monetary policies.
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Figure 1.2: The rise of the political cycle literature
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(Remmer 2007; Padovano 2012), or municipal level (Veiga and Pinho 2007; Drazen and Eslava
2010a; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011).11
The second important characteristic is the growing focus on the contexts under which political
cycles might be more or less likely to occur. For instance, institutions have been shown to shape
a variety of social and economic outcomes (e.g., North 1990). They also shape the magnitude of
political cycles, or indeed whether they take place at all, since they often hold executive behavior
in check. For instance, fiscal transparency (Alt and Lassen 2006b), fiscal rules (Rose 2006), and
membership in a currency union (Efthyvoulou 2011) all hinder the magnitude of political cycles. In
contrast, some—though certainly not all—developing countries suffer from a lack of independent
institutions, which tends to weaken the ability to prevent manipulation around elections. This
means that strong executives face few constraints on their ability to co-opt branches of government.
Other factors include the level of political sophistication of voters (Shi and Svensson 2006), or the
age of political parties (Hanusch and Keefer 2014).
1.2 A unified theory of political cycles
The theory of political cycles can be summarized in a stylized depiction, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Moving from left to right, the first step is establishing whether the incumbent needs to manipulate
in the first place. If the current political environment is unfavorable, the incumbent may pursue
one of two options. First, they may alter the budget in order to win the support of voters, perhaps
increasing expenditures or running fiscal deficits. Alternatively, they could pursue budget cycle
alternatives, such as extending favorable credit to individuals (Cole 2009), boosting public sector
employment (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2014), adjusting monetary policy, or instigating conflict in order
to create a “rally around the flag” effect (Hess and Orphanides 1995; Oneal and Bryan 1995).12
Even if an incumbent has decided on a tool through which they will manipulate, this does
not always translate into an observable political cycle. As discussed above, there are conditional
11Although political budget cycles have been observed at all levels of government, to the best of my knowledge there
has been no overarching theory as to why these magnitudes may be larger for some elections rather than others. I discuss
this more in the conclusion chapter.
12Of course, budget cycles and alternatives to such cycles are not mutually exclusive. Depending on the incumbent’s
competency, any and all methods may be pursued in order to win voter support (Franzese 2002).
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Figure 1.3: Political cycles: A theoretical diagram
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factors which may make certain tools of manipulation more or less effective, or even whether
the incumbent may utilize them at all (e.g., an independent central bank severs the ability of the
incumbent to pursue manipulative monetary policy). A number of factors condition the extent
and the effectiveness of political cycles. This is shown as the “Ability to Manipulate” in Figure
1.3. These may include the level of institutional independence and capacity of institutions. Others
factors include budgetary inertia; an increase in the budget on paper may take some time to trickle
down to voters, or the incumbent may face difficulty making radical changes to the budget.
The last step of the theoretical process is shown on the right-hand side of Figure 1.3. Voters
incorporate the benefits and subtract the costs of political cycles from their valuation function of
the incumbent. Together with prior determinants of incumbent support, such as ideology, personal
and economic evaluations, and affinities, the incumbent is either re-elected or is defeated.
1.3 Plan of the dissertation: Three contributions
As shown by the Google Scholar search in Figure 1.2, there is a huge body of literature on political
cycles. Despite many important contributions from both political science and economics, important
gaps remain. In this dissertation, I address three of the most important gaps. Each chapter is
briefly summarized below. In the conclusion chapter, I briefly summarize the contribution of this
dissertation to the literature on political cycles, and offer several potential areas of interest for future
research.
1.3.1 Seeing the forest through the trees: A meta-analysis of political budget cycles
Despite the unified theory shown in Figure 1.3, the political budget cycle literature contains a
substantial number of conflicting theoretical expectations. For instance, Kneebone and McKenzie
(2001, p. 757) argue that, “capital expenditures are more ‘visible,’ and therefore send a stronger
signal, than many types of current expenditures.” In other words, they expect that incumbents
will shift spending to capital expenditures (e.g., road building or infrastructure construction). This
stands in sharp contrast to Katsimi and Sarantides (2012, p. 757), who argue that current expen-
ditures (ongoing expenditures such as public sector wages) will increase around elections at the
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cost of capital expenditures, “incumbent policymakers may shift public expenditure towards more
‘visible’ current expenditure and away from less ‘visible’ capital expenditure.”
Not only are theoretical expectations different; empirical findings in the literature also contrast
one another. While Brender and Drazen (2005, p. 1292) find that “...results for new democracies are
consistent with the view that voters may ‘reward’ election-year deficit spending, while the findings
for established democracies are consistent with the view that they punish it,” Alt and Lassen (2006b,
p. 530) find instead that established democracies are just as likely to observe political budget cycles,
“...we find that cycles are present in a sample of 19 advanced industrialized OECD economies, all
fully developed and by no means recent democracies.”
To reconcile both theoretical differences and empirical findings seen throughout the literature,
in Chapter 2 I conduct the first meta-analysis of political budget cycles. Collecting estimates of the
political budget cycle effect from 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015 (1198 estimates), I
find that there exists a small, yet statistically significant, relationship between elections and budgets.
Expenditures and debt tend to increase around elections, while revenues and the fiscal surplus
decrease. To investigate how data-, study-, and method-specific differences between articles may
be influencing the effect size in the literature, I conduct a meta-regression analysis using Bayesian
model averaging. Last, I test for, and find evidence of, publication selection (i.e., “publication
bias”) in the literature.
1.3.2 Just in time: Political policy cycles of land reform
While the political budget cycle literature focuses on the manipulation of existing budgetary poli-
cies, a small number of other articles focus on non-budgetary tools that contain a cyclical compo-
nent around elections (c.f., DeRouen and Heo 2000; Mechtel and Potrafke 2013; Ahlquist 2010;
Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009), as shown in Figure 1.3 under “Budget Cycle Alternatives”. How-
ever, even among these articles, an analysis of the impact of the passage of redistributive policies
themselves remains absent.
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In Chapter 3, I contend that policy passage is a strategically timed signal to voters used before
elections to benefit the incumbent. Using aggregate data on land reforms passed by 15 states in
India from 1957 to 1992, I find that reforms are indeed timed before elections. Second, using
historical survey data, I show that land issues remain a strong signal to Indian voters over time,
even in states that have already enacted reforms. These findings provide further evidence for budget
cycle alternatives.
1.3.3 Strongholds or islands? Spatio-temporal opportunism and intergovernmental trans-
fers
Third, while time has been adequately addressed, space has been completely absent from theo-
ries of political cycles. Moreover, the literature on political opportunism has tended to focus on
single electoral units in isolation. If an incumbent can strategically time manipulations, can they
strategically place them too?
In Chapter 4 I use innovations in spatial econometrics to incorporate theories in distributive
politics into the political budget cycle literature. I show that models that incorporate the sur-
rounding spatial units are a better reflection of how incumbents place intergovernmental transfers.
Using municipal-level data from Brazil, I find that incumbents tend to reward supporter munici-
palities surrounded by regions of low support (“islands”) rather than core regions of heavy support
(“strongholds”). I also find that this strategy changes during municipal and presidential elections
towards a more broad-based redistributive scheme. This chapter has implications for the litera-
ture on political opportunism and budget cycles, since it suggests the need to take into account the
spatial context when examining these cycles at sub-national levels of government.
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2. SEEING THE FOREST THROUGH THE TREES: A META-ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
BUDGET CYCLES
2.1 Introduction
Do incumbents alter budgets before elections in order to secure the support of voters? Known
as political budget cycles, research on this question has become a well-established literature in
political economy. As of May 2016, a Google Scholar search for “political budget cycle” yields
over 1000 results. Despite this large volume of studies, the theoretical underpinnings, empirical
findings, and literature reviews of many articles often are at odds with one another. While some
scholars have found substantial evidence that governments tend to increase expenditures around
elections (Brender and Drazen 2005; Veiga 2012), others have found little to no such evidence
(Vergne 2009; Katsimi and Sarantides 2012; Enkelmann and Leibrecht 2013). Although various
fiscal instruments have been analyzed by scholars—such as expenditures, revenues, fiscal balance,
and public-sector debt—no theory establishes why incumbents might prefer one over the other.
More disconcerting, well-argued theories often lead to opposing empirical expectations. For in-
stance, while some scholars theorize that governments increase current transfers during elections
at the cost of capital expenditures (Kneebone and McKenzie 2001; Gonzalez 2002; Vergne 2009),
others argue that capital expenditures (commonly road or building construction) are more likely
than current spending to increase before an election (Schuknecht 2000; Khemani 2004; Drazen
and Eslava 2010b). All of this begs the question: what do we know about political budget cycles,
and how can we reconcile such a large body of literature?
To address this question I use a meta-analysis to conduct the first comprehensive overview
of political budget cycle studies. This approach is gaining popularity in economics and politi-
cal science, having been used to study the relationship between democracy and economic growth,
(Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu 2008), oil and democracy (Ahmadov 2014), the factors that influ-
Reprinted with permission from “Seeing the forest through the trees: A meta-analysis of political budget cycles” by
Philips, Andrew Q., 2016. Public Choice, 168(3-4):313-341, Copyright 2016 by Springer
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ence voter turnout (Smets and Van Ham 2013), and partisan effects on spending (Imbeau, Pe´try
and Lamari 2001). Surprisingly, no quantitative meta-analysis has studied the relationship between
elections and fiscal policies. By treating a regression coefficient from each model in each arti-
cle as a single observation, this research design offers an ideal way of synthesizing all available
information on political budget cycles.
This chapter is motivated by the contexts that make political budget cycles more or less likely
to occur. The broad notion that context matters is not new (Franzese 2002; Alt and Rose 2009;
Dubois 2016). For instance, countries may have political budget cycles of greater frequency and
larger amplitude if they are new democracies (Barberia and Avelino 2011), have less transparent
fiscal policies (Alt and Lassen 2006a), or lack balanced-budget requirements (Rose 2006). How-
ever, attributing how changes in context affect the evidence for political budget cycles is difficult,
given that empirical tests are conducted using different data sources, levels of aggregation, and
econometric methods. Meta-regression analysis can account for these differences, thus giving us a
cleaner assessment as to whether—and in what contexts—political budget cycles exist.
The meta-analytic approach is subject to two common critiques: a meta-analysis combines
studies of varying quality, and it compares studies that are fundamentally incomparable owing to
study-specific differences (e.g., methodology, data, controls). The first critique is easily addressed
by weighting the studies by a measure of “quality”, such as the impact factor of the journal in
which the article was published, or by the number of citations it has received. The second critique
is handled by accounting for any differences between studies that might explain variation in the
sizes of estimated effects in a meta-regression analysis. Although excellent qualitative reviews ex-
ist (Franzese 2002; De Haan and Klomp 2013; Dubois 2016), by considering all empirical results
published from 2000 to 2015, and by quantifying and controlling for observable differences be-
tween them, this chapter is more systematic and takes into account more studies than is possible
with a single literature review.
Using 1198 estimates from 88 studies, I find evidence that fiscal expenditures and government
borrowings increase around elections, while revenues and fiscal balance decline. Although the
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magnitude of this effect is small, it remains robust to publication bias, which I find evidence of
throughout the literature. I also test empirically how certain contexts may be influencing the results
by accounting for data- and methodological-specific differences between studies. I find that a
number of factors appear to be driving the differences in estimated effects, among them how the
election is coded, whether elections are pre-determined, and if dynamics are addressed. After
controlling for other confounders, I find evidence that a number of important factors influence the
size of the political budget cycle effect, among them democracy and development. In contrast,
others—such as electoral competition and ideology—do not. I also test for and find evidence of
publication bias. A statistically significant political budget cycle remains even after accounting for
this bias.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. I first review the literature on political budget
cycles. Next I discuss the research design and data collection. I then present calculated effect
sizes across a variety of budgetary categories and sub-categories. Next I examine differences in the
magnitudes of the political budget cycles by applying a meta-regression analysis. Finally, I discuss
publication bias and conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.
2.2 Political budget cycles: A review
Political budget cycles developed out of the literature on opportunistic fiscal policies. According
to this theory, politicians take advantage of the Phillips curve, or the negative relationship between
inflation and unemployment (Nordhaus 1975). Early works posited that an incumbent will reduce
unemployment rates before an election to appeal to voters, only to endure the impending rise in
inflation after the election. Hibbs (1977) adapted this conjecture by theorizing how an incumbent
may spend based on partisan preferences, thus explaining why left-leaning governments favor low
unemployment, while right-leaning governments show concern about the growth rate of the money
supply. After the paradigm shift towards rational expectations in political business cycles, a new
wave of scholars began to focus on the short-run changes in fiscal expenditures around elections—
the theory being that these are used to deceive voters into believing that the economy is doing better
than it actually is (Rogoff 1990; Persson and Tabellini 1990; Alesina and Roubini 1992). Out of
17
this came two distinct literatures. One centered on budget cycles that governments create around
elections. For the other, scholars of political business cycles focused on public-sector spending as
well as monetary policy and growth. Since then, three broad trends have emerged in the literature
on political budget cycles.
The first expanded the unit of analysis. While early studies tested theories in the United States
or Western European democracies (Schultz 1995), the literature has moved on recently to devel-
oping countries, such as Brazil (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011), Indonesia (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos
and Schulze 2013), or India (Sa´ez and Sinha 2010). Combinations of developed and developing
countries have been studied in order to examine how other factors, such as the level of democracy
and governmental transparency, affect political budget cycles (Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and
Svensson 2006; Klomp and De Haan 2013b), with the broad consensus being that countries with
low levels of development, democracy and transparency tend to show more evidence of political
budget cycles. Scholars also have begun to focus on elections held at intermediate (Galli and Rossi
2002; Khemani 2004) and local levels of government (Drazen and Eslava 2010b; Veiga 2012; Aidt
and Mooney 2014), although no theoretical argument has been advanced as to why such cycles
may be stronger or weaker at different levels of government.
Second, scholars have theorized about contextual conditions in which political budget cycles
may be more or less likely to occur (De Haan and Klomp 2013; Dubois 2016). For instance, fis-
cal transparency (Alt and Lassen 2006b), international oversight (Hyde and O’Mahony 2010), and
fiscal stability rules (Rose 2006; Streb and Torrens 2013) may moderate budget deficits around
elections. Poor economic conditions may make cycles more likely (Schultz 1995), as may elec-
tion dates that are fixed (i.e., predetermined) rather than called “early” so that incumbents can take
advantage of good economic news (Shi and Svensson 2006). These analyses contribute to the het-
erogeneous findings found in the literature. Thus, while the theoretical underpinnings of political
budget cycles have become richer, comparing studies has become more difficult.
Third, the fiscal variable under analysis has become ever more disaggregated over time. Studies
look at multiple budgetary instruments, such as revenues, expenditures, or debt (e.g., Rose 2006;
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Gonzalez 2002). Although highly aggregated fiscal categories, such as deficits or total expendi-
tures, rise as elections draw near (Alt and Lassen 2006b), scholars now argue that disaggregated
expenditures are more likely to be manipulated, since it is easier to allocate budgetary resources
to a single spending category than to revise the entire public budget. Moreover, particular budget
categories may be more visible to voters. For instance, infrastructure spending (Aidt, Veiga and
Veiga 2011) and administrative expenditures (Enkelmann and Leibrecht 2013) have been shown to
increase around elections.
How have these three shifts in the literature affected the evidence on political budget cycles? As
analyses becomemore diverse in terms of their data, methodological, and theoretical sophistication,
it becomes more difficult to explain why results differ across studies. This should not be seen
as a disadvantage, since theories of political budget cycles are richer than ever, and tested in a
growing number of countries and contexts. However, it makes comparisons between studies more
problematic. Moreover, study-specific differences make it hard to identify the potential causes of
changes in political budget cycle effects across studies. A meta-analysis addresses these challenges
in two ways. First, it can establish whether an effect exists and, if so, whether it differs across
contexts. Second, it allows us to parse out which specific data-, study- and methodology-specific
choices influence the findings.
2.3 Research design
To conduct a meta-analysis, I first created a specific set of criteria that had to be met for a study
to be included in the current study.1 First, a search using the terms “political budget cycle” and
“political business cycle” was conducted, using both Web of Science and Google Scholar, on arti-
cles published from 2000 to 2015. Next, study titles, abstracts, and keywords were screened. For a
study to proceed past that stage, it had to mention either political budget cycles or discuss a theoret-
ical relationship between elections and a fiscal outcome. For instance, “the prevalence of electoral
cycles in fiscal balance,” in the abstract of Alt and Lassen (2006b, p. 530) made it eligible for in-
1Further details are in the appendix to this chapter.
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clusion. In addition, studies had to be published in English in peer-reviewed journals.2 Borderline
cases were included rather than excluded. All told, 232 studies passed the screening stage.
Next, studies that made it beyond the first screening had to meet the following set of eligibility
criteria through a full-text reading. First, articles had to contain an empirical test, ruling out studies
that included exclusively formal models or qualitative overviews of political budget cycles. Second,
articles must have used a fiscal measure as a dependent variable, ruling out studies of monetary
policy. While studies of monetary cycles are important, these dependent variables (typically output,
inflation, and money growth) are too distinct from fiscal cycles to be included in a combined meta-
analysis. Third, since the main variable of interest in studies of political budget cycles is the
election, studies that did not include some form of election variable were dropped. Fourth, I did
not include any studies that exclusively tested an interactive effect between elections and another
covariate, since conditional coefficients are not directly comparable across studies. Instead, the
meta-analysis below offers a way to tease out how important factors affect political budget cycles
indirectly. Finally, an estimate of the size of the effect of elections on budgets had to be reported,
along with an associated measure of statistical precision. A total of 88 studies were eligible for
inclusion in the meta-analysis. Included studies, as well as the full list of excluded studies are
available in the appendix to this chapter.
When conducting a meta-analysis, raw coefficients reported in a study must first be converted
into an associated magnitude in order to make them comparable across studies (Stanley 2001;
Borenstein et al. 2011). One of the most useful metrics of standardized effects are partial correlation
coefficients:
ei j =
vuut t2i j
(t2i j+d fi j)
(2.1)
where ei j is the partial correlation coefficient of study i and model j, t2i j is the squared t-statistic
from the regression, and d fi j represents the degrees of freedom (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).3
Since this calculation creates a positive ei j by construction, it must be converted into a negative
2As have others (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu 2008), I did not include unpublished results. I address potential
publication bias in the appendix to this chapter.
3Standard errors and p-values were converted into t-statistics if they were reported.
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correlation if the t-statistic carried that sign, thus bounding ei j between -1 and 1. Alternatives
to calculating partial correlations exist, such as “vote-counting” (a tabulation of significant and
non-significant results), meta-probit analysis (Smets and Van Ham 2013), or a “success-rate” of
hypothesized directions (Imbeau, Pe´try and Lamari 2001). However, partial correlations are prefer-
able since this technique accounts for the sampling error of the estimated effect by adding weights,
as shown below (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).
The standard error of the partial correlation is given as
SEi j =
s
1  ei j
d fi j
(2.2)
Its inverse is used as a measure of estimate precision.
After obtaining partial correlations for each study, the total size of the political budget cycle
effect can be obtained as follows:
e = å
(Ni jei j)
åNi j
(2.3)
where the size of the total effect, e , is given by the sum of the partial correlations calculated
in Equation 2.1 multiplied by an assigned weight Ni j for each study, divided by the sum of the
weights, Ni j. A number of weights can be assigned in Equation 2.3. Keeping with the dominant
trend in economics and political science (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu 2008; Ahmadov 2014),
I let Ni j be the number of observations, although the results remain robust to two other forms of
weighting—such as the number of an article’s citations, the journal’s impact factor, and the inverse
of the standard error of the partial correlation.4
2.4 Results
To summarize the results of the partial correlations visually, I use funnel plots, shown in Figure
2.1. The calculated sizes of the 1198 models’ partial correlations are shown on the the vertical
4These results are available in the appendix to this chapter.
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axis, while the precision of the partial correlation (inverse of the standard error) is on the horizontal
axis. I disaggregate the calculated partial correlations into four distinct groups:
 Expenditures are the most often-studied dependent variable, and constitute the largest cate-
gory in the sample (699 of the 1198 study observations).
 Revenues are another important category in the literature, comprising 243 of the 1198 total
observations. Evidence suggests that revenues tend to decline around elections (Barberia and
Avelino 2011; Katsimi and Sarantides 2012; Aidt and Mooney 2014).
 Fiscal balances (revenues minus expenditures) show the net effect of elections on budgets,
and are not directly comparable to either expenditures or revenues. Out of the 1198 observa-
tions coded for this analysis, 234 were of fiscal balance.5
 Last, debt is a rarely studied (only 22 out of 1198 observations) dependent variable that is
distinct from the other categories.
As shown in Figure 2.1, expenditures tend to be above the horizontal dashed line. Since the
calculated partial correlation is positive with an average of around 0.05, this indicates that expendi-
tures tend to increase in the election year. Although the effect lies in the expected positive direction,
it is not large; Cohen (2013) suggests that a standardized effect is small if less than 0.10, moderate
if it is around 0.25, and large if greater than 0.40. With an average partial correlation of 0.01, the
same appears to be true for debt, although with only 22 observations the evidence is much less
conclusive. In contrast to these two categories, revenues always tend to have negative calculated
partial correlations, with an average of -0.05. This suggests—in line with the literature—that rev-
enues fall in an election year. The fiscal balance category shows a similar effect; calculated partial
correlations tend always to be negative, indicating that deficit spending increases in election years.
In fact, the average partial correlation for fiscal balance is -0.11, about double the magnitude of the
other types of dependent variables.
5I recoded studies that examined deficit spending as their dependent variable, so that a positive partial correlation
indicates an increase in fiscal surplus for all models.
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Figure 2.1: Funnel plots of the four budgetary categories
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2.5 Disaggregation and measures of uncertainty
Based on Figure 2.1, expenditures and public debt appear to increase during an election year, and
revenues and fiscal surpluses to decline. However, these are simple averages and do not take into
account the precision associated with each calculated partial correlation. To examine this further,
I plot calculations of magnitude in Figure 2.2, along with 95% confidence intervals. Recall from
Equation 2.3 that the size of an estimated effect, e , is the sum of each partial correlation multiplied
by an assigned weight (such as the number of observations), divided by the sum of the weights.
Confidence intervals are calculated four ways. The first is an estimate of the unweighted effect—
analogous to an unweighted average effect. Since the other three confidence intervals weight by
the number of observations, the sizes of their effects are identical. However, the estimated effects
differ in terms of how the error term is modeled. Confidence intervals calculated using random
effects model the error as a function of a purely stochastic component, ui j, as well as a study-
specific residual, v j. In contrast, fixed effects do not allow for study-specific errors. The random
effects model is almost always preferable to the fixed effects model since the latter is inappropriate
if unexplainable heterogeneity remains in the true effect size; this is common in nearly all social
science applications (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).6 The final confidence interval calculation
comes from Hunter and Schmidt (2004) and estimates the “heterogeneity variance by calculating
the difference between the total variance of the effect estimates and an average of the estimated
within-study variances” (Sa´nchez-Meca and Marı´n-Martı´nez 2008, p. 35).
As shown in Figure 2.2, even after accounting for sampling error using random effects, fixed
effects, or Hunter-Schmidt confidence intervals, a political budget cycle exists that is statistically
significantly different from zero for all four types of dependent variable. The sizes of the effects
of expenditures and debt are nearly identical, positive (albeit small), and around 0.05. This means
that, taken as a whole, the literature finds statistically significant evidence that expenditures and
debt increase in an election year. In contrast, scholars who have examined revenues and fiscal
6In fact, fixed effects often overstate our confidence in the coverage probability of the true effect (Sa´nchez-Meca and
Marı´n-Martı´nez 2008; Borenstein et al. 2011). This is formally tested through the Q-test; I was able to reject the null
hypothesis of no heterogeneity.
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Figure 2.2: The political budget cycle effect across four major categories
Fiscal Surplus (234)
Revenues (243)
Debt (22)
Expenditures (699)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: Study-model observations in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals reported.
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surplus tend to find a statistically significant negative relationship. Moreover, the magnitude of this
effect appears to be about twice as large for fiscal surpluses as it is for revenues.
While Figure 2.2 showed evidence of a political budget cycle across the four broad categories
of dependent variables, are certain types of expenditures and revenues more likely to be manipu-
lated around elections? Much of the literature has focused on how the pre-election composition of
spending may change (Vergne 2009; De Haan and Klomp 2013; Klomp and De Haan 2013a). For
instance, visible budget items that appeal to a broad range of voters, such as social welfare policy
(Chang 2008), may be more likely to increase prior to Election Day than a more narrow budget
category like administrative expenditures. For revenues, tax breaks may be targeted to certain key
voter constituencies (Khemani 2004).
To investigate whether certain budgetary categories may be driving the sizes of the effects
reported above, I disaggregate the calculated effect sizes further, as other meta-analyses have done
(Lau, Sigelman and Rovner 2007). I divide the 243 revenue-study observations into three of the
largest categories, and the 699 observations for expenditures into seven categories.7 The results
for revenue are shown in Figure 2.3. The overall effect of all 243 revenue observations is shown
for reference at the top. I disaggregated revenues into studies that modeled total revenues, those
that explicitly modeled tax revenues, and those that modeled “other” types of revenues (mostly
non-tax sources). It is clear from Figure 2.3 that studies of total revenue tend to have the largest
negative relationship with elections. Tax revenues, such as those on income and property, have an
estimated effect size of -0.03, while those for other revenue sources are not statistically significantly
different from zero. Taken together, this evidence suggests that total revenues and tax revenues tend
to decline the most around elections. Non-tax revenues do not appear to be manipulated around
Election Day.
In Figure 2.4, I show the size of the overall effect for expenditures as well as the seven largest
sub-categories: inter-governmental grants, total expenditures, administrative expenditures, edu-
cation and health expenditures, capital expenditures, other, and current expenditures. As with
7A detailed breakdown of these categories is in the appendix to this chapter.
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Figure 2.3: The political budget cycle effect: Revenue disaggregation
Other Revenue (19)
Tax Revenue (160)
Total Revenue (64)
Overall (243)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: Study-model observations in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals reported.
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revenues, substantial differences are evident in the political budget cycle effect, depending on the
fiscal variable considered. The strongest evidence of an effect in Figure 2.4 appears to be for inter-
governmental grants. For instance, Veiga (2012) reports evidence that grants from the European
Union to Portuguese municipalities tend to increase during election years. John and Ward (2001)
find that central government grants to UK local authorities increase in election years, and Padovano
(2012) finds a similar effect for Italian regions. Overall, the estimated effects of intergovernmental
grants are more than double the overall effect. For studies that use total expenditures as a dependent
variable, the effect is slightly larger than the overall effect, although some overlap is evident after
accounting for sampling error.
The last five categories presented towards the bottom of Figure 2.4 include some of the most
disaggregated components of spending that have been studied in the literature. In fact, theories
about “visible” expenditures suggest that capital and current expenditures are some of the most
likely budget categories to be manipulated. This makes the finding that these fiscal categories have
some of the weakest evidence for a political budget cycle effect notable. The findings here may be
explained best by the conflicting state of the literature. Some authors find that capital expenditures,
which typically create some form of asset in a one-time event, tend to increase before elections
(Schuknecht 2000; Khemani 2004; Drazen and Eslava 2010b). In contrast, others find that current
expenditures, which involve ongoing payments, such as salaries or subsidies, are more susceptible
(Kneebone and McKenzie 2001; Gonzalez 2002; Katsimi and Sarantides 2012). Such inconclusive
results are clear in this analysis as well. Neither category tends to be statistically significantly
different from zero once sampling error is accounted for, though the effect for capital expenditures
is slightly larger. Thus, it appears that neither category is consistently manipulated as a more visible
form of spending.
Administrative expenditures also have an effect that tends to overlap zero. Such uncertainty is
apparent in the literature; examining administrative expenditures, Drazen and Eslava (2010b) find
a positive effect, Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013) find virtually no effect, while Aidt and Mooney
(2014) find a negative effect. For models that focus on education and health spending, a small,
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Figure 2.4: The political budget cycle effect: Expenditure disaggregation
Current Expenditure (130)
Other (96)
Capital Expenditure (171)
Health/Education (52)
Administrative (55)
Total Expenditures (123)
Inter-Govt. Grants (72)
Overall (699)
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Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: Study-model observations in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals reported.
29
insignificant effect is evident. Since these two expenditures are often viewed as likely targets for
fiscal manipulation, this finding is particularly interesting. The last calculated effect in Figure 2.4
is an “Other” category, which consists of fiscal variables, such as spending on agriculture, media,
and defense. As with the other disaggregated categories, little evidence of a significant political
budget cycle effect can be found.
2.6 Explaining context through meta-regression
The previous section reported clear evidence of a political budget cycle for fiscal surplus, expen-
ditures, revenue, and debt. While calculating the effect of the partial correlation adds a measure
of uncertainty to our estimates, it does not inform us as to how much a particular data-specific
or methodological choice alters the magnitude of the budget cycle. Moreover, although calcu-
lated effects appear to vary greatly across the various disaggregations explored above, the findings
did not account for the possibility that other confounding variables may be explaining some of
these differences. To examine this I turn to meta-regression analysis (MRA). This approach at-
tempts to explain between-study variance by regressing the partial correlation of model j of study
i on so-called “moderator variables”—data characteristics, methodological choices, and author- or
paper-specific characteristics:
ei j = f ( f iscal variables; data characteristics; author=study characteristics;
methodology; election variables; moderating variables)
(2.4)
The regressors in Equation 2.4 can identify important contextual conditions in the literature
(Stanley 2001). A significant positive (negative) coefficient indicates that the presence of the mod-
erator variable tends to increase (reduce) the partial correlation, ei j, all else equal. While MRAs
cannot identify the magnitude of the effect that a larger or smaller moderator variable has on the
partial correlation, it does inform us as to the relative importance of the variable on the size of the
effect reported in the literature. Statistical (and substantive) significance of a moderator variable
suggests that it should be included in future studies of political budget cycles, since it appears to
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condition the relationship between elections and budgets. For variables measuring the character-
istics of the model, study, or data, statistical significance in the MRA suggests that an analysis
with that particular moderator variable is a relative outlier and should be generalized to the broader
population with caution.
One drawback to MRAs is that considerable disagreement exists on which moderator variables
to include. Multicollinearity and few degrees of freedom can be problematic, just as with standard
regressions. Because of this, I am able to analyze only the three most important dependent variable
categories: fiscal balance, expenditures, and revenues.8 In addition to the different categories of
the dependent variables analyzed in the previous section, I identified and coded 40 other candidate
covariates that may contribute to differences among partial correlations. These are shown in Table
2.1, along with means, standard deviations, and a brief description.
Table 2.1: Candidate covariates that may explain differences in partial correlations
Variable Variable description Mean Std. dev.
Expenditure variables
Total expenditures = 1 if dependent variable is total expenditures 0.10 0.31
Inter-govt. grants = 1 if dependent variable is grants/transfers 0.06 0.24
Capital expenditures = 1 if dependent variable is capital expenditures 0.15 0.35
Current expenditures = 1 if dependent variable is current expenditures 0.11 0.31
Administrative expenditures= 1 if dependent variable is administrative expenditures 0.05 0.21
Education and health exp. = 1 if dependent variable is health/education expenditures 0.04 0.21
Revenue variables
Total revenue = 1 if dependent variable is total revenue 0.05 0.23
Tax revenue = 1 if dependent variable is tax revenue 0.14 0.34
Data characteristics
Standard error Standard error of the partial correlation 0.05 0.03
OECD = 1 if at least one country is in OECD 0.68 0.47
Latin America = 1 if at least one country is in Latin America 0.23 0.42
Asia = 1 if at least one country is in Asia 0.17 0.38
Sub-Saharan Africa = 1 if at least one country is in Sub-Saharan Africa 0.09 0.29
E. Europe and Fmr. USSR = 1 if at least one country is in E. Europe and Fmr. USSR 0.14 0.34
Average year Average year in sample 1986.4 16.97
Quarterly aggregation = 1 if temporal aggregation is quarterly 0.06 0.23
Monthly aggregation = 1 if temporal aggregation is monthly 0.02 0.13
Single country = 1 if single-country study 0.46 0.50
Municipal aggregation = 1 if election level is municipal 0.21 0.40
State aggregation = 1 if election level is state/provincial 0.17 0.37
Moderating variables
Democracy = 1 if model controls for democracy (dummy, level, or index) 0.01 0.10
8Debt has only 22 model-study observations and is excluded.
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Table 2.1 Continued
Variable Variable description Mean Std. dev.
Coalition = 1 if model controls for coalition, maj/min government 0.06 0.23
Debt (control) = 1 if model controls for debt level or percent 0.04 0.19
Deficit (control) = 1 if model controls for deficit level or percent 0.03 0.17
Govt. expenditures = 1 if model controls for total government expenditures 0.03 0.17
Govt. revenues = 1 if model controls for total government revenues 0.06 0.24
Transfers (control) = 1 if model controls for inter-governmental transfers 0.07 0.25
GDP = 1 if model controls for output, in levels 0.61 0.49
GDP growth = 1 if model controls for output growth 0.34 0.47
Ideology = 1 if model controls for government ideology (dummy or index) 0.21 0.40
Inflation = 1 if model controls for inflation 0.03 0.18
Presidential = 1 if model controls for presidential systems 0.01 0.12
Proportional = 1 if model controls for PR system 0.03 0.16
Unemployment = 1 if model controls for unemployment 0.12 0.32
Win margin = 1 if model controls for margin of victory of past election 0.14 0.35
Methodology
Unit fixed-effects = 1 if model has unit/regional fixed effects 0.59 0.49
Lagged dep. var. = 1 if model includes lagged dependent variable/GMM 0.80 0.40
OLS PCSE GLS = 1 if model uses OLS, panel-corrected std. errors or GLS 0.14 0.35
Election variables
Election dummy = 1 if model uses simple dummy 0.57 0.50
Elec. half-yr = 1 if model uses dummy with May-June cutoff 0.09 0.29
Franzese = 1 if model uses Franzese (2000) method 0.17 0.37
Election pre-determined = 1 if election variable is for fixed elections 0.13 0.34
Election early = 1 if election variable is for elections called early 0.12 0.32
Electiont+1 = 1 if model includes period after election 0.10 0.30
Electiont 1 = 1 if model includes period before election 0.19 0.40
Study characteristics
Total models Total number of models per study 79.12 94.48
Cites per year Average article citations per year 3.00 3.48
Impact factor Journal’s impact factor (2013) 1.11 0.84
Notes: N = 1176 for 79 studies. Debt is excluded due to lack of observations.
Based on the earlier findings as well as the previous literature, I expect a number of covariates to
be particularly influential. Since there was substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects across the
seven expenditure categories and three revenue categories, these are each included as dichotomous
variables, with “other expenditures” and “other revenues” as the omitted category for each analysis.
A number of data characteristics also may influence the results. The standard error of the calculated
partial correlations is included to proxy for estimation precision (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012).
I also include regional dummies since some regions may be more susceptible to political budget
cycles than others, as cross-national analyses of recently democratic countries in Latin America
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(Barberia and Avelino 2011), and elsewhere (Brender and Drazen 2005) have shown. In addition,
since the estimated effect could be influenced by temporal aggregation and the governing level
at which elections were held, these, too, are entered. While previous authors have investigated
how temporal aggregation may affect the likelihood of observing political budget cycles within
a single dataset (Streb, Lema and Garofalo 2012; Klomp and De Haan 2013b), a MRA offers a
more comprehensive approach as to how aggregation may influence the sizes and significances of
political budget cycles.
I include 15 moderating variables that may condition political budget cycles. Each variable is
a dichotomous indicator equal to one if the study in question included that variable. When entered
into a MRA, a significant coefficient suggests that this variable may have an important conditional
relationship with political budget cycles. Democracy is added with the expectation that including
democracy in a regression will reduce the sizes of the partial correlations. Coalition governments
are controlled for since they may affect political budget cycles (Hanusch 2012a). A variety of fiscal
controls, such as debt and expenditures, are entered since they are common in most analyses of the
political budget cycle phenomenon. I control for whether economic conditions, such as GDP and
unemployment, are held constant. I also include variables for presidential and proportional systems
in addition to the win margin of the victorious candidate or party.
A variety of dichotomous variables are entered to account for the methodology used in the
analysis. I include a dichotomous variable equal to one if the model contained unit fixed-effects.
I also include a variable controlling for whether or not a lagged dependent variable was entered in
the model, as well as if a simple OLS or a GLS model was estimated.
Since the election indicator is the key independent variable of interest, I explore how differences
in coding affect political budget cycles. Three variables account for the most common types seen in
the literature. The first, Election dummy, takes on a value of one if the election variable also takes
on a value of one in the election period. Elec. half-yr. accounts for studies that establish a half-year
cutoff for which the dummy variable equals one in the year of the election if it is held after May
or June, or equals one in the year before the election if the election is held prior to May or June.
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Last, some studies adopt the technique attributed to Franzese (2000), which enters a variable equal
to M12 in the election year (where M equals the month of the election), and 1  M12 in the year before
the election, thus weighting the election-year indicator based on the month in which the election is
held. I also account for whether the study controlled for the period before an election, Electiont 1,
as well as the period after the election, Electiont+1.
MRAs can also control for a variety of study characteristics that may proxy quality. To inves-
tigate how this may affect the size of the partial correlations, I include the total number of models
in a given study, the average number of citations per year an article has received, and the 2013
impact factor of the journal in which the article was published. I expect that, especially if any form
of publication bias exists, studies with more citations or published in journals with high impact
factors will have stronger evidence for political budget cycles.
2.7 Results
Results from the MRA for expenditures are shown in Table 2.2. Model 1 uses the random-effects
specification described earlier by regressing the calculated partial correlations on the list of charac-
teristics that could be influencing the estimated political budget cycle effect. Model 2 assumes no
between-study variance using the fixed-effects specification, so its large proportion of statistically
significant results should be interpreted with caution. Both Models 1 and 2 are weighted by the
number of study observations. In addition to a frequentist approach, Model 3 uses a data-driven
approach to see which moderator variables are important for explaining differences in the partial
correlations through Bayesian model averaging (BMA). This strategy has been used in previous
meta-analyses (Irsˇova´ and Havra´nek 2013; Moeltner and Woodward 2009), and is useful for a
number of reasons. First, it can be used to find the model that explains more variation than all oth-
ers the algorithm covers. Second, we obtain posterior inclusion probabilities for each covariate—or
the likelihood that a given variable enters the final model. By convention, variables with posterior
inclusion probabilities exceeding 0.10 are deemed important; these are shown in italics in Model
3. Third, the resulting model produces a posterior mean and standard deviation, which are analo-
gous to a coefficient and standard error in a frequentist model. Finally, by searching for the model
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that maximizes explained variance by including or excluding candidate covariates, BMA offers an
ideal tradeoff between a parsimonious (yet potentially underspecified) model, and one that—by
including all covariates—is as comprehensive as possible, yet potentially over-saturated and full
of extraneous variables (Aguinis, Gottfredson and Wright 2011). Model 3 is estimated using a
Markov chain Monte Carlo approach to select candidate models using the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm (Feldkircher and Zeugner 2009).9 Last, Model 4 re-estimates a random-effects model
using only variables that had posterior inclusion probabilities of 0.10 or larger in Model 3.
Table 2.2: Explaining differences in partial correlations of expenditures
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
RE FE BMA RE
Data characteristics
Standard error -3.372 (1.060) -3.372 (0.396) 1.100 (0.077) 0.668 (0.392)
OECD 0.811 (0.378) 0.811 (0.140) 0.002 (0.008)
Latin America 0.011 (0.034) 0.011 (0.010) 0.001 (0.008)
Asia -0.015 (0.031) -0.015 (0.009) -0.021 (0.031) -0.012 (0.022)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.001 (0.041) -0.001 (0.012) 0.038 (0.048)
E. Europe and Fmr. USSR 0.061 (0.043) 0.061 (0.017) -0.002 (0.009) 0.022 (0.029)
Average year -0.051 (0.021) -0.051 (0.009) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.0004)
Quarterly aggregation 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.000) 0.001 (0.009)
Monthly aggregation 0.111 (0.060) 0.111 (0.029) 0.001 (0.008)
Single country -0.120 (0.087) -0.120 (0.029) 0.002 (0.008)
Municipal aggregation 0.000 (0.042) 0.000 (0.009) 0.016 (0.022) 0.039 (0.019)
State aggregation 0.052 (0.024) 0.052 (0.005) -0.028 (0.031) 0.057 (0.023)
Moderating variables
Democracy 0.042 (0.029) 0.042 (0.009) 0.014 (0.036) 0.062 (1.466)
Coalition 0.076 (0.072) 0.076 (0.025) 0.002 (0.009)
Debt -0.078 (0.037) -0.078 (0.009) 0.002 (0.010)
Deficits 0.055 (0.033) 0.055 (0.016) 0.001 (0.006)
GDP -0.011 (0.044) -0.011 (0.011) 0.000 (0.002)
GDP growth 0.026 (0.018) 0.026 (0.005) -0.000 (0.002)
Expenditures (control) -0.073 (0.036) -0.073 (0.012) -0.036 (0.039) -0.047 (0.026)
Ideology -0.061 (0.027) -0.061 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)
Inflation 0.052 (0.021) 0.052 (0.005) 0.002 (0.010)
Presidential 0.001 (0.053) 0.001 (0.011) 0.005 (0.020)
Proportional -0.005 (0.059) -0.005 (0.022) -0.000 (0.008)
Revenues (control) 0.022 (0.062) 0.022 (0.021) 0.079 (0.026) 0.030 (0.022)
Transfers (control) 0.035 (0.023) 0.035 (0.006) 0.008 (0.019) 0.037 (0.021)
Unemployment 0.017 (0.033) 0.017 (0.006) 0.038 (0.024) 0.026 (0.015)
Win margin 0.001 (0.022) 0.001 (0.008) 0.000 (0.004)
9There are two important priors to specify. The first is how many variables should be included in the “true” model.
Since I have no prior expectation as to how many variables should be included, I chose a diffuse beta-binomial model
prior (Ley and Steel 2009). The second set of priors concern the coefficients. I chose uninformed coefficient priors
(Fernandez, Ley and Steel 2001), although the findings remain robust to alternative priors, as detailed in the appendix to
this chapter.
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Table 2.2 Continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
RE FE BMA RE
Methodology
Unit fixed-effects 0.028 (0.027) 0.028 (0.008) -0.000 (0.003)
Lagged dep. var. -0.036 (0.049) -0.036 (0.005) -0.094 (0.016) -0.0108 (0.026)
OLS PCSE GLS -0.015 (0.022) -0.015 (0.006) 0.013 (0.022) 0.001 (0.022)
Election variables
Election dummy -0.050 (0.055) -0.050 (0.008) -0.010 (0.018) -0.026 (0.019)
Franzese -0.031 (0.027) -0.031 (0.010) 0.000 (0.002)
Elec. half-yr 0.042 (0.028) 0.042 (0.010) 0.005 (0.015) 0.010 (0.425)
Election pre-determined -0.067 (0.047) -0.067 (0.015) -0.008 (0.017) -0.031 (0.015)
Election early -0.029 (0.025) -0.029 (0.010) 0.000 (0.004)
Electiont+1 0.008 (0.025) 0.008 (0.010) 0.010 (0.022) 0.040 (0.027)
Electiont 1 0.104 (0.033) 0.104 (0.012) -0.000 (0.002)
Study characteristics
Total models -0.031 (0.023) -0.031 (0.005) -0.000 (0.000)
Cites per year 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003)
Impact factor 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.001) 0.006 (0.010) -0.028 (0.010)
Expenditure variables
Administrative expenditures -0.003 (0.017) -0.003 (0.006) -0.000 (0.003)
Capital expenditures 0.015 (0.026) 0.015 (0.005) -0.000 (0.002)
Current expenditures -0.020 (0.027) -0.020 (0.005) 0.002 (0.008)
Inter-govt. grants -0.028 (0.028) -0.028 (0.005) -0.077 (0.022) 0.112 (0.024)
Education and health exp. 0.068 (0.032) 0.068 (0.008) 0.000 (0.002)
Total expenditures -0.005 (0.028) -0.005 (0.006) 0.016 (0.020) 0.034 (0.027)
Constant 0.016 (0.031) 0.016 (0.005) -1.209 (0.790)
R2 0.32 0.30
I2 0.88 0.89
Notes: Dependent variable is the partial correlation of study-model i j. Coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses for Models 1, 2, and 4. Posterior means with posterior standard deviations in parentheses
for Model 3. * p< 0:10, ** p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01 for frequentist models. Estimates in italics in
Model 3 indicate a posterior inclusion probability greater than 0.10. 699 model-study observations for
61 studies for all models, with a total sample size of 1,027,186.
2.7.1 Data characteristics
In a MRA, characteristics of the data often influence the sizes of the partial correlations. The
variable that accounts for the standard error of the partial correlation has a large negative effect in
Models 1 and 2 and a somewhat smaller positive effect in Models 3 and 4. These mixed yet strong
effects are not surprising given that the funnel plot in Figure 2.1 suggested that estimates with less
precision (larger standard errors) tend to produce large positive or negative partial correlations.
In other words, studies with less precision find evidence of a substantial political budget cycle
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effect, but they also are likely to report evidence that expenditures decline around elections. With
the exception of the OECD, the five regional dummies generally reveal no statistically significant
effects on the partial correlation. This OECD finding is surprising; after controlling for other
factors, a substantial relationship exists between elections and expenditures in OECD countries.
The same is true for studies examining countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
though the effect is smaller. In contrast, Asian countries appear to be less susceptible to political
budget cycles. The average year covered by the sample appears to have some influence on the
partial correlation, though this effect is negative in Models 1 and 2 and positive and near-zero in
Models 3 and 4.
Characteristics relating to the temporal aggregation and level of analysis also appear to affect
the sizes of political budget cycles. Relative to studies using annual data, those using quarterly and
monthly observations tend to find more positive partial correlations, all else equal. This suggests
that temporally disaggregated data are better at detecting political budget cycles. Studies of one
country only appear to produce results similar to studies examining multiple countries. In contrast,
the level of government at which an election is held appears to be driving some of the differences in
partial correlations; studies of municipal elections are positive (albeit near-zero for Models 1 and
2) across all models. Studies at the state or provincial level find even stronger political budget cycle
effects, with the positive coefficient remaining robust across all estimates except Model 3. All of
this evidence suggests that sub-national political budget cycles tend to be stronger than national
ones.
2.7.2 Moderating variables
The significance of some of the moderating variables in Table 2.2 suggests that important con-
ditional relationships may play a role in political budget cycles. The consolidation and duration
of democracy has been theorized to lead to smaller political budget cycles (Brender and Drazen
2005; Barberia and Avelino 2011; De Haan and Klomp 2013). Table 2.2 supports this; studies that
control for the effects of democracy tend to have a larger partial correlation, all else equal. Thus,
democracy appears to be an important factor that explains the relationship between elections and
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expenditures. Controlling for coalitions does not have a statistically significant effect, which sug-
gests that coalitions and non-coalitions are equally likely to create political budget cycles. While
accounting for debt tends to decrease the partial correlations, deficits appear to be unrelated to the
political budget cycle effect. Neither GDP in levels or GDP growth appears to influence the size
of the partial correlations, suggesting that both advanced and developing economies are equally
susceptible to political budget cycles. In contrast, controlling for expenditures appears to be an
important predictor of the size of the partial correlations. Controlling for expenditures leads to
smaller correlations, as does ideology. In contrast, accounting for inflation appears to increase the
size of the partial correlations. Neither presidential or proportional systems, or win margin, appear
to have any moderating effect on political budget cycles. This is consistent with the mixed evidence
on the effect that parliamentary and majoritarian systems have on political budget cycles (Persson
and Tabellini 2005; Streb, Lema and Torrens 2009; Klomp and De Haan 2013b). Last, controlling
for revenues, transfers, and unemployment appears to be important, as evidenced by the positive
coefficients in Table 2.2.
2.7.3 Methodology
The significance of some of the moderating variables in Table 2.2 suggests that important condi-
tional relationships may play important roles in the political budget cycle literature. The consol-
idation and duration of democracy has been theorized to lead to smaller political budget cycles
(Brender and Drazen 2005; Barberia and Avelino 2011; De Haan and Klomp 2013). Table 2.2 sup-
ports this finding; studies that control for the effects of democracy tend to produce a larger partial
correlation, all else equal. Thus, democracy appears to be a key factor in explaining the relation-
ship between elections and public spending. Controlling for coalition goverments does not have
a statistically significant effect, which suggests that coalition and non-coalition governments are
equally likely to create political budget cycles. While accounting for debt tends to reduce the par-
tial correlations, deficits appear to be unrelated to the political budget cycle effect. Neither GDP in
levels nor GDP growth appears to influence the size of the partial correlations, suggesting that both
advanced and developing economies are equally susceptible to political budget cycles. In contrast,
38
controlling for expenditures appears to be an important predictor of the size of the partial correla-
tions. Controlling for expenditures leads to smaller correlations, as does political ideology. On the
other hand, accounting for inflation appears to increase the size of the partial correlations. Neither
presidential nor proportional systems, or win margins, appear to have any moderating effect on
political budget cycles. This is consistent with the mixed evidence on the effect that parliamen-
tary and majoritarian systems have on political budget cycles (Persson and Tabellini 2005; Streb,
Lema and Torrens 2009; Klomp and De Haan 2013b). Last, controlling for revenues, transfers and
unemployment appears to be important, as evidenced by the positive coefficients in Table 2.2.
2.7.4 Election variables
Since many studies investigate robustness by varying the electoral “window” (e.g., Streb, Lema
and Garofalo 2012), or the coding of the election variables, the results in Table 2.2 are of partic-
ular importance. I find evidence that coding the election as a simple dummy variable in the year
of the election tends to lead to smaller partial correlations. In contrast, fine-grained approaches,
such as coding with a half-year cutoff point, tend to lead to larger partial correlations. This result
suggests that, all else equal, political budget cycles may be influenced by how the election timing
is controlled for, although note that the method used by Franzese appears not to affect the size of
the partial correlations. Moreover, the significance of the pre-determined election variable suggests
that differences exist between fixed and non-fixed election dates. This finding is in line with the
large body of literature on how elections are not always exogenous to the public budget process
(Shi and Svensson 2006). Last, pre- and post- election dummy variables often are included in
studies of political budget cycles. I find that studies that enter such control variables tend to find
more positive partial correlations. Accounting for pre- and post-election periods thus seems to be
important in studying electoral effects on public budgets. Taken together, these results suggest that
political budget cycles are sensitive to the coding of elections (more fine-grained indicators are
better at uncovering the underlying effect) as well as varying the electoral window.
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2.7.5 Study characteristics
Study characteristics appear to have only minor effects on political budget cycles. The total number
of models appear to be unrelated to the partial correlations. Both the number of study citations per
year and the journal’s impact factor are positively related to the partial correlations in Models 1, 2,
and 3, although this effect is substantively very small. However, the fact that both variables enter
into Model 4 (i.e., had a high posterior inclusion probability using Bayesian model averaging)
suggests that they are important predictors of the partial correlations.
2.7.6 Fiscal variables
Out of the six fiscal variables in Table 2.2, only intergovernmental grants, education and health
spending, and total expenditures appear to explain differences among the partial correlations. Al-
though nearly all fiscal variables are statistically significant in Model 2, the result should be in-
terpreted with caution, since the large I2 value in Models 1 and 4 suggest that the random-effects
model is preferable because of the large share of variance explained by study heterogeneity. Model
4 indicates that intergovernmental grants are positively associated with the partial correlations, as
are total expenditures, although the latter is not statistically significant. That a highly aggregated
category such as total expenditures produces some of the strongest evidence for political budget
cycles runs contrary to the theoretical arguments about how disaggregated categories of spending
(e.g., administrative, capital, or current expenditures) should be the most likely to reveal a political
budget cycle effect (Vergne 2009; Brender and Drazen 2013).
2.7.7 Revenues
The previous section examined evidence of political budget cycles in public spending in the con-
text of a MRA. Do similar patterns emerge in public revenues? Table 2.3 uses the same estimation
strategy as before, but examines the 243 studies in which revenue was the dependent variable.
Interestingly, neither the impact factor nor the standard error of the partial correlation produced
posterior inclusion probabilities large enough to merit inclusion in Model 8. This result suggests
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that publication bias may be less of a problem for studies that examine revenues rather than expen-
ditures. While temporal aggregation and the level of analysis influence governmental expenditures,
only quarterly aggregation appears to be an important predictor for revenues (albeit not statistically
significant) in Model 8. All else equal, studies using quarterly data tend to find that revenues
increase prior to Election Day. The only regional dummies that reveal a posterior inclusion proba-
bility exceeding 0.10 are studies examining the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Since the coefficient is positive, it appears that both revenues and expenditures increase in
these regions during elections, all else equal.
Unlike expenditures, few moderating variables have significant effects on the partial correla-
tions for revenues. GDP growth is positively signed in Model 8, suggesting that it may be necessary
to include that variable in studies of revenue cycles. Controlling for revenue and unemployment,
both of which have negative signs (i.e., including these variables tends to intensify the decline in
revenues during elections), may also be important. The finding that unemployment matters is sim-
ilar to the findings for expenditures in Table 2.2. Taken together, these results suggest that incum-
bents manipulate budget balances—either by increasing expenditures or reducing revenues—only
when the unemployment rate is high.
The results for the methodology and election variables in Table 2.3 have some similarities and
some differences with respect to the expenditure results. For both, I find that dynamics are particu-
larly important to incorporate into models of political budget cycles by entering a lagged dependent
variable. However, less fine-grained election indicators, such as simple election year dummies, are
associated with more negative partial correlations for both the revenue and expenditure results. For
revenues, the negative coefficient indicates that revenues are reduced more around elections when a
coarse electoral window is defined. Last, in both models of revenues and expenditures, differences
seem to exist between elections that are fixed and those that are called early.
A few study characteristics seem to affect the size of the partial correlations for revenues. Both
the total number of models in a study and the average number of citations received per year largely
are significant across all models, although the magnitude of this effect is small and switches signs
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Table 2.3: Explaining differences in partial correlations of revenues
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
RE FE BMA RE
Data characteristics
Standard error 1.273 (1.065) 1.273 (0.676) -0.004(0.067)
OECD 0.018 (0.041) 0.018 (0.025) -0.000(0.002)
Latin America -0.004 (0.050) -0.004 (0.031) -0.000(0.002)
Asia -0.048 (0.119) -0.048 (0.084) 0.001 (0.008)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.031 (0.146) 0.031 (0.109) 0.003 (0.015)
E. Europe and Fmr. USSR 0.053 (0.084) 0.053 (0.066) 0.010 (0.027) 0.027 (0.039)
Average year 0.003 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Quarterly aggregation 0.194 (0.136) 0.194 (0.089) 0.037 (0.034) 0.074 (0.059)
Monthly aggregation -0.455 (0.325) -0.455 (0.231) 0.001 (0.009)
Single country 0.015 (0.089) 0.015 (0.053) 0.000 (0.006)
Municipal aggregation -0.032 (0.134) -0.032 (0.075) -0.002(0.012)
State aggregation -0.154 (0.137) -0.154 (0.095) -0.001(0.013)
Moderating variables
Coalition 0.048 (0.104) 0.048 (0.082) -0.000(0.006)
Debt 0.040 (0.192) 0.040 (0.148) 0.000 (0.009)
GDP -0.045 (0.028) -0.045 (0.021) -0.000(0.003)
GDP growth -0.165 (0.105) -0.165 (0.078) 0.006 (0.018) 0.056 (0.051)
Expenditures (control) 0.083 (0.073) 0.083 (0.053) -0.000(0.004)
Ideology 0.001 (0.032) 0.001 (0.024) -0.001(0.006)
Revenues (control) -0.445 (0.164) -0.445 (0.119) -0.003(0.021)
Transfers (control) 0.050 (0.072) 0.050 (0.038) 0.001 (0.008)
Unemployment -0.272 (0.124) -0.272 (0.089) -0.001(0.011)
Methodology
Unit fixed-effects 0.014 (0.015) 0.014 (0.011) -0.000(0.002)
Lagged dep. var. -0.067 (0.051) -0.067 (0.031) -0.030(0.034) -0.052 (0.034)
OLS PCSE GLS 0.026 (0.047) 0.026 (0.017) 0.000 (0.003)
Election variables
Election dummy -0.021 (0.049) -0.021 (0.029) -0.015 (0.024) -0.012 (0.019)
Franzese 0.172 (0.085) 0.172 (0.055) 0.001 (0.006)
Election pre-determined -0.023 (0.052) -0.023 (0.031) -0.000(0.004)
Election early 0.013 (0.052) 0.013 (0.031) 0.017 (0.024) 0.039 (0.014)
Electiont+1 0.347 (0.124) 0.347 (0.088) 0.000 (0.005)
Electiont 1 -0.153 (0.084) -0.153 (0.054) 0.000 (0.003)
Study characteristics
Total models 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Cites per year -0.004 (0.006) -0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Impact factor 0.083 (0.050) 0.083 (0.034) 0.000 (0.002)
Revenue variables
Tax revenue -0.006 (0.025) -0.006 (0.007) -0.000(0.003)
Total revenues -0.029 (0.031) -0.029 (0.009) -0.001(0.008)
Constant -5.418 (2.455) -5.418 (1.792) 0.012 (0.026)
R2 0.47 0.29
I2 0.59 0.69
Notes: Dependent variable is the partial correlation of study-model i j. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
for Models 5, 6, and 8. Posterior means with posterior standard deviations in parentheses for Model 7. * p < 0:10, **
p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01 for frequentist models. Estimates in italics in Model 7 indicate a posterior inclusion probability
greater than 0.10. 243 model-study observations for 23 studies for all models, with a total sample size of 245,404.
Due to the smaller number of observations, the variables on democracy, presidential, proportional, win margin, deficit,
inflation, election half-year were excluded.
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when moving to Model 8. The journal’s impact factor is positive and significant in Models 5
and 6, indicating that higher quality journals (according to impact factor) often find that revenues
increase during elections. Last, in contrast to public spending, I find no evidence of any systematic
differences across the types of dependent variable used in the analysis. These results suggest that,
after accounting for other factors, political budget cycles are equally likely in all revenue categories.
2.7.8 Fiscal balance
As shown in Figure 2.2, studies specifying fiscal surplus as a dependent variable tended to find
some of the strongest evidence of political budget cycles. To see that result remains robust to the
addition of study and data characteristics, Table 2.4 shows the results from the 234 such studies in
the sample that use fiscal surplus as a dependent variable. I find few differences across regions, and,
moreover, temporal aggregation does not appear to influence the results. In contrast, while single-
country analyses tend to find evidence of a “reverse” political budget cycle (the positive coefficent
indicates that fiscal surpluses rise during elections), Table 2.4 suggests that municipalities tend to
run budget deficits during elections.
Although a number of moderating variables are statistically significant across Models 9 and
10, none had high enough posterior inclusion probabilities in Model 11 to be entered into Model
12. Nor did any of the election variables or study characteristics. In contrast, the coefficient on
lagged dependent variables is positive and statistically significant across all models, indicating that
studies accounting for dynamics find evidence of less deficit spending during elections. All of this
suggests that relatively few differences across studies help explain the underlying political budget
cycle effect of fiscal surpluses.
2.8 Discussion
The findings in this chapter have substantial implications for the political budget cycle literature. I
emphasize a number of key points. First, I disaggregated the dependent variables common in these
studies into four categories: expenditures, revenues, fiscal balance, and public debt, as well as a
number of sub-categories. As expected, I find that expenditures and debt increase during elections,
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Table 2.4: Explaining differences in partial correlations of fiscal balance
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
RE FE BMA RE
Data characteristics
Standard error -1.146 (0.381) -1.146 (0.367) -0.005(0.057)
OECD 0.000 (0.009) 0.000 (0.008) -0.000(0.001)
Latin America 0.001 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) -0.000(0.001)
Asia -0.080 (0.026) -0.080 (0.025) 0.000 (0.001)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.006 (0.024) 0.006 (0.023) 0.000 (0.001)
E. Europe and Fmr. USSR 0.045 (0.021) 0.045 (0.020) 0.000 (0.001)
Average year -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Quarterly aggregation -0.021 (0.014) -0.021 (0.013) 0.000 (0.001)
Monthly aggregation -0.140 (0.081) -0.140 (0.075) -0.000(0.008)
Single country 0.176 (0.038) 0.176 (0.037) 0.024 (0.048) 0.068 (0.029)
Municipal aggregation -0.311 (0.044) -0.311 (0.042) -0.041 (0.077) -0.027 (0.041)
State aggregation -0.121 (0.049) -0.121 (0.047) 0.070 (0.073) 0.012 (0.033)
Moderating variables
Democracy 0.087 (0.051) 0.087 (0.048) 0.000 (0.007)
Coalition -0.056 (0.044) -0.056 (0.043) -0.001(0.009)
Debt -0.005 (0.020) -0.005 (0.020) -0.000(0.005)
GDP -0.001 (0.017) -0.001 (0.017) -0.000(0.002)
GDP growth 0.030 (0.012) 0.030 (0.012) 0.000 (0.002)
Ideology 0.091 (0.018) 0.091 (0.017) 0.004 (0.015)
Inflation 0.020 (0.020) 0.020 (0.018) -0.001(0.008)
Presidential -0.035 (0.038) -0.035 (0.035) -0.000(0.006)
Revenues (control) -0.041 (0.023) -0.041 (0.022) -0.001(0.009)
Transfers (control) 0.088 (0.027) 0.088 (0.020) 0.000 (0.004)
Unemployment -0.057 (0.031) -0.057 (0.029) -0.006(0.025)
Win margin 0.095 (0.041) 0.095 (0.040) 0.001 (0.011)
Methodology
Unit fixed-effects 0.007 (0.017) 0.007 (0.016) -0.000(0.002)
Lagged dep. var. 0.140 (0.038) 0.140 (0.036) 0.220 (0.094) 0.192 (0.025)
OLS PCSE GLS 0.009 (0.021) 0.009 (0.019) -0.001(0.005)
Election variables
Election dummy 0.018 (0.009) 0.018 (0.008) -0.000(0.001)
Franzese -0.017 (0.021) -0.017 (0.020) -0.000(0.003)
Elec. half-yr -0.054 (0.023) -0.054 (0.020) -0.000(0.005)
Election pre-determined 0.070 (0.020) 0.070 (0.018) 0.002 (0.011)
Election early 0.022 (0.020) 0.022 (0.018) -0.000(0.001)
Electiont+1 0.016 (0.010) 0.016 (0.009) 0.000 (0.002)
Electiont 1 -0.002 (0.013) -0.002 (0.011) -0.000(0.001)
Study characteristics
Total models 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Cites per year 0.003 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Impact factor 0.002 (0.011) 0.002 (0.010) -0.000(0.001)
Constant 1.640 (0.970) 1.640 (0.872) -0.271 (0.025)
R2 0.89 0.29
I2 0.11 0.46
Notes: Dependent variable is the partial correlation of study-model i j. Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
for Models 9, 10, and 12. Posterior means with posterior standard deviations in parentheses for Model 11. * p< 0:10, **
p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01 for frequentist models. Estimates in italics in Model 11 indicate a posterior inclusion probability
greater than 0.10. 234 model-study observations for 39 studies for all models, with a total sample size of 201,888. Due
to the smaller number of observations, the variables on expenditures (control), proportional, and deficit were excluded.
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while revenues and fiscal surpluses decline. Based on funnel plots of the weighted partial corre-
lations, as well as the absence of significant variables in the meta-regression analysis, it appears
that public budget balance shows the most consistent evidence of a robust political budget cycle;
governments consistently run larger deficits around elections.
Using meta-regression analysis, I find that political budget cycles may be more likely to occur
in some expenditure categories than in others. Although many scholars have theorized that highly
disaggregated “visible” spending categories are most likely to be manipulated, I find instead that
total expenditures rise during elections. This evidence suggests that incumbents may be manipu-
lating multiple budgetary line items at once rather than increasing spending in a single category. I
also find that grants between tiers of government show some of the strongest political budget cycle
effects.
I also find that aggregating data annually rather than quarterly tends to reduce the sizes of
observed political budget cycles for expenditures, but less so for revenues and fiscal surpluses. This
finding complements existing work on how raising the level of temporal aggregation may hide an
important dimension of variation (Streb, Lema and Garofalo 2012; Klomp and De Haan 2013b).
In addition, this study was the first to test how the level of government at which elections are held
affects the evidence for political budget cycles. Municipal- and national-level elections appear to
be associated with increases in public spending and budget deficits. In contrast, election-based
cycles in revenues are not more prevalent at sub-national levels of government.
The results indicate that political budget cycles are present in a variety of contexts. Continental
dummies largely are inconsequential throughout much of the meta-regression analysis, and factors
thought previously to condition the budget cycle, such as electoral competitiveness and government
ideology, have negligible effects in the MRA reported herein. Neither were most methodological
choices, or decisions about coding the electoral window. Several important exceptions to that con-
clusion emerged, however. First, it appears that specifying dynamics is important; the significance
of a lagged dependent variable in the meta-regression results suggests the need to account for bud-
getary incrementalism. Second, democracy and economic development appear to be two important
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moderating variables that have conditioning effects on political budget cycles, as evidenced by the
significant coefficients in the meta-regression, and by previous studies (e.g., Brender and Drazen
2005). In addition, governmental revenues and expenditures, when entered as control variables,
tend to affect the size of the partial correlations. In addition, building on Streb, Lema and Garofalo
(2012), I find that more fine-grained election coding is associated with stronger political budget
cycles, and that controlling both for pre- and post-election periods may be necessary, at least for
public spending.
Meta-analyses can also test for publication bias. There is evidence that many bodies of litera-
ture in the social sciences suffer from that bias (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). To see if this is
true for political budget cycles, I performed a series of simple tests to explore whether the size of
the overall political budget cycle effect remains robust to various measures of article and journal
quality, as measured by a journal’s impact factor.10 To be brief, the results are not reported here but
are available in the appendix to this chapter. I find evidence that publication bias exists in the lit-
erature. However, the existence of political cycles across the four budget categories remains robust
after accounting for such bias. I also find that budgetary surpluses remain the most manipulated
budget category during elections.
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter was motivated by the importance of addressing the conflicting theories, literature re-
views, and inconclusive empirical results on political budget cycles. By combining all available
studies over the last 15 years, a meta-analytic approach offered an ideal way to synthesize our
knowledge of this topic. The meta-analysis herein does not provide conclusive evidence that polit-
ical budget cycles exist in every context. Factors such as the quality of government institutions and
fiscal transparency could not by analyzed in this chapter. Moreover, exploring the magnitudes of
conditional relationships (interactions) is difficult when using meta-regression analysis. Still, this
chapter goes beyond qualitative literature reviews by summarizing and evaluating the current state
10These are a regression of journal quality on precision, the precision-effect/funnel asymmetry (PET-FAT) test, and
the precision effect estimate with standard error (PEESE).
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of the empirical literature, as well as by identifying the circumstances under which we are more or
less likely to observe political budget cycles. Rather than relying on a single dataset, by aggregating
multiple study results I was able to identify the extent to which particular study-, methodological-,
and data-specific choices affect the evidence for political budget cycles. I investigated these dif-
ferences across four different types of commonly studied variables in a number of ways, including
testing for publication bias, using Bayesian model averaging, and calculating and plotting the sizes
of the overall effects across budgetary subcategories.
Several important conclusions were reached. First, the strongest evidence for political budget
cycles appears to be for public budget balance (the “fiscal stance”). Second, the lack of evidence
in disaggregated expenditure categories suggests either that no effect exists, or that scholars have
not yet pinned down a mediating variable that explains why these categories are manipulated only
at certain times. Third, while the results are robust across many types of data and coding deci-
sions, dynamics appear to be an important component to account for across all meta-regression
results. Fourth, I find evidence that context matters. While this issue has been discussed widely
in the literature, differences in data and methodology have made identifying particularly important
contextual elements (or comparing them while controlling for other factors) difficult. The results
reported herein also suggest that the level of government at which the election is held, as well as
the level of temporal aggregation, may merit further investigation. Last, although publication bias
exists in the literature, the size of the overall effect remains robust to this bias.
The purpose of this chapter was to begin reconciling the conflicting state of the political budget
cycle literature. Results from the meta-analysis suggest that although budget cycles are present in
expenditures, revenues, fiscal balance, and debt, the effect is substantively small. The results also
indicate the importance of accounting for context-conditional situations as well as controlling for
study- and data-specific factors when probing the robustness of future empirical studies. Scholars
of political economy should take note since meta-regression analysis suggests the necessity of
making cross-study comparisons more carefully. Responding to a recent question posed by Klomp
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and De Haan (2013b, p. 329), “do political budget cycles really exist?”—the answer appears to be
yes, but they are small and depend on a number of factors that must be taken into account.
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3. JUST IN TIME: POLITICAL POLICY CYCLES OF LAND REFORM
3.1 Introduction
For parties in government, elections represent a period of uncertainty. To reduce this uncertainty,
incumbents may create a variety of economic and distributional distortions around elections in
order to remain in office. For instance, they may increase total spending, run budget deficits, or
use targeted forms of distribution to specific voter groups. These are known broadly as political
cycles. With few exceptions, the extant literature has focused only on the manipulation of existing
policies. While fluctuations in expenditures and revenues around elections are important, analyses
of the strategic passage of new policies remain understudied in the literature on political cycles.
In this chapter I argue that political parties, conscious of the need to win support among large
segments of the population, will time the passage of redistributive policies in order to maximize
their support. Although policies do not consist of incremental changes like budgets, I find consis-
tent evidence that certain policies are passed just before elections. Moreover, this process repeats
itself over time. I argue that this is because these policies are an important tool used to win over
voters. While some studies have examined electoral cycles in various non-budgetary areas such
as government contracts (DeRouen and Heo 2000), active labor market policies (Mechtel and Po-
trafke 2013), social pacts (Ahlquist 2010), and artists employed in public theaters and orchestras
(Tepe and Vanhuysse 2014), I focus on the timed policy passage of redistributive policies.
This chapter addresses two related lines of literature: distributive politics and political cycles.
Scholars of distributive politics primarily focus on the distributive consequences of elections, and
less on advantageous timing of policies. Likewise, those who study political cycles address mostly
macro-level manipulation of existing fiscal policies, rather than examining specific policies de-
signed to benefit targeted constituencies. Drawing off work emphasizing how governments gain
electoral support through increasing spending to “visible” budgetary categories, I argue it is not
necessarily the actual rewards—but the promise of future rewards—that has been overlooked in
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the literature. Policy passage is an ideal form of manipulation, since it provides a clear signal to
voters of promised future benefits, while remaining less costly to governments than a strategy of
altering existing policies.
I test for political policy cycles in two ways. First, I examine the passage of state-level land
reform legislation in India. Following independence, the authority to pass land reform was de-
volved to states. Rather than envisioning land reform as a public good, I argue that certain groups
clearly benefit more than others; primarily the large number of landless and poor working farmers,
a valuable voting bloc in India. Thus, promises of land reform are a clear signal meant to attract a
substantial number of votes from the middle and lower classes. Second, I use historical survey data
from the Indian National Election Study to examine whether the salience of land issues decreased
over time, and if this decrease can be attributed to land reform passage.
Results suggest that policies such as land reform are indeed passed before an election. This
result remains robust to a variety of econometric specifications as well as the inclusion of additional
control variables, providing support for the theory that policies are passed strategically in order to
win votes. Moreover, the results from the survey show that voters consistently view land reform as
a salient issue, regardless of previous policy enactments. Taken together, these results indicate that
land reform policy is a signal to voters that politicians use to their advantage.
In the following section I briefly summarize the relevant literature. I then discuss political pol-
icy cycles in greater detail. I test my theoretical expectations by conducting an empirical analysis
using land reform policy at the state-level. Tests of the continued saliency of land reform using
survey-level evidence follow. Finally, I discuss these findings and conclude with broader implica-
tions.
3.2 The determinants of political budget cycles
A large body of literature focuses on the factors that affect political budget cycles. For instance,
the flexibility of election timing may determine if budget cycles are necessary (Kayser 2005).
Another factor is the length of time a country has been a democracy (Gonzalez 2002); without
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a long history of elections, voters are likely to be fooled through manipulation since they have
little prior information on how a competent incumbent should behave (Brender and Drazen, 2005;
Barberia and Avelino, 2011). In addition, institutions are typically less independent in emerging
democracies, leaving them vulnerable to political capture.
As an election nears, governments are likely to create budget cycles in order to sway voters
by bending the cyclical line in their favor through fiscal or monetary manipulation (Block, 2002).
Equally important is timing; policies must be implemented at a time in which the party in gov-
ernment can take credit for it. In order for such implementation to be effective, policies must be
passed close enough to an election that they are still fresh in the minds of voters. Although the
focus of many of these theories has been on timing, the beneficiaries of particular strategies has
been underemphasized in the literature.
While scholars of political cycles have written extensively about the causes of fiscal changes
around elections, scholars of distributive politics have focused on targeted spending designed to
win the support of particular groups. Dixit and Londregan (1996) propose that instead of providing
benefits to core supporters, parties in a two-party system will compete for swing voters by allocat-
ing redistributive policies towards them (see also Kwon, 2005; Stokes, 2005). This model contrasts
with the core-voter theory put forth by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and others (Calvo and Murillo,
2004; Nichter, 2008). In a compromise between these two competing theoretical expectations,
Albertus (2012) finds that governments employ a mix of short-term rewards for their core voters
while giving more permanent funds to swing supporters in order to build clientelistic relationships.
Targeted distribution may also be strategically timed to coincide with elections (Franzese, 2002;
Franzese and Jusko, 2006). For instance, Cole (2009) finds that agricultural lending to Indian farm-
ers increases between 5 and 10 percent during an election year. Drazen and Eslava (2010) find that
targeted expenditures, such as spending on roads and infrastructure, significantly increase during
election years in Colombia in order to gain voter support. In other instances, more programmatic
policies may be enacted to benefit entire constituency types. In an example of broad-based dis-
tribution, Sa´ez and Sinha (2010) find that Indian states increase spending on public goods such
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as education and health prior to an election. Overall however, using a meta-analysis of political
budget cycles, Philips (2016) finds weak evidence that any particular category of expenditures is
routinely increased before elections.
Party ideology is also an important component of distributive policies. However, the extent
to which ideology applies to distributive spending appears to be conditional on whether parties
spend opportunistically or based on partisan considerations. The literature suggests that they do
both. On the one hand, Sa´ez and Sinha (2010) hypothesize that supporter composition influences
the ideological spending preferences of Indian political parties. Yet they find almost no significant
ideological effect across parties, evidence that they are opportunistic; parties spend in any budget
category necessary to ensure reelection. In contrast, the investigation of pre-election spending in
Portuguese municipalities by Veiga and Veiga (2007) suggests that parties of the left tend to spend
more than right-wing parties in the year of and the year preceding an election. Therefore, ideology
may affect not only the type, but also the size of spending before elections.
Finally, the intensity of competition between political parties may determine whether distribu-
tive benefits are directed towards core supporters or the population more broadly (Schultz, 1995;
Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004; Cole, 2009; Aidt, Veiga and Veiga, 2011). Parties will reward
core supporters in less competitive regions, yet reward swing voters as competition increases, as
long as core supporters remain loyal even without an increase in benefits. The effective number
of political parties competing in elections also affects the intensity of competition. As the number
of electorally viable parties increase, pre-electoral policy passage is more likely since uncertainty
(especially common in developing democracies) tends to lead towards short-term, rather than long-
term, policy strategies (Lupu and Riedl, 2013).
3.3 A theory of political policy cycles
Despite the substantial literature on both distributive policies and political budget cycles, there is
relatively little research linking the two together. Although existing policies may change during
elections, does the passage of distributive policies become more likely as well? In other words, is
52
it possible for the government to gain the support of voters through mechanisms other than fiscal
spending before an election? A few scholars have found that non-budgetary policies can be used
as signals to voters. For example, Tepe and Vanhuysse (2014) find that more artists are hired for
public theaters and orchestras in Germany around elections. DeRouen and Heo (2000) conclude
that US defense contracts are more numerous before elections. Mechtel and Potrafke (2013) find
that job-creation schemes are passed before elections in Germany, while Ahlquist (2010) finds that
social pacts in developed economies are more likely to occur before elections.
Like the scholars above, I contend that the passage of certain policies—not just changes in
spending—constitutes a signal to voters of promised returns in the future, should they re-elect the
incumbent. In effect, a contract between promising to deliver the policy and the assurance of a vote
is struck. For voters, it is the visibility component that matters most (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
2004; Veiga and Veiga 2007). Just as with an increase in spending, policy passage changes a
voter’s evaluation of the incumbent. Policy passage contains both retrospective and prospective
components. Policies passed before an election stay fresh in the minds of voters, increasing their
likelihood of a positive retrospective evaluation. Yet unless the policy is implemented quickly,
there is also a prospective component; a need to re-elect the incumbent so that the policy may be
fully implemented. Both components rely on the assumption that the policy is visible to voters.
In addition to visibility, the policy must be easily attributed to the current government. It must
also be cost-effective (feasible to pass and implement within certain budgetary constraints), and
must be a salient issue for large segments of the population. While existing research has empha-
sized visibility mechanisms, it has not extended to the context of the passage of policies aimed at
maximizing electoral support. Although policy passage may not be the only timed opportunistic
tools governments use, it may serve as a substitute for manipulating the budget. This is due to
policy salience. Below I show how land reform is one example of an ideal policy instrument.
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3.3.1 Land reform in India: A signal to voters?
Giving land is like parting with your soul or body. People are more attached to land
than anything else. —Shri Uma Shankar Dikshit, Governor of Karnataka1
To test for political policy cycles, I examine the passage of Indian land reform from 1957 to 1992 in
15 major Indian states. There are several reasons why a single-country analysis is an ideal research
design. Land reform is a polarizing issue in many countries, especially India. In principal, they
were designed with three goals in mind. First, to rectify historical disparities between groups.
Second, to alleviate poverty, since India is home to a full third of the world’s poor. Third, to
reallocate land in order to use it more productively, and in turn boost growth. Advocates argue
that reform leads to increased land security, property values, land rights, and even social capital
(Deininger et al. 2003; Teofilo and Garcia 2003). After India gained independence in 1947, each
state has been tasked with land reform policy and implementation. Any pressure from the central
government for land reforms is largely an advisory role.2 Moreover, turnout for state elections in
India is much higher than for the national election, sometimes approaching 80 percent (Gill 1998),
and evidence suggests that there is a strong sub-national identity in India (Singh 2015). Finally,
in the sample used in this study, political activity below the level of state government was largely
inactive (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007).
The land system in India in the 20th century can trace its origins to colonial British rule, al-
though a landlord-tenant system was almost certainly in place even before the British. Largely
relying on property levies for revenue, the British devised a land system comprised of three pri-
mary categories (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). The zamindari systems were traditional landlord-tenant
based structures, in which the landholder was the intermediary between tenants and the British. Za-
mindaris were typically more extractive than other systems since landlords were able to keep any
1Spoken at the All India Conference Committee on Land Reforms, August 18 and 19, 1976. Quoted from Zaidi
(1985, p. 117).
2As Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh said of the central government’s hands-
off role in forming land reform policy, “[the states] are culprit of not coming out
with land reforms.” http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Jairam-Ramesh-signs-pact-averts-
siege/articleshow/16775475.cms?referral=PM. Accessed 03/03/2014.
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windfall revenues after paying a fixed amount to the colonial government. These existed primarily
in the northern and eastern regions. The second category were village-centeredmahalwari systems,
in which the entire village collectively paid a tax. These were established in what is now Punjab
and Uttar Pradesh. The third category was comprised of individual farmer systems, or raiyatwari.
These were established along the eastern and western coasts, and in parts of Assam. Raiyatwari
generally had the most developed property rights, and in some cases even legal titles to land. Taxes
were paid directly to the state. Still, a significant portion of the population lacked land. More-
over, land under the raiyatwari system was leased to tenants on occasion. Zamindari and raiyatwari
systems were the most common land structure in India, comprising some 95 percent of the total
(Hanstad et al., 2009).
Land reforms are best classified into four types.3 First, tenancy reforms were enacted, “to
regulate tenancy contracts both via registration and stipulation of contractual terms...as well as
attempts to abolish tenancy and transfer ownership to tenants” (Besley & Burgess, 2000, p. 392).
Second, certain land reforms dissolved the intermediary landholders that had been crucial to the
agricultural system in British India. Much of these estate-type systems were prevalent in the East,
in what later became Bengal-state. Third, ceilings on landholdings were enacted to limit the amount
of land a person, or in some cases families, could own. Fourth, some landholdings were allowed
to be consolidated, in a move to allow greater agricultural efficiency. As shown in Figure 3.1b,
although tennancy reforms were the most popular type throughout much of the 20th century, there
is substantial variation over time in all reform categories.
Saliency of land reform, and political pressure to implement reforms, has existed even be-
fore Indian independence. Since landholders often had tightly aligned interests with the colonial
government, by independence they had become deeply unpopular (Hanstad et al., 2009). Taking
advantage of this growing political realization, the Communist Party of India incorporated a motto
of “land to the tiller” into its party platform in 1948. This was followed by the Congress Party
creating an Agrarian Reforms Committee a year later (Joshi, 1975, p. 38). Even into the 1970s,
3This slightly differs from Hanstad et al. (2009) who add an additional category of transfers of government-owned
‘wasteland’ to landless individuals.
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mass campaigns for agrarian reform took place such as Operation Barga in West Bengal in 1978,
which tried to create a stronger legal basis for tenants (Bandyopadhyay, 1986). However, as shown
in Figure 3.1a, which depicts the number of land reforms enacted in the 15 major states in India
from 1957 to 1992, the fact that almost every state enacted at least some type of reform suggests
that land reform is not simply an ideological policy implemented by the left, but rather an oppor-
tunistic policy due to its sheer popularity. As one prominent Assamese legislator pointed out, “we
are to look to the interests of 96% of the cultivators of land and not to the 4% of the landlords
or capitalists or big people who are holding lands for generations depriving these cultivators for
generations of their dues.” (Borgohain, 1992, p. 49).
In addition to the continued saliency described above, many reforms differed in what they
hoped to accomplish. In some states tenancy reforms enabled land to be passed down by families,
while in other cases legal and administrative hinderances greatly limited the effectiveness of land
reform (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2010). Policies such as ceilings on landholdings varied between
states as well; in the 1960s Assam had a ceiling of 20 hectares, while Rajasthan had a maximum of
136 hectares that any single landholder could own (Das, 1995). Some reforms permitted families
to have twice the ceiling on landholdings if they had five or more members in their family. Others
offered an exemption, “of tea, coffee, rubber, cardamom and cocoa plantation[s] and of lands held
by religious and charitable institutions beyond normal ceiling limits.” (Bandyopadhyay, 1986, p. A-
51) In some areas, landless residents even received free brick houses provided by the government.
Although reforms differed in what they hoped to accomplish, they all tried to implement at least
some form of redistribution in the interests of the poor (Das, 1995). Thus, land reforms serve as
a clear signal to specific voting segments of the population, although they may vary slightly based
on the particular context.
In regards to poverty, land reforms were an effective policy instrument implemented at the state
level since they altered the terms and structure of property contracts (Besley and Burgess, 2000).
Agricultural reforms such as landholding ceilings benefitted both landless tenants and the rural
poor, which make up a sizable constituency in India. They were also popular politically, since
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Figure 3.1: Land reform is dispersed over time and space, and is highly salient
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public opinion was strongly in favor of limiting the power of intermediary zamandari landholders.
In just one example of the visibility of reforms, Bardhan and Mookerjee document how, “A mass-
mobilization campaign involving party leaders, local activists, and the administrators was mounted
to identify landowners owning more land than the ceiling, or leasing to sharecroppers.” (2010, p.
1576). This suggests that reforms were highly visible.
While analyzing the impact of land reforms is beyond the scope of this chapter, evidence sug-
gests that they have had both beneficial effects (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2001) as
well as mixed outcomes (Bandyopadhyay, 1986; Borgohain, 1992). For instance, ceilings on land
ownership have not improved outcomes for the most part (Deininger et al. 2003), and despite the
increased participation of the poor in Indian politics, economic inequality tends to persist (Kohli
1980).
Despite the mixed literature on the economic consequences, large numbers of land-poor tenants
and farmers, as well as discriminated castes, directly benefitted from the passage of redistributive
policies (Bandyopadhyay, 1986; Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2010). Issues of land were salient to a large number of poor voters, making agrarian topics likely
to rise to the top of the political agenda. As evidence of this, Figures 3.1c and 3.1d show the results
of two questions asked on the 1971 Indian National Election Survey (Eldersveld, Ahmed, and Mar-
vick, 2011). The first asks if there should be a ceiling on property ownership.4 Nearly 70 percent
of respondents thought that there should be some limit on the amount of land an individual can
own. The second question asks if the respondent approves of land grabs—or the taking of property
by those who have little to no land themselves.5 This answer is more split but still highly salient,
with about 44 percent approving of land grabs compared with around 45 percent disapproving.
In addition to voter demand, land reforms are ideal policy cycle instruments for governments
due to their cost-effectiveness. Reforms are in-kind rather than cash. They impose little cost
4“Some people say that the government should pass legislation so that people are not allowed to own and possess
large amounts of land and property. Others say that people should be allowed to own as much land and property as they
can acquire—what would you say?”
5“Some political leaders and parties have been advocating that poor people with no land and property should occupy
a part of land and property of those who have a large amount of land and property. Do you approve of this or do you
disapprove?”
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on the government since revenues to pay for reforms do not have to be generated through taxes
or borrowing—instead, the burden falls mostly on landholding elites.6 This policy is ideal since
it benefits supporters and circumvents fixed budget constraints. Freed of this budget constraint,
governments are likely to implement land reforms in areas with large amounts of poor voters who
own little land, and are thus most susceptible to these promises. Moreover, this may be far more
efficient than the cost of large redistributive handouts to win voters.
In India, mandated elections for the state assembly occur every five years.7 Therefore, policy
passage should consistently occur just before an election, and reform should be less likely after an
election since the need to win over voters is small.
H1: Reforms are more likely to occur before an election than after
Since enacting policies such as land reform may be difficult in the state assemblies, and since state
elections are typically held early in the year, I expect that governments will aim for the policy to
be passed in both the election year as well as the year before the election.
As Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) emphasize in the Indian context, based on the level of
competition, parties in Vidhan Sabha elections face different incentives in their decision to provide
public goods. In multiparty systems there may be less total voters to buy off, but the margin of
victory is much smaller. This makes reform more important in order to win votes. In systems
with two or more competitive parties, governments have an incentive to enact land reform in order
to beat their opponent in elections. By contrast, in states where a single party is consistently in
government, there tends to be less competition in elections, and parties should be less likely to
push for reforms, regardless of ideology. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010) confirm this view in
their discussion of competition and leftist party dominance in West Bengal, “once the Left obtains
a majority, further increases in its share of local government seats will decrease the extent of land
6In other cases such as Venezuela, public lands were used, and elites were bought off through payments from oil
revenues or encouraged to move to urban centers (Albertus, 2012).
7Earlier elections are possible; for instance if a coalition collapses or if “President’s Rule” is imposed. I account for
this in the robustness section. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has elections every six years according to its constitution.
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reforms implemented” (emphasis theirs, p. 1574). Therefore, I hypothesize that land reforms will
be more likely during elections where two or more parties are engaging in electoral competition.
H2: Multi-party competition makes land reform more likely, relative to single-party competition
Ideology is another factor that may determine whether parties implement policy opportunisti-
cally or for partisan reasons. Although party ideology could affect the desired extent of land reform,
with few exceptions, parties on either side of the ideological spectrum have advocated for reform.8
For instance, the centrist, “[Indian National] Congress Party advocated the abolition of interme-
diaries while the growing left and radical movement emphasized the rights of the subtenants and
the actual tillers.” (Eashvaraiah, 1993, p. 159). While post-election implementation effectiveness
of policies may be conditional on ideology, the literature suggests that the passage of reforms is
not.9 Therefore, rather than policies that are implemented based on ideology, I expect that oppor-
tunistic parties of all ideologies will take advantage of increased voter support through the passage
of reforms. I generate the following hypotheses regarding specific ideologies in India: leftist gov-
ernments such as the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India-Marxist will be
most likely to implement land reform. Centrist parties such as the Indian National Congress (INC)
have, “traditionally represented the interests of big landowners in rural areas,” and so are less likely
to implement reform (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2010, p. 1573). Although early on the INC gave
strong support for land reform, over time they slowly backed away from strong redistributive pref-
erences as they began to rely on the support of constituencies other than the poor (Zaidi 1985).
This places the INC somewhere between the left and the right. Right-wing parties are expected to
implement even less than the INC.
H3: Left-leaning governments make land reform more likely relative to centrist governments
H4: Right-leaning governments make land reform less likely relative to centrist governments
8In fact, recent evidence suggests strong elite party strategy is used in India to secure votes (Thachil 2011).
9The literature has substantial evidence for signals rather than substance. Eashvaraiah believes the Praja Socialist
Party-Congress coalition’s 1964 Land Reform Act in the state of Kerala was a, “watered down version of the original
bill of 1959 passed by the Communist Government.” (1993, p. 124) In addition, the ‘de facto’ level of reform was often
much less than what the statute prescribed; in West Bengal the amount actually taken over by government was much
less than the land allotted by law. In some instances, land distributed to individuals by government was often only half
as much as had been agreed to in the land reform bill (Eashvaraiah, 1993).
60
3.4 Data and methods
To test the hypotheses above I use the dependent variable, land reform, from Besley and Burgess
(2000, 2002, 2004), which is coded 1 if a land reform occurred in state i in year t. It is the most
comprehensive dataset on land reforms and inequality in the Indian states. The dummy variable
encompasses the following four categories: tenancy reform, dissolving intermediaries, consolidat-
ing landholdings, or imposing a landholding ceiling on property owners. In the appendix to this
chapter, I test the robustness of my findings by disaggregating the four categories.
One drawback to this analysis is the coding of the dependent variable as dichotomous. This
does not consider the intensity of each land reform. Despite this, it is justified for three reasons.
First, land reform was highly context-specific, which would make coding difficult. For instance,
ceilings on property varied, and in some states there were certain exemptions for particular crops
such as tea and cardamom (Das, 1995; Bandyopadhyay, 1986). Second, a dichotomous indicator
still captures the underlying casual mechanism. Passing land reforms sends a signal to voters that
benefits (through redistribution from the reform) are likely to occur in the future. I parse out this out
more in the individual-level analysis below. Third, no good measures exist that proxy for intensity
of reform.
For party competition and ideology I draw from Chhibber and Nooruddin’s (2004) coding of the
Indian states. They differentiate between a low-competition state and multi-party contested state
assembly elections. I extended their indicators back ten years, lengthening the range of ideological
competition from 1957 to 1992, and expanding the analysis for a total of 15 Indian states over the
period.10 Arguably, in a state dominated by a single party, ideology matters less to voters than
in multiparty states where ideology could come into play in determining land reform policies. To
capture this I employ dummy variables for a variety of competitive and ideological positions. They
account for each position’s effect on land reform relative to a two-party competitive Parliament
10The states are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Although Jammu and Kashmir
may be considered a “special category” due to its unique status enshrined in the constitution, results do not change if it
is dropped from the analysis.
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with two centrist parties. Although coarse, this measure serves to distinguish between the type of
competition (single party, two party, multiparty) and the strain of ideology present in each state
over time. The resulting model is the following:
Pr(Land Re f ormit) = f (Electionsit ; Ideologyit ; Competitionit) (3.1)
where the probability of land reform in a given state-year is a function of Electionsi;t+s, which
are a set of dummy variables equal to one if the state i is holding an election in year t—where
s 2 [ 1;0]—one year before or the year of an election (Besley and Burgess 2002). Ideology and
Competition are a set of dummy variables to test the effect of ideology and party competition. I also
control for the percentage of citizens in each state who do not own any land (Besley and Burgess,
2000). Land reforms were primarily designed to redistribute the property owned by wealthy hold-
ers where inequality was large (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In the colonial era, the ability to set
any rate of taxation antagonized tenant farmers in zamandari systems. Since land reforms have
been implemented to benefit the poor, states with large numbers of poor or landless individuals
lacking property should make land reform more likely since they favor redistribution. In addition
to inequality, signaling to voters through a broad-coverage policy such as land reform may be eas-
ier and less expensive than other, more targeted forms of redistribution. Parties in India have a
large incentive to target landless and poor voters. The poor in India vote at a similar rate as their
wealthier counterparts (Yadav, 1999). The former chief of India’s Election Commission sums up
the situation, “the poor, the underclass, the uneducated, the former untouchables tend to vote not
less but more than others.” (Gill, 1998, p. 166). Poor voters are likely to be swayed by promises
of land redistribution since a legacy of inequality has caused the poor to, “support political pro-
grams that advocate expropriating the assets of the rich.” (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005, p. 1198). More
broadly, poor voters across the developing world are among those most susceptible to promises of
redistribution and patronage (Remmer, 2007). Therefore, demand for reform in states is likely to
be greater if there are more land-poor voters. To address those who may be targets of land reform
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by politicians, I add % Owning No Land. As the percentage of the landless population rises, there
should be a greater demand for redistribution.
All descriptive statistics and data sources are available in the appendix to this chapter. To model
the probability of land reform in a given state-year, I use a random effects logit model. However, to
alleviate any concerns about unobservable heterogeneity across panels, I also present models with
state fixed effects.
Another concern is the potential for temporal heterogeneity. Ignoring such dependence may
lead to incorrect inferences (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998; Carter and Signorino, 2010). Binary
dependent variables in a cross-sectional time-series context are duration models by definition. So
accounting for temporal dependence is crucial. This seems plausible in the case of land reform;
over time they should become less likely for two reasons. First, if reforms are effective there
should be less need for more of them in the future. Second, if reforms are ineffective, politicians
will be less likely to use them as a visibility mechanism before elections, since voters start to
heavily discount the signal of promised reforms. To account for duration dependence, I add a cubic
spline with four knots instead of time fixed effects, since a Wald test cannot reject the null that the
parameters are jointly equal to zero. I investigate the robustness of the findings by including time
fixed effects as well as a lowess smoother in the robustness section below.
3.5 Results
Turning to Model 1 in Table 3.1, elections appear to affect the propensity for reform. In the year
before an election the parameter estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels, and is in
the hypothesized positive direction. The election-year dummy is positive, much smaller in mag-
nitude, and insignificant. This lends support to the hypothesis that governments strategically time
policies to occur before an election in order to win votes. Moreover, the coefficient remains statis-
tically significant and exerts a similar effect across both random and fixed effects specifications for
Model 1.
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In terms of ideology and competition, both multiparty competition and two-party left-center
competition increase the likelihood of land reform passage. However, this effect loses statistical
significance in the fixed-effects specification in Model 1. The percentage of the population owning
no land also lies in the expected positive direction, and is statistically significant across all models.
This provides evidence that poor, landless voters demand reform, and politicians try to win their
support through implementing policy.
So far the election indicator has been dichotomous, providing evidence that land reforms are
passed in the year before an election. Why does passage occur in the year before an election and not
in the election year? Most likely this is because state Assembly elections are typically held early
in the year. In fact, the median month of an election in this sample was March. To account for the
month of the election, I re-specify the election indicator so that it is equal to M12 in an election year
(whereM is the month of the election) and 1  M12 in the year before an election (Franzese 2000). All
other years equal zero. These monthly weights are shown in the “Alt-RE” and “Alt-FE” columns of
Model 1, and show the results from the random effects and fixed effects specifications, respectively.
Although the coefficient in the election year remains insignificant, the year before the election effect
grows even stronger. In other words, when an election is held in the beginning of the year, the
likelihood of land reform in the year before the election increases. The competition variables have
similar effects in the alternative models as compared to the dummy variable models. Two-party
left-center and multiparty competition are significant only in the random effects specifications, but
not when we look within-state. Most likely this is due to the substantial variation across states in
regards to electoral competition, but limited within variation.
Since Model 1 did not parse out any effect with ideology and competition, in Model 2 I include
Leftist and Congress indicators through the use of dummy variables. Leftist is coded one if a left-
wing ideology party is in power in the state, and Congress is coded one if the Congress Party is in
control. A leftist ideology exerts a strong, statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood
of land reform passage. Note that the coefficient on Year Before Election remains statistically
significant and positive as well, both in the dummy variable and monthly weight specifications. In
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addition, while single-party dominant states had a positive effect on the likelihood of land reform
passage in the first model (and only in the fixed effects specification), this effect is no longer
significant at conventional levels. Model 2 suggests that in addition to opportunistic timing of land
reform around elections, leftist parties are more likely to pass land reform than the Congress Party,
and that Congress is more likely than other parties to pass reform as well, all else equal. This is
consistent with hypotheses H3 and H4. Moreover, it confirms Chhibber and Nooruddin’s (2004)
theory that ideology plays a role in distribution. However competition, as examined in Model
1, seems to matter less than ideology. This suggests that although parties in government may
opportunistically time the passage of land reforms, they are more likely to do so along ideological
lines.
Although the effect of a simple ideology measure was examined in Model 2, it did not account
for competition. I add the Effective Number of Parties in Model 3, which is coded according to
the formula given by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).11 Even with its inclusion, the year before the
election coefficient remains significant and in the same direction as before. The same is true for
the leftist and Congress coefficients, as well as the percentage of the population owning no land.
However, the effective number of parties does not achieve statistical significance. This provides
evidence that the competitive environment does not affect the decision to enact land reform.
In Model 4, I investigate an alternative measure for land-poor voters who increase demand
for land reform. Including the percentage of land owned by the bottom 50 percent of the income
distribution as well as the percentage of land owned by the top 10 percent captures the inequality of
land ownership within a state. Although these variables are in the expected direction—as the poor
own more land the need for land reform decreases, as the rich own more land the need for land
reform increases—they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, including
proxies for the inequality of land ownership does not change the earlier results in regards to timing
and competition.
11This is given by Nit = 1åni=1 r2it
, where Nit is the number of parties competing in state i in year t with at least one state
assembly seat, and r2it is the proportion of all assembly seats in state i in year t, squared.
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To see the robustness of the political cycle of land reform, I plot the odds ratios for the two
election variables from Table 3.1 in Figure 3.2. Coefficients to the left of the vertical line (which
indicates an odds ratio of one) decrease the likelihood of land reform, while those to the right make
reform more likely by a factor of two, four, and so on. Coefficients on the vertical line make land
reform no more or less likely to occur. Both the dummy and monthly weighted specifications are
shown, along with 95 percent confidence intervals. It is clear that in regards to electoral timing,
only the coefficient on the Year Before Election is statistically significant. Land reform is about 2.5
times more likely in the year before an election using the dummy variable specification, and around
three times more likely when using the monthly weighted specification. Moreover, this result
remains robust across all models, even when potentially unobserved state-specific heterogeneity is
accounted for using state fixed effects.
Figure 3.2: Policies are consistently passed before elections
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In the appendix to this chapter I perform a host of robustness checks. I find that the results
are robust after accounting for early elections and President’s Rule (the suspension and calling of
new elections by the Indian President). I also find that the results are robust after accounting for
whether the party in control at the state level is the same as the party in government at the national
level. Last, I also employ a variety of additional methodological specifications and find that the
results remain unchanged.
3.5.1 Individual-level evidence for the use of policies as a strategic tool
Themacro-level evidence presented above suggests that land reform is a strategic tool passed before
an election in order to gain the support of voters. This supports analyses in other countries that show
how land reform policies may increase political support (Albertus, 2012; Boone, 2012). However,
this theory raises two concerns at the individual level about the use of policy passage as a strategic
tool to win votes. First, does the repeated use of land reforms weaken the signal? In other words, if
land reforms are passed but not fully implemented, are voters aware of this? If so, then continuous
policy passage may water down the effectiveness it has as a signal to voters. Second, does the
effectiveness of land reform make it less likely to be passed in the future? If reforms are effective,
a smaller number of voters will be won over by the promise of further reforms. Thus, the signal to
voters may weaken over time.
To examine these concerns, I turn to individual-level survey data from the nationally repre-
sentative Indian National Election Study (Eldersveld, Ahmed and Marvick 2011). Two important
questions were included over time in these non-longitudinal studies. First, both the 1967 and 1971
election studies asked respondents an open-ended question about the ‘most-important’ problem
(MIP) facing their village or town. I coded respondents as having Land/Inequality as the Most-
Important Problem if they voiced concerns over issues of land or issues of inequality.12 This vari-
12Issues of land covers a variety of responses such as land tenure, consolidation of land, protecting the landless, the
size of landholdings, and need to get more land. Issues of inequality applied to responses such as increasing economic
disparities and the gap between the rich and poor. Since these were open-ended questions, each type of response was
grouped into an overall category.
68
able is a dichotomous indicator where 1 indicates the respondent was concerned with land reform
or issues of inequality, and 0 indicates the respondent was concerned with some other issue.
Second, both the 1971 and 1985 surveys ask whether or not the respondent thinks people with
no land or property should occupy the land of those who have a large amount of property.13 I coded
Approve of Land Grabs as a dichotomous variable with one meaning “approve of land grabs” and
zero meaning “disapprove” or “uncertain”. Both question types, though imperfect measures, serve
as proxies for the saliency of land reform in the minds of voters.
The question core to this theory is whether or not passage of land reform speeds up temporal
dependence (i.e. if we see a smaller proportion of respondents that approve of land grabs or think
land issues are the most important problem). If land reform is a strategically-timed policy, voters
should continue to show a concern for land grabs and land reform even in states where land reform
has already occurred. Since this is a conditional expectation, I specify an interactive relationship
between duration and the number of land reforms passed between the first and second survey.
Duration is proxied by a dichotomous variable equal to one for the latter survey—1985 for the
land grab question and 1971 for the important problem question. I expect that land reform will
lose saliency over time, but that it is not conditional on the passage of new land reforms. In other
words, if land reform saliency remains unrelated to the number of land reforms passed in a state,
the interaction between land reform passage and duration should remain insignificant.
Table 3.2 shows the results from the individual responses to each question, modeled using
a logit with standard errors clustered by state. A basic model as well a model with additional
respondent controls are shown, although there is little difference across either in terms of the log-
odds coefficients of interest. The respondent controls were dummy variables for social groups at
each end of the social hierarchy, gender, religion, occupation, a 5-category education indicator, a
rural area dummy, and a trichotomous indicator of political interest. Additional details are in the
appendix to this chapter.
13“Some political leaders and parties have been advocating that people with no land and property should occupy a
part of land and property of those who have a large amount of land and property. Do you approve of this or do you
disapprove?”
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Table 3.2: The individual saliency of land reform
Land/Inequality is the Most Approve of Land Grabs
Important Problem 1971 & 1985 Surveys
1967 & 1971 Surveys
(11) (12) (13) (14)
DLand Reforms 0.032 (0.289) 0.069 (0.225) -0.029 (0.113) -0.028 (0.110)
2nd Survey 0.721 (0.259) 0.753 (0.244) -3.787 (0.780) -3.652 (0.763)
DLand Reforms -0.451 (0.356) -0.471 (0.299) 0.338 (0.225) 0.357 (0.219)
2nd Survey
Dalit 0.563 (0.200) 0.345 (0.136)
Backwards Caste -0.147 (0.211) 0.227 (0.148)
Brahmin Caste 0.089 (0.252) -0.242 (0.237)
Male 0.142 (0.138) 0.128 (0.102)
Hindu -0.682 (0.242) 0.347 (0.326)
Muslim -1.299 (0.667) 0.577 (0.421)
Farm Laborer 0.217 (0.151) 0.486 (0.174)
Cultivator -0.032 (0.214) 0.008 (0.126)
Education -0.170 (0.103) -0.244 (0.047)
Rural 0.779 (0.282) -0.318 (0.191)
Political Interest 0.111 (0.052) 0.286 (0.100)
Constant -3.644 (0.256) -3.652 (0.517) -0.223 (0.285) -0.281 (0.400)
N 6752 6752 5417 5417
States 16 16 16 16
Log Lik. -1088.0 -1053.0 -3258.8 -3164.5
c2 13.54 860.3 115.9 166873.8
Prob > c2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log-odds coefficients with standard errors in parentheses clustered by state. Dependent variables are those choosing
issues regarding land reform or economic inequality as the most important issue in the 1967 and 1971 waves, and those
who approve of land grabs in the 1971 and 1985 waves. Variable details available in the appendix to this chapter.
Two-tail tests,  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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The first two columns of Table 3.2 show the results for a survey respondent choosing land
issues or economic inequality as the most important issue facing their town or village. The number
of land reforms passed between the 1967 and 1971 waves of the survey is not significant, nor is the
interaction between the number of new land reforms passed and the dummy variable indicating the
second survey wave. The second survey wave variable is statistically significant, indicating that, as
suspected, over time the saliency of land issues decreases.
To help interpret if the over-time decrease in support for land reform differs across the number
of reforms passed, I plotted the predicted probabilities fromModel 12; this is shown in Figure 3.3a.
The vertical axis shows the predicted probability of a respondent selecting land reform as the most
important problem. The horizontal axis shows the number of land reforms passed after the first
survey wave in 1967. Moving from the 1967 to the 1971 wave, it is clear that the predicted prob-
ability actually increases if no new land reforms have been passed in the state. Moreover, Figure
3.3a also shows that even in states where land reform was passed, there is no statistically significant
difference in the predicted probability between surveys. Taken together, this suggests that although
there is a slight decrease in the importance of land reform issues over time, respondents are not
affected by the actual passage of reforms. This indicates that land reform policies are not cheap
talk, but instead strategic signals.
The second two columns in Table 3.2 show the results for respondents who approve of land
grabs. The effect of the change in land reforms between the surveys is small and not statistically
significant. Relative to the early survey, the latter has a negative coefficient. As expected, this
means that over time the importance of land reform in the eyes of voters diminishes. However, the
interaction between time and the number of land reforms passed in a state between waves remains
insignificant—indicating that although less respondents approve of land grabs in 1985 than in 1971,
this does not depend on the number of land reforms passed between then. As with the previous
question, the results remain robust to the addition of the 11 control variables.
The predicted probabilities of supporting land grabs from Model 14 are shown in Figure 3.3b.
In contrast to the most important problem question, support for land grabs drops substantially over
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Figure 3.3: Previous land reforms do not affect support for future ones
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time—from nearly 40 percent of respondents approving in 1971 to under 10 percent in 1985. As
discussed earlier, the main test in this section is whether or not the salience of land reforms weaken
over time. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.3b, the opposite occurs. In the 1985 wave, individuals
residing in a state with more land reforms tended to be more likely to support land grabs.
The controls in Table 3.2 also shed light on the type of voter that land reform is meant to appeal
to. Land reform issues were most likely to be more important to respondents who were of lower
caste, had lower levels of education, and strong political interest. Interestingly, rural area, farm
laborer, and cultivator dummies tended not to be significant across both models, and in some cases
were oppositely signed and significant.
Using individual-level survey data, I have provided further evidence that concern about land
remains a salient issue for voters. Although saliency decreases over time, it is not conditional on
the passage of further land reforms—if anything the effect became stronger. Thus, both macro-
and micro-level evidence suggests that land reforms are policies timed strategically in order to win
votes.
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter theoretically links the research on distributive politics and political budget cycles. Us-
ing data on Indian land reform, I find evidence that policy passage is more likely before an election.
Policies are a clear signal to voters of incumbent competence, responsiveness to voter demands,
and the desire to win over additional supporters. Moreover, individual-level survey evidence con-
firms that land reform issues remain salient even if reforms have already been passed within a state.
In other words, the signal that land reform provides does not seem to diminish over time any faster
in states that have passed previous reforms.
Designed to win over rather than reward constituents, land reform is an ideal policy due to
its low fiscal cost to governments as well as its high visibility among landless rural voters. This
supports earlier findings in Venezuela (Albertus 2012) and Kenya (Boone 2012) that examine the
use of land reform as a distributive tool to increase political support. It also supports previous work
that finds that reforms are politically salient (Teofilo and Garcia, 2003). This salience is not limited
to India; in 2003 an estimated 40 percent of the non-urban population in Asia lived under informal
land ownership (Deininger et al. 2003). In Africa this figure is 50 percent. In addition to land
reform, other types of legislation may also contain a cyclical component, such as subsidy policies,
or the announcement of large make-work projects.
Results in this chapter suggest that competition had only a slight effect on policy passage.
However, there was evidence that ideology affects land reforms. Leftist parties were more likely
to implement reforms than parties of the center and the right. This suggests that this particular
policy may be a partisan good, rather than a purely opportunistic one. To further examine whether
opportunistic or partisan behavior is coming into play, a study of the implementation of land reform
is needed. Policy implementation, carried out by bureaucratic agents, may differ across ideologies.
Or, bureaucracies may be influenced by political considerations in choosing to regulate and enforce
certain policies. For instance, in the context of land reform, bureaucratic agents may reward loyal
supporters with faster implementation, or they might try to win over swing voters.
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In this chapter I have advanced a theory of political policy cycles. Using data on Indian land
reform, I find evidence of a policy cycle that is timed to coincide with elections. These findings are
complimented by individual-level evidence that suggests that land reforms are precisely the type
of issue that matter to voters. Far from being a neutral, demand-based policy, I have argued that
governments strategically pass land reforms as a signal to voters, and that they send this signal
at a time advantageous to them electorally. Indian land reforms appear to have been constructed
to help both the poor and the politicians. As scholars continue to disaggregate macroeconomic
indicators into targeted spending areas designed to benefit and attract certain constituencies, the
ability to use policy passage around elections as a signal to voters appears to be an important tool
of governments.
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4. STRONGHOLDS OR ISLANDS? SPATIO-TEMPORAL OPPORTUNISM AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
4.1 Introduction
How do politicians reward their political supporters? One line of reasoning holds that they target
their core bases of support (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Nichter 2008).1
Another finds that constituencies with narrow win margins are rewarded, since swing constituen-
cies are made up of voters who are much easier to “purchase” (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Kwon
2005; Stokes 2005). Both theoretical approaches have led to important discoveries in distributive
politics. However, both have tended to focus on a single electoral unit in isolation—such as a
town, congressional district, or state—effectively throwing out important information about what
is occurring in nearby regions.
In this chapter I build on existing literature in distributive politics by advancing a theory of
spatio-temporal opportunism around elections. I extend the core-swing dichotomy that dominates
most of the work on intergovernmental transfers around elections in three ways. First, the effects
of the core-swing characteristics of a municipality on the level of transfers received may be condi-
tioned by what is occurring in the surrounding constituencies. Despite some literature on temporal
opportunism in the swing-voter literature, to the best of my knowledge, no research has considered
how spatial patterns of support may affect the distribution of transfers. Second, this is especially
likely to matter around elections, when incumbents face strong incentives to reward voters in order
to win re-election. In other words, incumbent strategy may shift according to the electoral cycle.
Third, I examine if other informational cues about voter support, such as whether or not the mu-
nicipality elected a mayor of the same party as the national incumbent, factor into their decision to
reward certain municipalities.
1Throughout this chapter I speak of political benefits in terms of geographic units of support rather than individual
supporters, since the vast majority of empirical work in distributive politics focuses on constituencies rather than voters
(Golden and Min 2013), but see Stokes (2005), or Nichter (2008).
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I use data on federal development transfers to over 5,550 Brazilian municipalities from 2005
to 2012 to test whether opportunism is more likely to occur for municipalities that supported
the national incumbent but are surrounded by municipalities less favorable to the incumbent—
or “islands” of support—or if instead incumbents tend to reward their regional electoral base, or
“strongholds” of support. Brazil is an ideal case for several reasons. It is an open-list system of pro-
portional representation, and existing evidence suggests that pork-barrel spending occurs regularly
(Ames 1995). Moreover, research suggests that transfers are channeled to Brazilian municipali-
ties in order to reward voters, and to increase the likelihood of victory for mayors who share the
same party as the president (Brollo and Nannicini 2012). In addition, municipalities are highly
decentralized and account for around one quarter of all public sector expenditures (Sakurai and
Menezes-Filho 2011), making them highly salient political units in the eyes of voters.
Evaluating this “islands versus strongholds” theory of support, I find that incumbents tend
to allocate more transfers to municipalities when they are surrounded by municipalities of low
support than when they are surrounded by municipalities of high support. Thus, incumbents appear
to reward islands rather than strongholds. Although I find no evidence that this pattern changes
based on the partisan characteristics of the municipality, I do find that the island-targeting strategy
becomes much more broad-based during both municipal and presidential election years.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. I first review the existing literature on politi-
cal opportunism. I then theorize how incumbents may incorporate spatial context when choosing
where to strategically place transfers around elections. Next, I test my theoretical expectations and
discuss the findings. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for other
scholars of distributive politics.
4.2 Core and swing voters
How does a rational incumbent allocate resources to constituents? Typically, research on this sub-
ject has been divided along two theoretical lines: core and swing strategies. Core strategies—
largely attributed to Cox and McCubbins (1986)—hold that governments will reward their core
76
constituencies through targeted provision of goods and services. This has several advantages. For
one, parties tend to know their core constituencies well. Continued periods of constituency sup-
port and political rewards has the potential to build strong clientelistic relationships (Kitschelt and
Wilkinson 2007). In addition, support is “low-risk,” since core constituencies typically have a long
history of support (Diaz-Cayeros 2008).
A substantial body of empirical evidence supports the core-voter hypothesis. Wilkinson (2007)
finds that in India, “politicians are determined to give non-supporters and people whose votes are
seen as non pivotal as little as possible” (127-128). Alperovich (1984) finds a similar pattern
when looking at earmarked spending by Israel’s Likud party. Berry, Burden and Howell (2010)
find that congressional districts belonging to the president’s party receive almost five percent more
expenditures than un-aligned districts. Moreover, benefits are likely to accrue to districts where
the previous election was decided by a narrow margin. Examining federal funding to US states,
Larcinese, Rizzo and Testa (2006) find that regions of strong presidential support received the
largest share of funds, in contrast to swing states. Also focusing on US states, Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2006) find support for the core voter hypothesis.
In contrast to rewarding core constituencies, proponents of the swing voter hypotheses argue
that since support is already solidified in core districts, politicians will instead target heavily con-
tested areas (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Kitschelt and Wilkinson
2007; Kwon 2005), where there are more voters who are relatively indifferent between parties.
One key assumption in swing-voter models is that the pivotal voter is undecided (and thus is al-
ready likely to vote); a boost in expenditures can help sway them towards supporting the incumbent
(Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006).2
Like the core-voter literature, the swing voter hypothesis has substantial empirical evidence to
support it. Examining Portugese municipalities, Veiga and Pinho (2007) find that swing municpal-
2A closely related literature focuses on the act of getting voters to turnout or abstain from voting, often known as
turnout buying (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Bratton 2008). This research tends to focus on the individual, through
surveys, formal models, or in-depth interviews. In contrast, much of the core-swing literature that involves geographic
constituencies focuses on expenditures and transfers from different levels of government. I focus on this latter literature
since it is larger and fits well within a spatial framework.
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ities receive more intergovernmental grants. Kwon (2005) finds that districts who are more elec-
torally competitive tend to receive more subsidies in South Korea, while Weghorst and Lindberg
(2013) find evidence that clientelistic goods, as well as public goods, sway voters into switching
parties in Ghana. All of this suggests that substantial empirical evidence exists for both the core
and swing hypotheses.
4.2.1 Distributive politics and vertical intergovernmental opportunism
Much of the core-swing literature has a sub-national focus. As such, vertical opportunism be-
tween levels of government—through distributive channels such as grants, fiscal transfers, or
expenditures—especially in federal or highly decentralized countries, plays a particularly impor-
tant role.3 Transfers from higher to lower levels of government are an important tool used to
equal out horizontal inequities between sub-national units (e.g., redistribute revenues to the poorer
states), and are especially important in highly decentralized countries that lack the local capacity
for revenue raising (Oates 1999; Wallis and Oates 1988). Because of this, transfers often constitute
a large proportion of local revenues (Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2011; Veiga and Pinho 2007).4
Given that a self-interested national executive is generally considered the main designator of trans-
fers (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Brollo and Nannicini 2012), they have the ability to exert
substantial influence over sub-national actors. Thus, intergovernmental transfers can become a tool
which the incumbent can use for credit claiming, winning re-election, and benefiting co-aligned
constituencies while punishing opposition ones.5
There is substantial evidence that political favoritism plays a role in intergovernmental redis-
tribution in Peru (Schady 2000), Germany (Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012), Portugal (Veiga and Pinho
2007), Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini 2012), and the US (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Berry, Burden and
3Expenditures and transfers are not the only form of pork; alternative strategies include extending access to govern-
ment employment or increasing public sector wages (Calvo and Murillo 2004).
4For instance, 43.1 percent of total municipal revenues in Portugal (Veiga and Pinho 2007).
5While co-alignment is often thought of (and operationalized) as being if the party in power at the local government
is the same as the national government, this does not have to be the only case. Ethnic, racial, or regional ties, though
more difficult to operationalize, could also play a role.
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Howell 2010).6 Often, this involves rewarding co-aligned sub-national units while punishing non-
aligned ones, as Larcinese, Rizzo and Testa (2006) find in the case of US state funding, and Brollo
and Nannicini (2012) when looking at close municipal elections in Brazil. However, it is not always
the case that solidly aligned sub-national units are always rewarded. Looking at Australian state
elections, Worthington and Dollery (1998) find only modest support for the co-alignment hypothe-
sis, and also find that marginal federal seats are punished, rather than solidly opposition-controlled
regions.
4.2.2 The timing of opportunism
While the work above largely focuses on the determinants of expenditures and transfers within
a sub-national unit, a vast literature focuses on when spending is most likely to occur (Franzese
2002; Cole 2009; Drazen and Eslava 2010a; Sa´ez and Sinha 2010).7 Given that incumbents desire
re-election, there is often an incentive to time intergovernmental transfers around elections, so as
to maximize the marginal returns of their effort. In fact, in a meta-analysis of the political budget
cycle literature, Philips (2016) finds that intergovernmental grants show some of the strongest ev-
idence for manipulation around elections. For instance, Schady (2000) finds that Peruvian social
expenditures tend to increase during elections, going to high-poverty areas as well as areas with
heavy support for the governing party. Kwon (2005) finds that subsidies to voters in South Korea
increase around elections, especially for highly-competitive districts. Expenditures that are more
visible to voters are more likely to be manipulated during elections, although there is mixed evi-
dence as to whether current expenditures such as public sector wages (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya
2004; Kwon 2005), or capital expenditures such as road construction (Drazen and Eslava 2010a),
are more likely to be manipulated (Philips 2016).8
6Schady (2000) finds that Peruvian social expenditures are channeled to areas that support the governing party.
Examining the distribution of EU structural funds in German districts, Dellmuth and Stoffel (2012) find that electoral
considerations tend to distort the allocation of funds; supporting the party of the prime minister is associated with an
increase in EU structural funds. Veiga and Pinho (2007) find that municipalities that elected mayors of the same party
as the Prime Minister tend to receive more grants. Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that federal spending tends to favor
heavily Democratic districts, especially during the 1970s when Democrats had strong control at the federal level, and
Berry, Burden and Howell (2010) find a similar pattern looking at US congressional districts.
7For an excellent review see Dubois (2016).
8In a meta-analysis of these two expenditure categories, Philips (2016) finds no evidence that either form of expen-
diture is consistently manipulated around elections.
79
4.3 A theory of spatio-temporal opportunism
As discussed above, the existing literature in distributive politics has made substantial inroads as to
how factors such as political competition and partisan alignment affect the distribution of benefits.
However, with few exceptions—and despite a substantial literature on swing-voter politics—there
is surprisingly little about spatio-temporal effects on intergovernmental transfers. On the temporal
side, Diaz-Cayeros (2008) focuses on the volatility of electoral regions; regions that shift support
from one party to another are risky to target, but offer a large potential gain in support. Albertus
(2012) finds that governments may pursue a strategy whereby short-term payoffs are channeled to
core supporters while long-term structural policies are created in order to win over swing support-
ers. In fact, party strategies in general may become more short-sighted as electoral competition
increases, especially in the developing country context (Lupu and Riedl 2013).
Despite some literature on temporal opportunism in the swing-voter literature, to the best of my
knowledge no research has considered how spatial patterns of support may affect the distribution of
transfers. Why might electoral characteristics of surrounding localities factor in to how an incum-
bent allocates transfers? Consider an incumbent executive at the national level. In many countries
such as the US, Brazil, or India, incumbents control a large amount of discretionary transfers to
sub-national jurisdictions. They are opportunistic in that they desire to win re-election (by seek-
ing out new voters), as well as trying to reward those in their own party. Therefore, they tend to
strategically allocate transfers.9 This is a common assumption in distributive politics, one which
has empirical support (Brollo and Nannicini 2012; Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Dellmuth and
Stoffel 2012; Veiga and Veiga 2007; Levitt and Snyder 1995), although as discussed above, it is less
established whether principals tend to target core constituencies, swing constituencies, or both.10
9This assumes that transfers are not limited by budgets, and that incumbents do have some discretion over their
placement. Discretionary transfers in some countries such as Brazil constitute a large proportion of municipal revenues
but a relatively small proportion of the national budget, thus can be seen as largely discretionary (Brollo and Nannicini
2012).
10I am careful to distinguish between geographic constituencies that are either swing or core regions rather than
individual voters, since the latter is almost never tested in the literature (Golden and Min 2013). For an exception see
(Stokes 2005).
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I argue that opportunistic targeting of intergovernmental discretionary transfers may occur not
only based on the electoral results in a locality—as current theories of distributive politics would
predict—but also based on the level of support of the surrounding localities. There are a number
of reasons why the incumbent would want to incorporate surrounding information when deciding
how to reward a municipality.
First, assuming that the instrument of manipulation has spillover effects, it may be wise for
an incumbent to reward core regions (i.e. concentrations of municipalities of high support) rather
than a municipality surrounded by weak or opposition supporters. Evidence suggests that certain
government expenditures have spillover effects to proximate spatial units (Murdoch, Rahmatian
and Thayer 1993; Baicker 2005). For instance, Sole´-Olle´ (2006) finds that local government ex-
penditures in areas such as radio, museums, and parks in Spain have beneficial spillover effects to
neighboring municipalities. By taking into account information about neighboring municipalities,
an incumbent can strategically place transfers so as to avoid rewarding opposition municipalities
through potential spillovers.
Second, a single election result may be a one-off event and not represent the true characteristics
of a municipality. That is to say, a particular election result could be stochastic and not representa-
tive of the underlying amount of support for the incumbent or the incumbent’s party. Incorporating
surrounding information allows for a more detailed picture of true regions of support. An incum-
bent may discount a particularly poor performance in a municipality if surrounding municipalities
are strong supporters; likewise, they may not reward a municipality that strongly supported the
incumbent if its neighbors offered only marginal support. Thus, the amount of intergovernmen-
tal transfers may not be entirely a function of municipal support, but instead moderated by the
performance of the geographic region as a whole.
Third, the incumbent can strategically punish or reward districts, since—assuming they have
similar economic and demographic characteristics as their surrounding neighbors—it should be
low-cost to entice voters in these municipalities. Thus, swing regions of support may be particularly
likely to be targeted if they are surrounded by regions of incumbent support.
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Figure 4.1: Strongholds and islands: A theoretical figure
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The effect that these compositions have on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers is
shown as a simple theoretical diagram in Figure 4.1, using an example of municipal support in
during national elections. The columns of Figure 4.1 show the previous results during the last
election; either the municipality has strong support for the incumbent’s party, or they have weak
support. This is the extent of existing theories on geographic core and swing districts; opposition
districts receive the least amount of intergovernmental transfers, while those of strong support are
rewarded.
The theoretical expectations shown in Figure 4.1 add nuance to this argument. It is not only the
amount of support within a district, but also the amount of support in the surrounding districts that
determines the level of intergovernmental grants allocated. As shown in Figure 4.1, incumbents
may also take into account the level of support in neighboring municipalities when deciding how
much to reward districts. This leads to the following theoretical expectations: municipalities that
are strong supporters of the incumbent’s party and surrounded by similarly inclined municipalities
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(regions that are “supporter strongholds” in Figure 4.1) will receive a larger amount of transfers,
all else equal. Municipalities that supported the incumbent’s party, but that are surrounded by
municipalities that support the opposition party (“supporter islands”), will also receive a larger
amount of transfers. If theories of core-swing politics are extended to spatial units, diverging
expectations emerge as to the amount of expected transfers in supporter strongholds relative to
supporter islands. The core voter hypothesis might lead us to expect that geographic strongholds
of support receive the largest amount of transfers. In contrast, the swing voter hypothesis may lead
to the expectation that supporter islands of support, or even “opposition islands”—where support
for the incumbent is low but not as low as the surrounding municipalities—are likely to be targeted
with an increase in transfers. I expect municipalities that strongly support the opposition to receive
the least amount of transfers, especially if they are surrounded by similar municipalities, or regions
of “core opposition”.
In addition to taking into account the spatial context of intergovernmental transfers, the litera-
ture on political budget cycles suggests that political opportunism is most likely to occur in the run
up to an election. Thus, the spatial opportunism shown in Figure 4.1 may be strongest before an
election. Or, incumbents may shift opportunistic strategies in election years. I illustrate this theory
in the context of Brazil below.
4.4 Strongholds and islands in Brazil
I use data on 5,550 Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 2012 to test whether spatio-temporal
opportunism exists. Brazil is an ideal test of whether incumbents reward strongholds or islands for
several reasons. It is a relatively young democracy. Moreover, is highly decentralized, and evidence
suggests that opportunism takes place (Brollo and Nannicini 2012; Fried 2012). Another advantage
is that voting is mandatory in Brazil; this mitigates some concerns about incumbents spending for
“turnout buying” rather than “conversion buying” or rewarding core supporters (Ansolabehere and
Snyder 2006; Nichter 2008).
83
Recent electoral outcomes in Brazil for the time period used in my analysis are shown in Ta-
ble 4.1. Presidential elections have been held every four years, in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014.
Municipal elections are always staggered two years after presidential ones: 2004, 2008, and 2012.
The four right-most columns show the results of the national elections. The Brazilian Worker’s
Party, or PT, has consistently won the presidency from 2002 to 2014, moving from Lula da Silva
to his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff. The Brazilian Social Democracy Party, or PSDB, has always
been the largest opposition party in recent elections. Therefore, the consistency of the party in
government and the main opposition party at the national stage makes examining Brazil ideal.11
Table 4.1: Brazilian electoral outcomes
Year Election Type Winning
Party
Coalition Members Opposition
Party
Opposition
Coalition
Members
2002 Presidential Lula da Silva
(PT)
PL PC do B, PMN, PCB,
PV
Jose´ Serra
(PSDB)
PMDB, PP,
PFL
2003
2004 Municipal
2005
2006 Presidential Lula da Silva
(PT)
PC do B, PRB, PMDB,
PL, PSB, PP, PMN
Geraldo
Alkmin
(PSDB)
PFL, PPS
2007
2008 Municipal
2009
2010 Presidential Dilma
Rousseff
(PT)
PMDB, PC do B, PDT,
PRB, PR, PSB, PSC,
PTC, PTN
Jose´ Serra
(PSDB)
DEM, PTB,
PPS, PMN, PT
do B
2011
2012 Municipal
2013
2014 Presidential Dilma
Rousseff
(PT)
PMDB, PSD, PP, PR,
PROS, PDT, PC do B,
PRB
Ae´cio
Neves
(PSDB)
PMN, SD,
DEM, PEN,
PTN, PTB,
PTC, PT do B
11Both the PT as well as the opposition PSDB have had slight changes to the makeup of their coalitions over time.
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The dependent variable in my analysis is per capita infrastructure transfers to municipalities.
These are, “related to budget items that involve the construction of buildings or bridges, the paving
of roads, the improvement of water and sewer systems, the purchase of ambulances, and so on,”
and evidence already suggests that these transfers are distributed primarily by the president for
opportunistic reasons (Brollo and Nannicini 2012, p. 749).12 Using a regression discontinuity de-
sign, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) find that mayors that are aligned with the ruling PT government
receive about one-third greater infrastructure transfers than municipalities that narrowly elected a
mayor of the opposition.
4.4.1 Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical argument discussed above, I have a number of expectations as to the
direction and relative size of the coefficients in the context of Brazil. First, I expect that greater
municipal support for the president’s party in the previous election will lead to larger transfers:
H1: As electoral support for the president increases, municipal transfers increase
The first hypothesis focuses only on how within-municipality factors might affect the level of
transfers from the national government. Taking into account the electoral support of neighbor-
ing municipalities leads to two competing theoretical expectations. On the one hand, incumbents
may reward stronghold regions. Thus, we might expect that increases in electoral support for the
president will lead to larger transfers, but only when surrounding support is also strong:
H2a: Increasing electoral support leads to increased municipal transfers, especially when a mu-
nicipality is surrounded by strong incumbent support
On the other hand, if we take the view that it is not strongholds, but islands, that the incumbent
should attempt to reward, we should observe the opposite effect. Greater electoral support for the
incumbent should still lead to increased infrastructure transfers, especially when a municipality is
surrounded by weak support for the incumbent:
12Moreover, most of the other types of transfers from the national level to municipalities are non-discretionary (Brollo
and Nannicini 2012).
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H2b: Increasing electoral support leads to increased municipal transfers, especially when a mu-
nicipality is surrounded by weak incumbent support
Last, the literature on temporal opportunism posits that there are strong incentives to time
budgetary changes to coincide with the election. Thus, transfers around the election should be
larger.13 I expect that political budget cycles may take place for both presidential and municipal
elections, since an incumbent wants to ensure re-election in the former, and tends to support co-
aligned incumbents in the latter (Brollo and Nannicini 2012). In addition, this pattern of support
may take place along the strongholds versus islands divide discussed above. Perhaps transfers
are timed around elections, but only to those regions of core support (strongholds) or instead to
supporters surrounded by municipalities of weak support (islands):14
H3a: Evidence for hypothesis H2a will be strongest in an election (municipal or presidential) year
H3b: Evidence for hypothesis H2b will be strongest in an election (municipal or presidential) year
4.5 Data and methods
As discussed above, I use data on 5,550 Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 2012 to test whether
incumbents pursue a strategy of rewarding strongholds or islands of support. The dependent vari-
able is the per capita infrastructure transfers to municipality i in year t. I use a random-effects
estimator for all models. To test if political transfers are a function of presidential support both
within-municipality as well as based on the surrounding municipalities, I use the following model:
Transfersit = b0+fTransfersit 1+b1Voteit +b2W Voteit +b3Voteit xW Voteit+
b4PT/Coal Mayorit + gControls+ eit (4.1)
where Transfersit is the level of intergovernmental discretionary transfers per capita for municipal-
ity i in year t, b0 is a constant, Transfersit 1 is the previous year’s per capita transfers to municipal-
13Municipal elections are held in October in Brazil; political budget cycles are likely to occur in the election year,
given that the election is not held until 10 months into the year. Previous scholars have accounted for different months of
elections in a number of ways, including the method used by Franzese (2000) which weights the month of the election.
14I remain ambivalent as to whether these effects should be largest during municipal or presidential elections
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ity i, and Voteit is the vote share of the president (always the PT) in the last presidential election.
To take into account the electoral performance outside a municipality, I add, W Voteit , which is
the vote share of the surrounding municipalities. This is also interacted with the vote share of the
municipality. The measure of the vote share of the surrounding municipalities,W Voteit , is known
as a spatial-X variable, with a weights matrix, W, specified by the analyst. This specification
is seldom straightforward, and often best-guided by theory (Neumayer and Plu¨mper 2012; Beck,
Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006). In this case, I use an inverse distance connectivity matrix, given
as wi j = 1di j , where each entry for row i, column j, is wi j, and di j is the centroid distance between
municipalities i and j. Therefore, if municipality j is far away from municipality i, it will have only
a small effect. I then row standardized the matrix by dividing each entry by the largest row sum
and column sum in the matrix (min-max row standardization). Next, I premultiplied presidential
vote by theW matrix. This creates a new vector,W Voteit , where higher values indicate that more
surrounding municipalities support the president, while low values indicate that the surrounding
municipalities have weak support.
In Equation 4.1, I also include PT/Coal Mayorit to control for partisan co-alignment between
the national and subnational levels (Khemani 2004; Brollo and Nannicini 2012), which is a dichoto-
mous variable equal to one if the mayor of the municipality belongs to either the PT or a coalition
member.15 I also include log total expenditures, the percentage of extremely poor residents, the
percentage of residents living in rural areas, the age of the mayor, and a dummy variable for if the
mayor is in their second—and final—term as a set of controls.
4.6 Results
The first set of results are shown in Table 4.2. Model 1 shows the results from Equation 4.1 without
the interaction between a municipality’s presidential vote and the surrounding presidential vote. As
expected, a one percentage point increase in presidential vote in a municipality is associated with
a 0.12 Brazilian Real (R$) increase in per capita transfers.16 In addition, the statistical significance
15Municipalities held by a PT mayor constituted about 9 percent of the sample; for those held by the PT or a coalition
member, this is around 46 percent.
16In mid-2010 the exchange rate was about R$1.8 per US dollar.
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of the lagged dependent variable suggests that transfers change annually at a moderate pace; on
average less than half of a municipality’s level of transfers can be attributed to the prior level of
transfers alone.
Model 1 shows support for the hypothesis that stronger support for the president leads to larger
subnational transfers. Yet does the surrounding support for the president affect how much the
incumbent distributes to a municipality? In Model 1, the coefficient on the spatial-X variable,
WPresidential Vote, is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that all else equal, a
municipality that is surrounded by strong incumbent-supporting municipalities receives less trans-
fers than one that is surrounded by municipalities with weak support.
While Model 1 shows evidence for the first hypothesis, it cannot test the second two hypotheses
on whether or not surrounding municipalities’ support for the incumbent conditions the effect that
a municipality’s own presidential support has on transfers. To do so I turn to Model 2, which inter-
acts presidential vote with the spatial-X variable, surrounding presidential vote. Since interpreting
interactive effects is not always straightforward, I use marginal effects plots, which are shown in
Figure 4.2. The plot on the left in Figure 4.2 shows the marginal effect of support for the PT in
the last presidential election, across the level of support of the surrounding municipalities (where
larger values indicate stronger support for the PT). This result clarifies the findings in Model 1;
increases in a municipality’s support for the PT has the largest positive effect on transfers when
surrounding municipalities are less supportive. While the marginal effect is not statistically sig-
nificant at either the very low- or high-end range of surrounding presidential PT vote, this finding
suggests that incumbents tend to favor islands of support rather than strongholds. This can also
be seen in the plot on the right in Figure 4.2, which shows the marginal effect of the surrounding
municipalities’ support for the PT, across the level of presidential vote for the PT. Again, while the
results are not statistically significant across the entire range, it shows that the marginal effect of
increasing surrounding support for the PT is always negative across the level of a municipality’s
own presidential support, and becomes more negative as surrounding support for the incumbent
party increases. The results from the first two models in Table 4.2 suggest that incumbents take
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Table 4.2: Evidence of spatio-temporal opportunism in Brazilian municipalities
(1) (2) (3)
Transfersit 1 0.458 0.458 0.458
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Presidential Vote 0.123 0.263 0.299
(0.050) (0.168) (0.226)
WPresidential Vote -0.194 0.021 0.209
(0.084) (0.260) (0.336)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won 6.131 6.146 16.066
(1.223) (1.223) (16.196)
WPresidential Vote x Presidential Vote -0.004 -0.007
(0.005) (0.007)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won xWPresidential Vote -0.481
(0.500)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won x Presidential Vote -0.111
(0.335)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won xWPresident. Vote x President. Vote 0.007
(0.010)
Municipal Election Yr. 52.356 52.358 52.397
(1.463) (1.463) (1.463)
Presidential Election Yr. 37.516 37.656 37.594
(1.517) (1.526) (1.534)
ln(Expenditures) -7.077 -7.100 -7.109
(0.676) (0.676) (0.676)
% Extremely Poor -1.310 -1.301 -1.303
(0.068) (0.069) (0.070)
% Rural Population 0.375 0.377 0.377
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Mayor Age -0.654 -0.656 -0.655
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Second Term 3.407 3.401 3.398
(1.261) (1.261) (1.261)
Constant 176.309 169.934 166.420
(12.610) (14.572) (16.081)
N 37540 37540 37540
Municipalities 5549 5549 5549
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22
c2 10710.99 10711.69 10714.47
Note: Dependent variable is per capita infrastructure transfers. Random-effects regression with standard errors in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests.  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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Figure 4.2: Incumbents reward islands, not strongholds
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into account their performance in the surrounding municipalities when choosing how to allocate
discretionary transfers.
4.6.1 Incorporating the sub-national context
So far, the results suggest that incumbents incorporate information about previous national PT sup-
port of the surrounding geographic area when allocating transfers to a given municipality. However,
the incumbent also has information on support at the local level; this was accounted for in mod-
els 1 and 2 in Table 4.2 with the dummy variable for whether or not a the municipality elected
a PT mayor (or mayor of a party in the PT’s governing coalition). In both models, this variable
was positive and statistically significant, confirming previous findings that co-aligned sub-national
units are often rewarded by their national counterpart (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Veiga and Pinho
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Figure 4.3: Sub-national partisanship affects transfers but it does not condition islands vs.
strongholds
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2007; Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012). Yet does such co-alignment affect the findings that incumbents
provide transfers to islands of support rather than strongholds? To test this, in Model 4 in Table
4.2 I interact the mayoral dummy with both presidential vote and surrounding presidential vote, as
well as the interaction between the two.
To better interpret these results, I plot the marginal effects in Figure 4.3. Overall, there are no
statistically significant differences between municipalities that elected a PT or coalition mayor and
those that did not. This suggests that although PT or coalition mayors tend to receive more transfers
than other municipalities, such partisanship is unassociated with the effect between presidential
electoral support and surrounding presidential support.
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4.6.2 Taking elections into account
The results in Table 4.2 indicate that incumbents reward supporter municipalities, especially when
they are surrounded by municipalities of low support. Yet incumbents also have an incentive to in-
crease these transfers at key points in the electoral cycle. As shown in Table 4.2, the coefficients on
the municipal and presidential election year dummy variables are always positive and statistically
significant. This is evidence of a political budget cycle effect for transfers. In addition, it may be
the case that the targeting of islands of support may be greatest during elections.
To see if elections condition the previous finding that the national incumbent targets islands of
support and not stronghold regions, in Table 4.3 I interact the municipal election dummy variable—
in Model 4—and national election dummy variable—in Model 5—with the percent of vote for the
incumbent and the surrounding vote for the incumbent, and the interaction between them.17 Again,
marginal effects plots offer the easiest way to interpret the interactive results in Table 4.3. The
results from Model 4 are depicted in Figure 4.4, where in the left plot I plot the marginal effect
of presidential vote on transfers across surrounding presidential vote. The solid blue line is the
marginal effect in a municipal election year, while the red dashed line is the marginal effect in a
non-municipal election year.
The results in Figure 4.4 show two vastly different incumbent strategies. In a non-municipal
election year, the marginal effect of a municipality’s presidential support is positive and significant
only when they are surrounded by weak supporting municipalities. When surrounding support is
high, stronger municipal support is associated with less transfers, all else equal. In contrast, in
a municipal election year the marginal effect of previous PT presidential vote is always positive
across the range of surrounding municipal support, albeit not statistically significant when sur-
rounding support is very low. The marginal effect for surrounding PT presidential support shown
on the right of Figure 4.4 supports these findings; in a non-election year, incumbents tend to re-
ward weak PT supporters in strong PT-supporting areas. In an election year, weak supporters are
17Recall from Table 4.1 that municipal and presidential elections are staggered, the former being held in 2004, 2008,
and 2012, and the latter in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014.
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Table 4.3: Incumbent strategy shifts during municipal elections
(4) (5)
Transfersit 1 0.458 0.458
(0.005) (0.005)
Municipal Election Yr. -25.049 52.378
(19.796) (1.464)
Presidential Election Yr. 37.147 23.558
(1.537) (17.340)
President. Vote 0.010 0.192
(0.194) (0.215)
WPresident. Vote -0.713 -0.150
(0.300) (0.322)
WPresident. Vote x President. Vote 0.007 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Municipal Election Yr. xWPresident. Vote 2.763
(0.588)
Municipal Election Yr. x President. Vote 1.120
(0.395)
Municipal Election Yr xWPresident. Vote x President. Vote -0.043
(0.012)
Presidential Election Yr. xWPresident. Vote 0.614
(0.551)
Presidential Election Yr. x President. Vote 0.221
(0.376)
Presidential Election Yr. xWPresident. Vote x President. Vote -0.011
(0.011)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won 6.092 6.186
(1.223) (1.227)
ln(Expenditures) -7.145 -7.065
(0.676) (0.677)
% Extremely Poor -1.334 -1.295
(0.069) (0.072)
% Rural Population 0.383 0.374
(0.036) (0.036)
Mayor Age -0.657 -0.656
(0.064) (0.064)
Second Term 3.307 3.434
(1.260) (1.261)
Constant 189.559 173.825
(15.280) (16.154)
N 37540 37540
Municipalities 5549 5549
R2 0.22 0.22
c2 10755.92 10713.82
Note: Dependent variable is per capita infrastructure transfers. Random-effects regression with standard errors in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests.  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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Figure 4.4: Incumbents shift to rewarding supporters
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rewarded less as the surrounding level of PT support is stronger. This suggests that incumbents
pursue a strategy of rewarding islands of support and punishing non-supporting municipalities in
stronghold regions in off-election years, and shifting towards rewarding supporter municipalities,
no matter the level of surrounding support, during municipal elections.
To see if this effect holds in presidential election years, in Figure 4.5 I plot the marginal effects
of presidential support and surrounding presidential support from Model 5 in the left and right
plots, respectively. Note now that the solid blue line shows the marginal effect in a presidential
election year, while the dotted red line shows the marginal effect in a non-presidential election year.
Unlike the results for municipal election, there appears to be no difference between presidential
election and non-election years in terms of affecting the relationship between municipal support
and surrounding support. The marginal effect of municipal support for the PT is generally positive
(though not statistically significantly different from zero) across the range of surrounding support
for the PT. Therefore, incumbents appear to shift their strategy during municipal election years, not
presidential ones.
4.6.3 Robustness
I investigate the robustness of the findings above by examining the vote share in the second round
of presidential elections. In Brazil, these are held if no candidate secures a majority vote. Second
rounds were held in each presidential election in the sample. If a second round is held, only the top
two candidates face off against each other. If voters use the first round as a “protest vote,” results
may be more clear when examining the second round of presidential election results.
As with the first-round results, I estimate the same five models on the second round. These
are shown in Table 4.4. Across the first four models, the results are very similar to those using the
first round of presidential election results. The exception is Model 10, which examines whether
incumbent strategy of rewarding strongholds or islands shifts during presidential elections. While
none of the interaction terms in this model were significant in Table 4.3, many of them are in Table
4.4.
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Figure 4.5: No shifting strategies during presidential elections
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Table 4.4: Spatio-temporal opportunism in the second round of voting
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transferst 1 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456 0.456
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
W 2nd Round -0.443 0.049 0.142 -0.646 -0.537
(0.071) (0.260) (0.348) (0.305) (0.305)
2nd Round -0.015 0.321 0.332 0.032 -0.101
(0.049) (0.177) (0.244) (0.208) (0.211)
Municipal Election Yr. 52.323 52.314 52.339 -9.881 52.361
(1.461) (1.461) (1.462) (23.172) (1.461)
Presidential Election Yr. 36.535 36.634 36.590 36.850 -48.199
(1.487) (1.488) (1.492) (1.489) (22.810)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won 6.301 6.360 12.188 6.075 6.140
(1.221) (1.222) (20.678) (1.222) (1.224)
W 2nd Round x 2nd Round -0.008 -0.010 0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won xW 2nd Round -0.243
(0.512)
PT Mayor/Coal. Won x 2nd Round -0.043
(0.354)
PT Mayor/Coal. xW2nd Round x 2nd Round 0.003
(0.009)
Municipal Election Yr. xW2nd Round 2.364
(0.568)
Municipal Election Yr x 2nd Round 0.974
(0.394)
Muni. Elec. Yr. xW2nd Round x 2nd Round -0.038
(0.009)
Presidential Election Yr. xW2nd Round 1.883
(0.570)
Presidential Election Yr x 2nd Round 1.261
(0.399)
Pres. Elec. Yr. xW2nd Round x 2nd Round -0.027
(0.010)
ln(Expenditures) -7.381 -7.407 -7.419 -7.514 -7.534
(0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.680)
% Extremely Poor -1.261 -1.254 -1.256 -1.249 -1.185
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072)
% Rural Population 0.359 0.363 0.364 0.366 0.354
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Mayor Age -0.647 -0.650 -0.650 -0.648 -0.645
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Second Term 3.608 3.594 3.595 3.403 3.573
(1.259) (1.259) (1.259) (1.259) (1.259)
Constant 199.397 180.486 178.579 200.541 210.215
(12.837) (16.035) (18.504) (17.227) (17.521)
N 37540 37540 37540 37540 37540
Municipalities 5549 5549 5549 5549 5549
R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
c2 10757.90 10762.60 10763.06 10833.94 10787.32
Note: Dependent variable is per capita infrastructure transfers. Random-effects regression with standard errors in paren-
theses. Two-tailed tests.  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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Figure 4.6: National elections do shift incumbent strategy (second round results)
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To better visualize these differences, I plot the marginal effect of second round presidential vote
for the PT across surrounding second round vote (on the left-side plot), and the marginal effect of
surrounding municipalities’ second round presidential vote across a municipality’s second round
vote (on the right-side plot) in Figure 4.6. In a non-presidential election year, increased support for
the incumbent’s party is associated with increased transfers to a municipality, but only when the
municipality is surrounded by fairly weak support. In a presidential election year, there appears
to be no conditioning relationship between municipal and surrounding incumbent support; in fact,
as shown in Figure 4.6, the effect of previous incumbent support on transfers is not statistically
significantly different from zero, no matter the level of surrounding support.
Overall, the results using the second round vote in presidential elections are largely similar to
the first round results. I find that incumbents pursue a strategy of rewarding islands of support
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rather than strongholds. However, unlike the first round results, I find that, when using the second
round votes, the incumbent party does tend to shift its opportunistic strategy both during municipal
as well as presidential elections, moving from rewarding islands to a much broader flow of transfers
to municipalities that does not appear to be conditional on the level of support in the surrounding
municipalities.
4.7 Discussion and conclusion
A number of important findings are worth discussing from the results above. First, as the literature
on opportunism predicts, I find evidence that municipalities are rewarded for their support for
the incumbent in the previous presidential election. Expanding extant models by incorporating
surrounding patterns of municipal support, I also find that incumbents pursue a strategy of favoring
islands of support rather than strongholds. That is, incumbents tend to shift more transfers to
supporter municipalities surrounded by areas of weak support than to those surrounded by strong
supporters. This suggests that incumbents are taking into account external factors—surrounding
regional support—when considering how to allocate resources to a particular municipality.
I also found evidence of a political budget cycle effect. Across all model specifications, there
was a marked increase in infrastructure transfers to municipalities in both municipal and presi-
dential election years. This is consistent with a large literature suggesting that incumbents may
opportunistically time transfers (Schady 2000; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; Kwon 2005).
Even more important, I find that the incumbent strategy shifts during municipal and presidential
elections; incumbents reward islands of support and tend to punish non-supporting municipalities
surrounded by strong supporters in off-municipal and off-presidential election years.18 However,
during elections, the effect that previous PT support has on transfers does not depend on a munic-
ipality’s neighbors. That is to say, incumbents appear to not take surrounding geographic context
into account during elections.
18Recall that the presidential election findings were only present when using election results from the second round
of voting.
99
While an important step forward, there are a number of directions that could be investigated in
future work. For one, I assumed that the spatial weights matrix was an inverse distance, such that
spatially proximate municipality regions matter more than ones further away. While this is a com-
mon assumption in most applied work, there are reasons why spatial distance may not be the only
driver of the placement of transfers.19 In addition, while I operationalized party support through the
use of the previous PT vote share in presidential elections, perhaps a measure of competition—such
as win margin—is a better reflection of the way in which the national incumbent rewards or pun-
ishes sub-national municipalities.20 Last, while I found evidence that the incumbent incorporates
previous presidential support, mayoral partisan characteristics, and surrounding municipal support,
there may be other factors that play into the incumbent’s strategy.
The existing literature in distributive politics has tended to focus on geographic units in iso-
lation. In this chapter, I expanded upon this by looking both across space and over time to argue
that incumbents may strategically time where and when transfers are likely to occur. Pitting a
“strongholds” hypothesis versus a “islands” one, I find evidence that incumbents tend to reward
islands of support rather than regional strongholds. Moreover, I find evidence that this strategy
switches in municipal and presidential election years. Taken together, these results suggest the
need to take into account both neighboring spatial units, as well as the time relative to the election,
when examining opportunistic transfers.
19As the title of Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006) suggests, “Space is more than geography.” In the case of Brazil-
ian municipalities, perhaps the relative size of the municipality (e.g. population, wealth) matters more for connectivity
between municipalities than geographic distance alone.
20Of course, using second round election results is essentially a win margin measure, since there are only two parties.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Introduction
It has been over four decades since Nordhaus (1975) wrote what is largely considered to be the first
quantitative article on political cycles. This subject has remained an important area of interest ever
since. At its core lies a paradox regarding democratic accountability; on the one hand, elections
are designed to hold politicians to account for their performance over their term in office. As the
economic voting literature suggests, incumbents are largely evaluated on how well the macroecon-
omy performed, or how well-off an individual voter perceives they themselves have become. On
the other hand, the very act of holding elections, coupled with the fact that voters tend to remember
the more recent past, creates an incentive for the incumbent to manipulate various instruments just
before an election to make voters feel that the economy is doing better than it actually is. Thus, the
very elections used to hold politicians accountable create perverse incentives to change behavior
during elections.
Much ink has been spilt about the various tools incumbents might use, such as monetary or
fiscal policy—as well as other routes—such as entering into conflicts (to create a “rally-round-the-
flag” effect), boosting employment, speeding along government contracts, and so on. Ultimately,
whether one feels such manipulation is “good” or “bad” depends on context; passing land reform
policies, as shown in the third chapter, may truly have been in the voters’ interests, but it was in the
incumbent’s interests to time their passage strategically. On the other hand, boosting the money
supply (and therefore increasing price rises) probably benefits very few voters over the long-term.
In addition to the context on the normative implications on political cycles, a substantial body
of literature now exists on the contextual factors that make political cycles more or less likely. For
example, institutional constraints on fiscal behavior, the transparency of government, and the level
of development are just three examples of important conditioning effects. Despite such a large body
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of literature, in this dissertation I have addressed three significant gaps. Below, I briefly summarize
each of the substantive chapters. I conclude by offering ideas on fruitful areas of future research.
5.1.1 What do we really know about political budget cycles?
In the second chapter, I used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the political budget cycle literature
in order to establish whether or not budgetary instruments such as expenditures, revenues, debt,
and fiscal balance, increase or decrease around elections. This was motivated by the need to better
summarize the literature, which is very large, and nearly impossible to summarize in a single liter-
ature review. Although a number of scholars have written excellent qualitative literature reviews,
even these articles face a number of issues. For one, they face a difficulty aggregating the results
and accounting for the “quality” of a study. If one article finds statistically significant evidence
for political budget cycles but another does not, what can we substantively conclude? Is one arti-
cle more convincing (theoretically, methodologically) than another, and how can we take this into
account? In other words, given numerous studies on political budget cycles, what is the best way
to aggregate the results of individual studies to make broad statements about what we know? The
second issue with qualitative literature reviews is that it is difficult to make an “all else equal” com-
parison between articles, given that they are often conducted on different data, use different control
variables, and might even use a different operationalization of the dependent variable.1 How can
we account for these differences when comparing studies?
To better quantify the literature on political budget cycles, I used a meta-analytic approach,
popular in other fields, and growing in prominence in political science and economics. Taken as a
whole, evidence suggests that there is statistically significant evidence that expenditures and debt
increase during elections, while revenues and fiscal surpluses decrease. However, the magnitude of
this effect, judged against other meta-analyses in the social sciences, is small. I also documented
evidence of publication bias in the literature, which suggests that higher-ranked (by impact factor)
1Although these are probably the two most important issues, a number of others exist. There is no way to identify, or
account for, publication bias. Study-specific heterogeneity cannot be identified or characterized. In addition, it is hard
to be comprehensive; given journal page limits, one cannot write about every article in the literature. Thus, subjective
author biases might also play a role in which articles are appearing in a qualitative meta-analysis.
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journals tend to publish “more significant” findings. However, a statistically significant political
budget cycle effect remains even after accounting for such bias.
In the second chapter I was also able to characterize how much a particular decision about
data, variables, or methods in a particular article influences the relationship between budgets and
elections. Using Bayesian model averaging in the context of a meta-regression analysis, I found
that incumbents tend to consistently manipulate aggregate expenditures—and not, as much of the
literature contends—highly disaggregated expenditures such as education or health. I also found
that political budget cycles are robust to many methodological and data-specific choices, such as
employing fixed or random effects, or more fine-grained coding of the election year. Last, in line
with numerous studies, the results in the second chapter suggest that a number of factors, such as
democracy and economic development, probably condition the relationship between elections and
budgets.
5.1.2 Are there budget cycle alternatives?
In the third chapter, I proposed a theory of political policy cycles. If we expect that fiscal and mon-
etary manipulation takes place, why not other policies that matter to voters? I specifically focused
on the passage of land reform legislation in the context of Indian states. This case was selected
since it should be one of the most likely contexts in which to observe political policy cycles, should
they exist. There are several reasons for this. Land reform has been an important redistributive
policy in India that is salient to voters, attributable to the government in power, and low-cost to the
incumbents, since wealthy landowners bear the brunt of the costs. Using aggregate data, I found
that land reform policies are consistently passed in the year before a state election. This finding
remained robust to a variety of alternative specifications, such as controlling for ideology, polit-
ical competition, proxies for landless voters, and accounting for states that have had historically
left-leaning policies. I also used historical survey evidence to show that land reform has remained
a salient issue to individuals, even in states that have passed previous reforms. This suggests that
redistributive policies are a tool used by incumbents during elections, and an important alternative
to fiscal manipulation.
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5.1.3 Does space matter in addition to time?
In the fourth chapter, I used theories from distributive politics to help explain why sub-national
transfers may shift around elections not only in time, but also in space. The literature on distribu-
tive politics has debated on whether incumbents reward their political bases of support, or instead
target geographic areas of marginal support in order to win the next election. Adapting these two
competing theoretical claims, I have argued that this literature has left out two important com-
ponents. First, incumbents targeting localities for distributive benefits may focus not only on the
electoral performance of that locality, but also the electoral performance of the surrounding local-
ities in deciding how to reward them with opportunistic goods. Second, not only are these goods
more likely to be provided during elections (as the political budget cycle literature suggests), the
spatial targeting strategy used by incumbents might shift during elections.
Using data on intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities, in the fourth chapter I
found that incumbents appear to take into account the electoral performance of surrounding mu-
nicipalities when handing out transfers. Greater support for the incumbent’s party in the previous
presidential elections is associated with larger transfers, especially when a municipality is sur-
rounded by municipalities that have not supported the incumbent. In line with the political budget
cycle literature, I also found that transfers to municipalities increase during both presidential and
municipal election years.2 Last, the findings suggest that incumbent strategy shifts during elections.
In off-election years, incumbents reward “islands” of support (supporter municipalities surrounded
by low-supporting municipalities). However, during election years, especially municipal ones, in-
cumbents shift their opportunistic strategy towards rewarding past political support, regardless of
whether a municipality is surrounded by strong supporters or weak supporters. This suggests that
incumbents are aware of both time and space during elections, and shift their strategy accordingly.
2Recall that these were staggered so that municipal elections occur every four years, two years after a presidential
election.
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5.2 Future directions
Despite the three contributions herein, there still remain a number of other areas for future research
on political cycles. I address five different areas below. For some proposed research areas, such
as cross-governmental linkages and compositional spending, data already exist and a few scholars
have made important inroads in these areas. Others, such as elite behavior or the impact of political
cycles on elections, may be highly endogenous, or data may be difficult to gather. Regardless, these
five areas represent some of the most promising avenues of future research on political cycles.
5.2.1 Compositional spending
As described in the meta-analysis chapter, much of the recent work on political budget cycles has
shifted from aggregate indicators, such as total expenditures or fiscal balance, to disaggregated ones
such as capital, current, health, and education expenditures. Such disaggregation is a welcome im-
provement, since it helps narrow down exactly where increases in expenditures (or decreases in
revenues) might occur during elections. Yet selecting a particular category may miss important
changes in other, overlooked categories. As Kramon and Posner (2013, p. 467) contend when
discussing the field of distributive politics more broadly, the conclusions reached by a particular
scholar, “will be as much a function of the outcome they happen to select as of the general pat-
terns of political behavior that they are trying to understand.”3 In other words, picking specific
categories may either downplay or—more likely given author subjectivities and bias towards sig-
nificant findings—emphasize sizable movements in single categories that are of little substantive
significance when looking at the entire budget.
A study examining all budgetary components would get around these critiques by analyzing
how all allocations change simultaneously around elections. Although scholars have looked at
the total change of budgetary categories around elections (Brender and Drazen 2013), they have
not modeled simultaneous changes in the composition of budgets during elections (i.e., modeling
3The authors examine four dependent variables across studies examining six African countries, finding that the
conclusions reached about whether ethnic favoritism exists depends to a large part on which country is being examined
and which outcome (e.g., water provision, infant life expectancy) is used as the dependent variable.
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how health, education, welfare, defense spending, etc., change around elections). Recently, a
number of methodological approaches have been designed to handle this type of data (Philips,
Rutherford and Whitten 2015, 2016a,b; Lipsmeyer, Philips and Whitten Forthcoming). Examining
how budgets change around elections, not just particular categories, would be a welcome addition
to the literature.
5.2.2 Cross-national linkages
Are political budget cycles more likely, or larger in magnitude, at the regional or local level? As
discussed in the meta-analysis chapter, there has been no theorizing as to why this may be the case.
One reason might be due to linkages (partisan or some other type) between the local and national
incumbents. This might provide an incentive for further manipulation; as Dubois (2016, p. 249)
points out, “one might think that [political budget cycles] at the local level would be reinforced
if the local government shared the same political opinions as the national government.” That is
to say, linkages allow the national government to channel funds to choice localities, and localities
use these funds around elections to appeal to voters. In federal systems such as the US and Brazil,
there are multiple levels of government with the potential to create political cycles (e.g., national,
state, local), and important relationships between each level that may make these cycles more or
less likely. Although there has been some work on accounting for such linkages (e.g., Khemani
2004; Pepinsky 2007; Rumi 2014; Ribeiro and Jorge 2015)—and I control for them in the third and
fourth chapters—this phenomenon remains understudied.
5.2.3 Elite behavior
Although the workhorse competency model of political budget cycles assumes that the incumbent
is either competent or incompetent, much more remains to be done in terms of how elites behave in
terms of their decision to manipulate. Are certain types of incumbents more likely to manipulate,
such as men versus women incumbents, new leaders, incumbents in new democracies, or partisan
differences? In addition, when in the election cycle does the incumbent decide that they need to
manipulate, and what goes into their strategic decision-making about how much to manipulate?
106
Other literatures focus on the forces that change elite behavior. For instance, in the work on
economic voting, there is evidence that parties shift their strategies in response to external stimuli
(Green and Hobolt 2008; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009),
and that parties change their economic emphasis during campaigns in response to changing eco-
nomic conditions, as well as the campaign strategies of other parties (Williams, Seki and Whitten
2016). Such strategic behavior could be further incorporated into the work on political cycles.
5.2.4 Individual-level evidence
Articles analyzing disaggregated expenditures have argued that incumbents will try to manipulate
certain, “visible” policies that appeal to voters (Gonzalez 2002; Khemani 2004; Chang 2008; Aidt,
Veiga and Veiga 2011; Katsimi and Sarantides 2012; Enkelmann and Leibrecht 2013). However,
as shown in the meta-analysis chapter, there is very little evidence in support of a particular visi-
ble category of revenues or expenditures that incumbents consistently manipulate during elections.
Moreover, there is no research in the political cycle literature on the type of fiscal categories voters
are most likely to focus on during elections. Are voters more likely to notice an increase in transfer
payments than an increase in road construction, for instance? More importantly, is it likely to influ-
ence their vote? While numerous scholars have staked out a theoretical expectation on this without
much evidence, survey evidence—perhaps even a survey experiment—of particular policies that
become more salient to voters around elections would help shed light on the type of policies that
are truly visible and likely to be manipulated.
5.2.5 Impact of political cycle on elections
While it is clear that incumbents manipulate policies around elections, does such manipulation
have an effect on electoral outcomes? That is to say, does fiscal or monetary intervention make
enough of a difference in elections to turn an incumbent defeat into a victory? A few scholars have
flipped the causal arrow around in this manner. For instance, Klomp and De Haan (2013c) examine
if political budget cycles increase the probability of re-election, while Brender and Drazen (2008)
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find no relationship between increases in fiscal deficits and re-election prospects (see also Veiga
and Veiga 2013).
Despite some research into the effect that political cycles have on re-elections, a number of
issues remain. First, there may be non-linear or threshold effects, such that a large enough change
in a fiscal category, such as expenditures, has the ability to move election results. Second, as
discussed above, certain visible categories might be more efficient at shifting votes for a given
amount of manipulation. There is a clear need for further investigation into the electoral “boost”
that political cycles provide.
5.3 Manipulating the masses
“You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but
you cannot fool all the people all the time” —Abraham Lincoln
Are politicians “manipulating the masses?” As evidenced by the substantive chapters in this dis-
sertation, the answer appears to be yes. As shown in the second chapter, taking the literature as
a whole, there is statistically significant (though substantively small) evidence that expenditures
and debt rise during elections, while revenues and fiscal surpluses fall. All of this suggests that
incumbents use policies at their disposal to increase their likelihood of re-election.
However, far from being a blunt tool, I have shown that incumbents are often sophisticated
in their varied use of tools of manipulation. As discussed in the third chapter, incumbents may
pursue alternative policies to fiscal or monetary manipulation, such as passing redistributive poli-
cies around elections that appeal to voters. In the fourth chapter, I showed that incumbents do not
simply allocate transfers to municipalities during elections, but follow a careful strategy of target-
ing supporter municipalities surrounded by non-supporters in off-election years, and move towards
broad-based rewards (based on previous presidential support) in election years. Not only do politi-
cians appear to use political cycles in order to enhance their re-election prospects, they appear to
adapt their strategy in order to continue to do so.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Studies included in meta-analysis
Table A.1 shows the studies included in the main meta-analysis.
Table A.1: Included studies
Schady (2000); Schuknecht (2000); Wibbels (2000); Harrinvirta and Mattila (2001); Kneebone
andMcKenzie (2001); Neck and Getzner (2001); John andWard (2001); Goff and Tollison (2002);
Rodden and Wibbels (2002); Svorny and Marcal (2002); Galli and Rossi (2002); Block (2002);
Gordin (2002); Gonzalez (2002); Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004); Baleiras and Costa (2004);
Binet and Pentecoˆte (2004); Khemani (2004); Lambrinidis et al. (2005); Brender and Drazen
(2005); Kwon (2005); Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2005); Ames et al. (2005); Alt and Lassen (2006);
Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006); Haber and Neck (2006); Mink and de Haan (2006); Rose (2006);
Shi and Svensson (2006); Geys (2007); Remmer (2007); Tujula and Wolswijk (2007); Pepin-
sky (2007); Veiga and Pinho (2007); Veiga and Veiga (2007); Chang (2008); Klasˇnja (2008);
Bercoff and Meloni (2009); Chang et al. (2009); Streb et al. (2009); Vergne (2009); Sa´ez and
Sinha (2010); Drazen and Eslava (2010); Hagen (2010); Hyde and O’Mahony (2010); Krish-
nakumar et al. (2010); Peters (2010); Potrafke (2010); Barberia and Avelino (2011); Efthyvoulou
(2011); Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2011); Garcı´a-Sa´nchez et al. (2011); Jochimsen and Nuscheler
(2011); O’Mahony (2011); Park (2011); Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2011); Sedmihradska´ et
al. (2011); Bartolini and Santolini (2012); Benito et al. (2012); Efthyvoulou (2012); Hanusch
(2012); Katsimi and Sarantides (2012); Padovano (2012) Streb et al. (2012); Veiga (2012); Benito
et al. (2013); Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2013); Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013); Dash and Raja
(2013); Guillamo´n et al. (2013); Klomp and De Haan (2013c,b,a); Sjahrir et al. (2013); Wehner
(2013); Aidt and Mooney (2014); Amable and Azizi (2014); Garcı´a-Sa´nchez et al. (2014); Macˇkic´
(2014); Nyblade and O’Mahony (2014); Padovano (2014); Petrarca (2014); Shelton (2014); Tepe
and Vanhuysse (2014); Bee and Moulton (2015); Getzner (2015); Houlberg and Pedersen (2015);
Neck, Haber and Klinglmair (2015); Ribeiro and Jorge (2015)
A.2 Details on research design
As discussed in Chapter 2, a specific set of criteria had to be met for a study to be included in
the meta analysis. This can be grouped into four general stages, as shown in Figure A.1. In
the identification step, searches for “political budget cycle” and “political business cycle” were
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performed using both Google Scholar and Web of Science. A total of 1120 were identified for
political budget cycles, and 4740 for political business cycles. Next, study titles and abstracts were
screened. This excluded the vast majority of search results, since a substantial portion of Google
Scholar results are often citations to unpublished papers, or conference papers that became articles,
were not in English, or overlapped with the other search term.
Figure A.1: Decision tree for inclusion
Studies identified 
through keyword 
search “political budget 
cycle”
(N=1120)
Study titles and 
abstracts screened
(N=5860)
Full-text Screening for 
Eligibility
(N=232)
Studies Included in 
Meta-analysis
(N=88)
Excluded Studies
(N=5630)
Excluded Studies
(N=144)
Only Formal Model
(N=25)
Qualitative Study
(N=6)
No Fiscal Variable
(N=35)
No Election Variable
(N=37)
Exclusively 
Conditional Effects
(N=22)
Other
(N=19)
Iden%ﬁca%on	
Screening	
Eligibility	
Inclusion	
Studies identified 
through keyword 
search “political 
business cycle”
(N=4740)
Of the 232 studies that remained, a full-text screening for eligibility was performed. This
involved reading the text and ensuring that the article: 1.) contained an empirical test, 2.) used a
fiscal measure as the dependent variable, 3.) included some form of election variable 4.) did not
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exclusively report an interaction between elections and some other variable. The studies that did
not meet these criteria are in the “Excluded Studies” section below.
One interesting question is how the inability to get all available studies might affect the results.4
We might expect that if working papers were to be included, the effect size might be smaller
(towards zero). This is because of the tendency for journals to publish significant findings. In line
with other meta-analyses, (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu 2008), I did not include working papers.
There were several reasons for this. First, working papers have not yet gone through the peer
review process, so we might expect these studies to be of lower quality. Second, with nearly 1200
estimates of the political budget cycle effect, the dataset I constructed was large by meta-analytic
standards (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012); this reflects the substantial size of the literature, both
in number of articles and length of time studies have been published. Were the literature on political
budget cycles less developed, considering working papers might be a good strategy. Last, unless the
overlooked studies were non-randomly distributed along the funnel plot (which plots the calculated
partial correlation against precision), they should not exert much influence on the average effect.
Again, while we might expect working papers to be centered around zero effect, it is hard to
see how other overlooked studies—for instance, if a public finance article simply controlled for
elections—would be anything except random. In fact, Stanley, Jarrell and Doucouliagos (2010)
show that keeping only the top 10% most precise estimates often leads to better estimates of the
true effect size. As shown in Table A.2, the trimmed estimated effect size is fairly close to the
full-sample estimate. The average effect is slightly larger for expenditures and debt and smaller for
revenues and fiscal balance. Thus, the effect sizes seen in Chapter 2 appears to be robust; it would
take a very precise overlooked study to change the results in a significant way.
In Chapter 2 I opened discussion of the results from the effect size calculation through the use
of a funnel plot. Another way to visualize the effect size, and to test if the empirical findings remain
constant over time, is to regress the publication year on the partial correlations. This is weighted
by the precision of the estimate. This is shown in Figure A.2. More precise estimates are indicated
4I thank an anonymous reviewer for posing this question.
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Table A.2: Does trimming the bottom 90% change the effect size?
Fiscal Variable Full Sample (Obs.) Top 10% Precise (Obs.)
Expenditures 0.046 (699) 0.060 (70)
Revenues -0.047 (243) -0.019 (25)
Fiscal Balance -0.107 (234) -0.073 (24)
Debt 0.011 (22) 0.082 (3)
Notes: Table shows unweighted means of calculated partial correlations, with number of observations in parentheses.
by larger circles. A number of interesting characteristics of the results can be gleaned from Figure
A.2. The first is that extreme estimates of the effect size tend to lack precision. In addition, the
variation in effect size appears to increase for more recent publications. As mentioned earlier, the
average effect size is relatively small. Moreover, it does not appear to change much over time,
although all effects look like they are converging on zero.
Figure A.2: Effect size over publication year
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Note: Larger circles indicate increased model precision. Regression lines weighted by precision.
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A.3 Addressing potential publication bias
In Chapter 2, the results of the meta-regression analysis suggested that publication bias may exist.
To test whether the quality of a journal affects the precision of the estimates, I ran the following
regression:
Precisioni j = b0+b1Impact Factori j+ ei j (A.1)
testing the hypothesis that journal quality for study i, model j (as proxied by the impact factor)
is not related to the precision of the partial correlation (one over the standard error), H0 : b1 = 0.
As shown by Table A.3, the journal impact factor is positive and statistically significant for expen-
ditures and revenues, but not for fiscal surplus or debt. This suggests that higher quality journals
publish studies of expenditures and revenues with higher levels of precision. To put these effects
in perspective, consider that moving from an unranked journal (with an impact factor of zero) to
the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the highest-ranked journal in the sample, would result in the
standard error of the effect size decreasing from about 0.049 to 0.017 (when using expenditures).
Given that the average partial correlation was near-zero, this means moving from an effect that is
not statistically significant to one that is. In contrast, neither fiscal surplus or debt appear to suffer
from publication bias according to Table A.3, since the impact factor is not statistically significant.
Table A.3: Publication bias: Journal quality on precision
Expenditures Revenues Fiscal Surplus Debt
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Journal Impact Factor (b1) 6.701 3.167 -1.490 -9.002
(0.939) (1.578) (1.257) (7.769)
Constant (b0) 20.595 21.330 25.425 41.493
(1.388) (2.095) (1.459) (6.317)
Observations 699 243 234 22
R2 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.06
Notes: Dependent variable is precision. Standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0:10, ** p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01.
141
Next, I follow the suggestion of Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) to test for publication bias
using the following regression:
ti j = b0
1
SEi j
+b1+ vi j (A.2)
where the t-statistic of the partial correlation for model i and study j is regressed on the coefficient
on the standard error of the effect size divided by itself, b1, a constant term, b0, and an error term,
vi j =
ei j
SE . These results are shown in Table A.4. Also known as the funnel asymmetry test (FAT),
it is used to examine asymmetries in the t-statistic across the precision of the estimates. Such
asymmetry is indicative of publication bias. As shown in the table, the coefficient on the standard
error, b1, is negative and statistically significant for expenditures and debt. Both revenues and
fiscal surplus have positive standard error estimates, although this effect is statistically significant
for only fiscal surplus. This indicates that expenditures, fiscal surplus, and debt appear to have
effect sizes that may be distorted by publication bias.
Table A.4: Publication bias: FAT-PET
Expenditures Revenues Fiscal Surplus Debt
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Standard Errori j (b1) -60.455 0.624 20.246 -121.969
(7.579) (5.910) (4.269) (31.055)
Constant (b0) 4.261 -1.007 -3.246 5.873
(0.318) (0.262) (0.202) (1.005)
Observations 699 243 234 22
R2 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.44
Notes: Dependent variable is the t-statistic of the model-study partial correlation. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p< 0:10, ** p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01.
In Table A.4 we can also test for the significance of of the constant, which is known as the
precision effect test (PET). Rejection of the null hypothesis that b0 = 0 indicates that despite pub-
lication bias, there exists a true underlying effect. Or, in other words, when publication bias equals
zero, there is still an effect statistically significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis can
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be rejected for all four dependent variable categories, in the expected theoretical directions; despite
publication bias, there appears to be a genuine increase in expenditures and debt during elections,
and a decrease in revenues and fiscal surplus.
Since publication bias and an underlying effect appear to exist, as well as an underlying effect,
I present the precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE) test in Table A.5. It provides
a better estimate of the underlying effect in the presence of publication bias (Stanley and Doucou-
liagos 2012). Weighting by the standard error as with the FAT-PET test, but replacing the standard
error on b1 with the variance yields:
ti j = b0
1
SEi j
+b1SEi j+ vi j (A.3)
A significant b0 provides evidence that there is an underlying effect of political budget cycles. As
evidenced by the constant, b0 remains positive and significant for expenditures and debt, and neg-
ative and significant for revenues and fiscal surplus. This suggests that the underlying effect seen
in the literature remains robust to publication bias. Moreover, this effect remains in the expected
theoretical direction and is statistically significant across all models.
Table A.5: Publication bias: PEESE
Expenditures Revenues Fiscal Surplus Debt
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Variancei j (b1) -357.239 14.967 106.617 -1029.085
(72.906) (63.683) (33.163) (416.913)
Constant (b0) 2.775 -1.011 -2.647 3.627
(0.220) (0.166) (0.125) (0.769)
Observations 699 243 234 22
R2 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.23
Notes: Dependent variable is the t-statistic of the model-study partial correlation. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p< 0:10, ** p< 0:05, *** p< 0:01.
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A.4 Excluded studies
Table A.6 documents the studies that failed to make it past the eligibility stage, along with the
reason for exclusion.
Table A.6: Studies excluded from analysis
Formal model
Tuinstra (2000); Baleiras and Santos (2000); Ghate and Zak (2002); Gavious and Mizrahi (2002);
Economides et al. (2003); Dhami (2003); Streb (2005); Kayser (2005); Sieg (2006); Aidt and
Dutta (2007); Beniers and Dur (2007); Candel-Sa´nchez (2007); Saporiti and Streb (2008); Biswas
and Marjit (2008); Martinez (2009); Bonomo and Terra (2010); Garrı´ (2010); Yoshino and Mi-
zoguchi (2010); Gersbach (2004); Hanusch (2012); Streb and Torrens (2013); Ales et al. (2014);
Ferre´ and Manzano (2014); Hanusch and Magleby (2014); Findley (2015)
Qualitative
Franzese (2002); Shi and Svensson (2003); Eslava (2011); Lupu and Riedl (2013); Percic and
Apostoaie (2014); Hala´sz (2014)
No fiscal variable
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Table A.6 Continued
Kiefer (2000); DeRouen and Heo (2000, 2001) [no. of defense contracts]; Toma and Cebula
(2001); Patterson and Beason (2001) [announcement of stimulus package]; Heckelman (2001);
Heckelman (2002); Erlandsson (2004); Krause (2005); Heckelman and Wood (2005); An-
drikopoulos et al. (2006); Berlemann and Markwardt (2006); Heckelman (2006); Sadeh (2006);
O¨zatay (2007); Miliauskas and Grebliauskas (2008); Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) [no. new teach-
ers]; Milani (2010); Ferris and Voia (2011); Helland (2011); Potrafke (2012); Canes-Wrone and
Park (2012); Ahlquist (2010) [social pacts]; Coelho et al. (2006) [local employment]; Rose and
Smith (2012) [revenue forecast bias]; Brogan (2012) [forecast errors]; Brender and Drazen (2013)
[change of leader’s post-election effect on spending]; Geys (2013) [employment]; Mechtel and
Potrafke (2013) [growth in job-creation scheme enrollment]; Anessi-Pessina and Sicilia (2015)
[revenue misrepresentation] Baskaran, Min, and Uppal (2015) [electricity provision]; (Benito,
Guillamo´n and Bastida 2015) [deviation from expected]; Chiripanhura and Nin˜o-Zarazu´a (2015)
[GDP growth]; Katsimi and Sarantides (2015) [probability of re-election]; Konstantakis et al.
(2015) [GDP cycle]
No election variable
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Table A.6 Continued
Ergun (2000) [1 and 2 periods before election]; Esaw and Garratt (2000); Padovano and Venturi
(2001) [election variable is last term]; Reddick (2002) [1 and 2 periods before election]; Remmer
(2002); Matschke (2003) [countdown variable for election]; Easaw and Garratt (2006); Cerda and
Vergara (2008); Guo (2009); Benito and Bastida (2009); Balassone et al. (2010); Bogdan et al.
(2010) [election variable is for term continuation]; Luo et al. (2010); Klein (2010) [diff. in diff.];
Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010) [no election variable, hazard model]; Albuquerque (2011) [election
variable is decadal election count]; Alt and Lassen (2006); Tellier (2006) [election variable is
time elapsed since last election]; Fujii (2008); Brender and Drazen (2008) [examine re-election
prospects]; Schneider (2010) [only pre-election]; Javid et al. (2011); Bro¨thaler and Getzner (2011);
Aidt et al. (2011) [dependent variable is election year distortion from trend]; Tutar and Tansel
(2012) [dummy equals -1, 0, 1, in year before, year of, year after election, respectively]; Shahor
(2013) [dummies for each election]; Benito et al. (2013) [no election period variable]; Bertelli
and John (2013); Fiva and Natvik (2013); Veiga and Veiga (2013) [election dummies included
but not shown]; Franklin et al. (2013); Cassette and Farvaque (2014); Kim and Kwon (2014);
Garcı´a-Sa´nchez et al. (2014) [election variable is integer count-down to next election]; Bodea and
Higashijima (2015) [election variable is presidential or parliamentary dummy]; Cabaleiro-Casal
and Buch-Go´mez (2015)
Only conditional effects (i.e., interactions)
Clark and Hallerberg (2000); An and Kang (2000); Hallerberg et al. (2002); Block et al. (2003);
Blomberg and Hess (2003); Buti and Noord (2004); Golinelli and Momigliano (2006); Rose
(2008); Hiroi (2009); Moura˜o (2011); Gan et al. (2012); Vicente et al. (2013a, 2013b); Hanusch
and Vaaler (2013); Bastida, Beyaert and Benito (2013); Klomp and de Haan (2013); Rumi (2014);
Tsai (2014); Hanusch and Keefer (2014); Bojar (2015); Haga (2015); Klein and Sakurai (2015)
Other
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Thames (2001) [no measure of uncertainty]; Treisman and Gimpelson (2001) [no regression, only
F-test results]; Andrikopoulos et al. (2004) [no effect size reported]; Mierau et al. (2007) [logit];
Malley et al. (2007) [state-space]; Donahue and Warin (2007) [no measure of uncertainty, obser-
vations]; Lalvani (2008) [no regression]; Karagol and Turhan (2008) [VAR]; Brender and Drazen
(2007) [results identical to Brender and Drazen (2005)]; Dolezˇalova´ (2011) [unclear]; Kendall-
Taylor (2011) [no regression]; Hayo and Neumeier (2012) [no measure of uncertainty]; Karakas¸
(2013) [cannot obtain journal]; de Haan and Klomp (2013) [results taken from Klomp and de Haan
2013]; de Haan (2014) [results taken from Klomp and de Haan 2013]; Pe´rez-Fornie´s et al. (2014)
[no regression]; Benazic´ and Tomic´ (2014) [no regression]; Citi (2015) [unit of analysis is EU]
A.5 Probing the robustness of the effects
In Chapter 2, plots of the calculated effect sizes were given as:
e = å
(ei jNi j)
åNi j
(A.4)
where the effect size is given by the sum of the study-model partial correlations, ei j, times the
study-model number of observations, Ni j, divided by the sum of all observations. The number of
observations was chosen as the weighting scheme since it is a commonly-used weight in the meta-
analysis literature. In this section I probe the robustness of the results in Chapter 2 by considering
alternative weights.
One of the alternative weighting schemes is the precision, or the inverse of the standard error of
the calculated study-model effect size.5 After changing Ni j to precision, I then plotted the overall
effect size calculations, along with 95% confidence intervals calculated the same way as in Chapter
5Recall that the standard error of the partial correlation is given as
SEi j =
s
1  ei j
d fi j
(A.5)
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2.6 The results are shown in Figure A.3. It is clear that the results remain robust to weighting by
precision.
Figure A.3: The political budget cycle effect across four major categories (precision-weighted)
Fiscal Surplus (234)
Revenues (243)
Debt (22)
Expenditures (699)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
I also re-ran the revenue and expenditure disaggregation calculations using precision as the
weight. These are shown in Figures A.4 and A.5, respectively. As with the overall categories, the
results appear to be robust to weighting by the precision of the partial correlations.
6These were unweighted, random effects, fixed effects, and the Hunter-Schmidt calculation.
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Figure A.4: The political budget cycle effect: Disaggregation by Revenues (precision-weighted)
Other Revenue (19)
Tax Revenue (160)
Total Revenue (64)
Overall (243)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
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Figure A.5: Disaggregation by Expenditures (precision-weighted)
Current Expenditure (130)
Other (96)
Capital Expenditure (171)
Health/Education (52)
Administrative (55)
Total Expenditures (123)
Inter-Govt. Grants (72)
Overall (699)
-.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16 .2 .24
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
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Another alternative weighting scheme uses journal impact factors. Using the impact factors
(from 2013) as the new Ni j, I recalculated the effect sizes.7 The results are shown in Figures
A.6 (four general categories), A.8 (expenditure disaggregation), and A.7 (revenue disaggregation).
Once again, the results remain fairly robust to the alternative weighting scheme.
Figure A.6: The political budget cycle effect across four major categories (weighted by impact
factor)
Fiscal Surplus (234)
Revenues (243)
Debt (22)
Expenditures (699)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
7Not all journals had impact factor scores, thus severely downplaying the influence of these partial correlations.
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Figure A.7: The political budget cycle effect: Revenue disaggregation (impact factor-weighted)
Other Revenue (19)
Tax Revenue (160)
Total Revenue (64)
Overall (243)
-.12 -.08 -.04 0 .04 .08 .12
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
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Figure A.8: The political budget cycle effect: Expenditure disaggregation (weighted by impact
factor)
Current Expenditure (130)
Other (96)
Capital Expenditure (171)
Health/Education (52)
Administrative (55)
Total Expenditures (123)
Inter-Govt. Grants (72)
Overall (699)
-.04 0 .04 .08 .12 .16 .2 .24
Effect Size
Unweighted Random Effects Fixed Effects Hunter-Schmidt
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported.
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A.6 Meta-regression analysis and bayesian model averaging
For all models using Bayesian model averaging in Chapter 2, two million draws were taken after
a burn-in period of 500,000 draws. I used a beta-binomial model prior, with coefficient priors set
to benchmark priors for the hyperparameter in Zellner’s g-prior, as given by Fernandez, Ley and
Steel (2001)
A graphical depiction of the posterior inclusion probabilities is shown in Figure A.9, A.10, and
A.11 for the model of expenditures, revenues, and fiscal surplus, respectively. These are based
on the 500 best models chosen via the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). To swap covariates
when conducting the MCMC, a reversible-jump algorithm was used. Each row represents a dif-
ferent covariate eligible for inclusion in the final model. For example, for expenditures, those at
the top (where the colored bars span the width of the figure) have the highest posterior inclusion
probability. Red bars (lighter in grayscale) indicate that the covariate has a negative coefficient
(i.e., the presence of this factor makes the resulting political budget cycle effect smaller). Blue bars
(darker in grayscale) indicate that the coefficient is positive (i.e., the presence of this factor makes
the resulting political budget cycle effect larger).
To probe the robustness of the covariate-swapping algorithm, the model was re-run using a
birth-death algorithm. I found very similar results when using the alternative algorithm.
A.7 Coding decisions
This section details coding decisions made when coding variables for the calculation of the overall
effect sizes, and for the meta-analysis. The first are dependent variables:
 Fiscal surplus: Dependent variable used in the analysis was deficit spending or fiscal surplus.
The signs were reversed on deficits to indicate that increases correspond with an increased
budget surplus.
 Debt: Dependent variable used in the analysis was government debt, or net claims on gov-
ernment.
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Figure A.9: Posterior inclusion probabilities in model for each variable: Expenditures
Notes: Figure shows the probability of variable inclusion in the model based on 500 best models for expenditures.
Red bars (lighter in grayscale) indicate inclusion, but in the negative direction. Blue bars (darker in grayscale) indicate
inclusion in the positive direction. The hyperparameter on Zellner’s g-prior for regression coefficients set to a benchmark
prior, and the model prior is set to a random prior. A reversible-jump algorithm used to swap covariates.
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Figure A.10: Posterior inclusion probabilities in model for each variable: Revenues
Notes: Figure shows the probability of variable inclusion in the model based on 500 best models for revenues. Red bars
(lighter in grayscale) indicate inclusion, but in the negative direction. Blue bars (darker in grayscale) indicate inclusion
in the positive direction. The hyperparameter on Zellner’s g-prior for regression coefficients set to a benchmark prior,
and the model prior is set to a random prior. A reversible-jump algorithm used to swap covariates.
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Figure A.11: Posterior inclusion probabilities in model for each variable: Fiscal surplus
Notes: Figure shows the probability of variable inclusion in the model based on 500 best models for fiscal surplus.
Red bars (lighter in grayscale) indicate inclusion, but in the negative direction. Blue bars (darker in grayscale) indicate
inclusion in the positive direction. The hyperparameter on Zellner’s g-prior for regression coefficients set to a benchmark
prior, and the model prior is set to a random prior. A reversible-jump algorithm used to swap covariates.
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 Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was expenditures, further broken into
sub-categories below.
 Revenues: Dependent variable used in the analysis was revenues, further broken into sub-
categories below.
 Total Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was total expenditures. Other
names for this were government consumption, consumption expenditures, non-interest ex-
penditures, and general payments.
 Inter-governmental Grants and Transfers: Dependent variable used in the analysis involved
inter-governmental grants or transfers. This included loans to other levels of government.
Note that this did not include transfers to individuals, such as social security payments.
 Capital Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was capital expenditures. This
included capital transfers, construction spending, development expenditures, investment in
buildings and construction, and other infrastructure projects.
 Current Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was current expenditures.
This included (current) development expenditures, spending on economic services, (current)
grants, transfers to individuals such as social services or social security, payments to retirees,
and spending on “culture”.
 Administrative Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was administrative
expenditures. This included wages and income to public sector employees, transfers to state-
owned enterprises, police expenditures, and other administrative spending.
 Education and Health Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was education
or health expenditures.
 Other Expenditures: Dependent variable used in the analysis was some “other” expendi-
ture not listed above. Care was taken to choose the eight largest categories—this category
is a catch-all term for any non-classifiable dependent variable. This includes spending on
158
agriculture, defense, security, subsidies, economic services, housing, environment, industry,
irrigation, leisure, media, net lending, social expenditures, other transfers (to citizens), pub-
lic services, and spending on water, energy, and communications. Often, these were vaguely
defined—so although social expenditures could be capital or current, for instance, it was
unclear and so listed as “Other”.
 Total Revenues: Dependent variable used in the analysis was described as total government
revenues. Often this was expressed as a percent of budget or GDP.
 Tax Revenues: Dependent variable used in the analysis was tax receipts for government.
This included income, sales, and property taxes, for instance.
 Other Revenues: Dependent variable used in the analysis was some other type of revenue.
This included fees, non-tax revenues, and money income.
Below is a list of other variables coded for the meta-regression analysis.
 Standard Error: The standard error of the calculated effect size for a given study-model.
 OECD: A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the analysis included at least one
country in the OECD.
 Latin America: A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the analysis included at
least one country from Latin America.
 Asia: A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the analysis included at least one
country from Asia.
 Sub-Saharan Africa: A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the analysis included
at least one country from Sub-Saharan Africa.
 Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: A dummy variable that takes on a value of
one if the analysis included at least one country from Eastern Europe or the former Soviet
Union.
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 Average Year: The average year in the sample, calculated as MinYear+MaxYear2 .
 Quarterly Aggregation: The temporal aggregation is quarterly. This variable is dichotomous.
 Monthly Aggregation: The temporal aggregation is monthly. This variable is dichotomous.
 Single Country: A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the analysis is conducted
on a single country. Most often, this means that the level of aggregation is either municipal
or state.
 Municipal Aggregation: Level of analysis is at the lowest level of government—commonly
a municipality. This variable is dichotomous.
 State Aggregation: Level of analysis is at the state or provincial level. This variable is
dichotomous.
 Democracy: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for democ-
racy. This included some index of democracy (commonly the Polity score or an equivalent),
or a democracy dummy.
 Coalition: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for if the
current government was in a coalition, or was a minority or majority government. Typically
this was a dummy variable; although some controlled for the overall size of the coalition.
 Debt: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for the debt of
the unit of analysis (national government, state/province, or municipality). This was most
commonly a continuous variable, although I included those who had budgetary restraint
dummy variables or indebted dummy variables.
 Deficit: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for the deficit.
If the analysis controlled for the budget surplus (otherwise called the fiscal balance), I in-
cluded it as well.
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 Government Expenditures: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis con-
trolled for government expenditures. This could include total spending, non-defense spend-
ing, capital spending, or primary sector spending.
 Government Revenues: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled
for government revenues. This could include total revenues, tax revenues, capital revenues,
tax revenues per capita, privatization revenues, local-source revenues, and municipal taxes.
 Transfers: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for grants,
subsidies, bailouts, or other transfers from upper- to lower-levels of government.
 GDP: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for economic
output. This could include gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, GDP gap between
potential and real output, gross national product, as well as lags or leads of GDP.
 GDP Growth: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for GDP
growth.
 Ideology: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for political
ideology, either through a continuous measure or a dichotomous or trichotomous indicator.
 Inflation: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for inflation,
either actual, expected, or the change in inflation.
 Presidential: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for a
presidential system.
 Proportional: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for a
system of proportional representation.
 Unemployment: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for
unemployment.
 Win Margin: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for either
the vote share or margin of victory from the previous election.
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 Fixed-effects Unit: Analysis used some form of unit fixed effects. In this sample of articles,
this included unit fixed effects, regional fixed effects, weighted least squares with regional
fixed effects, and a tobit model with fixed effects.
 Dynamics: Analysis used some form of dynamics using a lagged dependent variable. In
this analysis, this included GMM and GMM-HLM models, error-correction models, pooled
mean-group estimators, and autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models.
 OLS PCSE GLS: A catch-all category that included models estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS), OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), generalized least squares
(GLS), and GLS with autoregression corrected using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
 Election Dummy: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the election variable used
in the analysis is a dummy variable. This is the most basic election variable since it does not
account for when the election occurred during the year.
 Election Half-Year: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the study accounted for
the election year in the following way: the election variable equals one in the year of an
election only if the election took place after June 30. If not, the year before the election is
coded as the election variable. This indicator is not as coarse as the simple dummy variable,
but not as specific as the Franzese indicator.
 Franzese: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the election variable used in the
analysis uses the method of Franzese (2000). The resulting variable is equal to M12 in an
election year, where M is the month of the election.8
 Election Pre-Determined: This is a variable equal to one if the author(s) election variable
was only for pre-determined...i.e., exogenous. This only applies to cross-national analyses.
 Election Early: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the author(s) election variable
was only for elections called early...i.e., endogenous. This only applies to cross-national
analyses.
8The period-before-election indicator, if included, is then equal to 1  M12 .
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 Electiont+1: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for the
period after an election.
 Electiont 1: This is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the analysis controlled for the
period before an election. To keep the comparison similar in terms of functional form (since
this is the key independent variable of interest), I only included indicators the are bounded
by zero and one. This excluded “counter” variables that equal 0, 1, 2,... for one year after,
two years after,... the election. It also excluded a number of articles that created an indicator
that could take on negative and positive values.
 Total Models: The total number of models (not including the appendix) that appear in the
article.
 Cites per Year: The total number article cites (collected at the time of the meta-analysis)
divided by the number of years since publication.
 Impact Factor: The impact factor of the journal (using 2013 impact factors).
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Summary statistics and robustness tables
In Chapter 3, robustness checks were conducted on the monthly weighted coding. The results
of the same robustness check using the alternative dummy variable coding for time relative to the
election are shown in Table B.1. As in Chapter 3, the Year Before Election variable remains positive
and significant throughout the various specifications. So too does the percentage of those owning
no land, suggesting that larger numbers of land-poor citizens prompt the government to pass land
reforms.
In Table B.2 I explore the effects of a number of context-specific variables to check the ro-
bustness of the findings above. All models now use the weighted monthly coding as well as state
fixed effects unless noted otherwise (though results using the dummy variable coding are above).
To investigate the effect of early elections, I add a dummy variable that equals one if there were
Early Elections in that year. Early elections most commonly occur due to a vote of no confidence
or a collapse of a majority coalition.9 As shown in Model 7, accounting for early elections does
not affect the previous findings. Model 8 controls for President’s Rule, which occurs when, “the
president of India, upon receipt of a report by the governor of the state or otherwise, may be sat-
isfied that constitutional breakdown has occurred at the state level. This leads to the temporary
imposition of President’s Rule and, eventually, fresh elections” (Arulampalam et al., 2009, p. 10).
Inclusion of this control does not change the results either.
Another control variable important to the Indian context is based off Khemani’s (2007) Strictly
Affiliated indicator, and shown in Model 9. This dummy variable equals one if the subnational
party in government is the same as the party in government at the national level. Existing literature
suggests competing expectations in regards to political control in India’s federal system. On the one
hand, a coattails effect may exist whereby state parties aligned with the central government benefit
9It can also be caused by the imposition of President’s Rule.
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Table B.1: Robustness: Dummy variable coding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year Before Election 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.94 1.12
Dummy Variable (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.53)
Election Year -0.30 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.31 -0.46
Dummy Variable (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.88)
Single-Party Dominant 0.94 0.89 0.80 0.29 0.80 0.77
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.50) (0.65)
Multiparty: Left-Center-Right 0.79 0.85 0.88 1.65 0.87 -0.46
(1.03) (1.05) (1.05) (0.90) (1.05) (1.31)
Two-Party: Left-Center 1.17 1.22 1.09 0.64 1.13 0.60
(1.62) (1.61) (1.62) (0.59) (1.61) (1.73)
Two-Party: Center-Right 0.82 0.74 0.78 -0.40 0.78 0.45
(0.92) (0.92) (0.93) (0.66) (0.93) (1.21)
% Owning No Land 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Early Elections 0.79 0.81 0.92 0.90 0.91 1.15
(0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (1.08)
President’s Rule -0.55 -0.56 -0.58 -0.55 -0.58
(0.68) (0.69) (0.67) (0.69) (0.86)
Strictly Affiliated 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.40
(0.44) (0.40) (0.43) (0.59)
West Bengal 0.81
(0.67)
Constant -4.02
(0.77)
State FE YES YES YES – YES YES
Time Splines YES YES YES YES – –
Lowest Smoother – – – – YES –
Year FE – – – – – YES
N 515 515 515 515 515 515
States 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
Log Lik. -119.33 -118.98 -118.13 -145.13 -118.23 -88.79
c2 21.16 21.86 23.55 26.02 23.35 82.24
Prob > c2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00
Dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if land reform was passed in state i in year t. Logit with standard
errors in parentheses. Two-tail tests presented despite directional hypotheses. Time-splines, lowess smoother, and fixed
effects included but not reported where noted.  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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Table B.2: Land reform remains robust
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year Before Election 1.12 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.09 2.14
Monthly Weight (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.82)
Election Year 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.63 2.35
Monthly Weight (1.28) (1.28) (1.28) (1.25) (1.28) (1.94)
Single-Party Dominant 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.28 0.79 0.80
(0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.42) (0.51) (0.65)
Multiparty: Left-Center-Right 0.96 1.06 1.10 1.79 1.12 -0.07
(1.04) (1.07) (1.07) (0.92) (1.06) (1.32)
Two-Party: Left-Center 1.11 1.16 1.08 0.68 1.07 0.64
(1.61) (1.61) (1.61) (0.59) (1.62) (1.75)
Two-Party: Center-Right 0.80 0.74 0.78 -0.38 0.77 0.53
(0.90) (0.91) (0.92) (0.67) (0.92) (1.21)
% Owning No Land 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Early Elections 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.06
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.72) (0.73) (0.89)
President’s Rule -0.54 -0.56 -0.60 -0.57 -0.71
(0.69) (0.70) (0.68) (0.70) (0.87)
Strictly Affiliated 0.51 0.57 0.54 0.34
(0.43) (0.40) (0.43) (0.59)
West Bengal 0.75
(0.67)
Constant -3.24
(0.67)
State FE YES YES YES – YES YES
Time Splines YES YES YES YES – –
Lowest Smoother – – – – YES –
Year FE – – – – – YES
N 515 515 515 515 515 515
States 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
Log Lik. -119.21 -118.87 -118.15 -145.16 -118.68 -87.61
c2 21.40 22.07 23.51 25.69 22.46 84.61
Prob > c2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00
Dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if land reform was passed in state i in year t. Logit with standard
errors in parentheses. Two-tail tests presented despite directional hypotheses. Time-splines, lowess smoother, and fixed
effects included but not reported where noted.  p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
166
from the additional popularity of the national stage, and therefore should be less likely to need to
win over voters through land reforms. On the other hand, if we hold the view that the national party
determines state policy, there may exist strong pressure for aligned states to implement land reform
to benefit the party on the national stage. Although the strictly affiliated dummy lies in the positive
direction, it is not statistically significant, and its inclusion has no substantive effect on the political
timing variables (although single-party dominant is no longer significant).
As a further check, in Model 10 I add a dummy variable for West Bengal since the colonial
history of zamandari estates in this region gave rise in the 20th century to leftist and communist
groups, who often championed land reforms. Its inclusion has no effect on the substantive impact
of the findings. The last two models in Table B.2 probe the sensitivity of accounting for temporal
duration. I continue using state fixed effects in Model 11 but substitute out the cubic splines for a
single lowess smoother. The results remain unchanged. Finally, including both state and year fixed
effects in Model 12 has no substantive impact on the results, although the coefficient on Year Before
Election roughly doubles. Overall, the main findings are robust to all alternative specifications.
The summary statistics for the aggregate level results are shown in Table B.3. Data sources
are from Besley and Burgess (2000,2002, 2004) and the EOPP Indian States Data Base, as well as
Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004). Data sources not listed were coded by the author.
In Chapter 3, the dependent variable in the aggregate-level analysis was land reform, which
was a combination of four categories: tenancy reform, the abolishing of intermediaries, ceilings
on landholdings, and the consolidation of landholdings. In Table B.4 I parse out the dependent
variable further. One dependent variable is created that equals 1 if a tenancy reform is passed in the
state-year, and 0 otherwise. The other dependent variable is a combination of intermediary abo-
lition, landholding ceilings, and consolidation—done so since these were the three least-common
categories. The results from Table 1 in Chapter 3 are shown here in Table B.4, although I restrict
the analysis to only using the monthly weighted coding of elections and use random effects.
As clear from Table B.4, even disaggregating land reform out further, substantive results remain
identical to those in Chapter 3. Land reform is likely in the year before the election, and left-leaning
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Table B.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Source
Effective Number of Parties 2.633 1.373 1.146 9.138 515 EOPP
% Owning No Land 13.483 8.175 0.96 41.58 515 EOPP
% Land Owned by Bottom 50% 5.648 4.235 0.2 20.68 515 EOPP
% Land Owned by Top 10% 49.366 7.029 29.3 66.92 515 EOPP
Dummy Variables Number of
(State-Years) Occurrences
Land Reforms 48 515 EOPP
Elections Held 126 515 EOPP
Multiparty: Left-Center-Right 10 515 C&N (2004)
Two-Party: Left-Center 75 515 C&N (2004)
Two-Party: Center-Right 74 515 C&N (2004)
Leftist 33 515
Congress 348 515
Single-Party Dominant 146 515 C&N (2004)
Early Elections 48 515
West Bengal 35 515
President’s Rule 60 515 C&N (2004)
Strictly Affiliated 348 515
Data on land reform: Besley and Burgess (2000,2002,2004) EOPP Indian States Data Base. EOPP = EOPP Indian States
Data Base. C&N (2004) = Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004). Data without sources listed are coded by the author.
governments are the most likely likely to carry out reforms. Interestingly, the Congress party seems
to have favored reforms other than tenancy reform, as evidenced by the significance of the Congress
dummy variable for the “Other” three types of land reform.
B.2 Details on individual-level analysis
The individual-level analysis in Chapter 3 used survey results from the Indian National Election
Study (Eldersveld et al., 2011), and available at the ICPSR website (No. 25402). Interviews were
fact-to-face and followed national elections in 1967, 1971, 1979, and 1985.
Only the 1967 and 1971 surveys contained questions about the most-important problem fac-
ing an individual’s village, including a specific category for issues of land reform and issues of
inequality. Issues of land included a variety of responses such as land tenure, consolidation of
land, protecting the landless, the size of landholdings, and the desire to get more land. Issues of
inequality could include responses such as an increase in economic disparities, or the gap between
the rich and poor. Since these were open-ended questions, each type of response was grouped into
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Table B.4: Parsing out the type of land reform
Tenancy Other Tenancy Other Tenancy Other Tenancy Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Before Election 1.47 1.81 1.57 1.92 1.57 1.93 1.56 1.81
Monthly Weighted (0.52) (0.55) (0.52) (0.55) (0.52) (0.55) (0.52) (0.54)
Election Year 0.88 1.54 0.95 1.84 0.96 1.83 1.00 1.73
Monthly Weighted (1.03) (1.06) (1.06) (1.13) (1.06) (1.13) (1.06) (1.12)
Single-Party 0.13 0.43 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.18
Dominant (0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
Multiparty: 0.72 1.21
Left-Center-Right (1.13) (1.15)
Two-Party: 1.15 0.97
Left-Center (0.47) (0.51)
Two-Party: -0.67 -1.05
Center-Right (0.79) (1.08)
Leftist 1.87 2.63 1.86 2.68 2.12 2.89
(0.69) (0.87) (0.74) (0.92) (0.68) (0.90)
Congress 0.68 1.58 0.68 1.58 0.71 1.64
(0.55) (0.78) (0.55) (0.78) (0.55) (0.78)
% Owning No 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
Land (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Effective No. 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.05
of Parties (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
% Land Owned, -0.10 -0.08
Bottom % (0.07) (0.07)
% Land Owned, -0.00 -0.00
Top 10% (0.04) (0.04)
Constant -2.62 -3.26 -3.26 -4.55 -3.29 -4.47 -2.47 -3.48
(0.68) (0.74) (0.81) (0.98) (0.97) (1.06) (2.05) (2.25)
N 515 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
States 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Log Lik. -116.80 -102.66 -116.60 -100.30 -116.60 -100.29 -115.57 -101.76
c2 22.11 26.12 19.89 28.81 19.87 28.80 23.80 26.73
Prob > c2 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
Random-effects logit with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail tests. Time-splines included but not reported. 
p< 0:10,  p< 0:05,  p< 0:01.
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an overall category. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was turned into a dichotomous indicator with
1 indicating the respondent thought inequality or issues of land reform were the most important
issue facing their village, and 0 indicating some other issue was the most important.
Only the 1971 and 1985 surveys asked the following question, “Some political leaders and
parties have been advocating that people with no land and property should occupy a part of land
and property of those who have a large amount of land and property. Do you approve of this or
do you disapprove?” Respondents could choose either “approve”, “disapprove”, or “uncertain”. I
recoded this into the Approve of Land Grabs indicator, where 1 means a respondent “approves of
land grabs” and 0 means they either “disapprove” or are “uncertain”.
Although most of the control variables are dichotomous, there were two multi-category vari-
ables used. Education is an 8-category indicator coded as follows. 1 is illiterate, 2 has some
primary education, 3 has some middle-level education, 4 is some high school, 5 is a high-school
graduate, 6 is some college, 7 is full college, and 8 is a post-graduate degree. The political interest
variable asks about the respondent’s interest in politics between campaigns. This is a trichotomous
indicator with 0 indicating no interest, 1 indicating some political interest, and 2 indicating a lot of
political interest.
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APPENDIX C
C.1 Robustness section figures
In Table 4.4 I re-ran the models using the second round of voting in the presidential elections.
Recall that in these second rounds, only the top two candidates face off against each other. I
presented the results from Model 10 in Chapter 4. The marginal effects plots for the other models
are presented below.
In Figure C.1 I plot the marginal effect of second round presidential vote across the level of
surrounding municipal PT support (in the second round as well) on the left-side, and the marginal
effect of the surrounding municipalities’ support for the incumbent across the level of a munici-
pality’s vote for the PT. These come from Model 7 in Chapter 4. Similar to results in Chapter 4, I
find that, if anything, incumbents seem to be targeting supporters surrounded by weak supporters
rather than core regions of support. Overall, the results are not statistically significantly different
from zero on the left-side plot in Figure C.1.
In Figure C.2 I plot similar marginal effects as in Figure C.1, although the interaction is further
conditioned by whether the municipality in question is held by a mayor belonging to the PT or a
party in the national coalition. The results come from Model 8 in Chapter 4. As with the results in
the chapter, there does not appear to be any conditioning effect based on local-level partisanship.
Nor does there appear to be much of a conditioning effect of surrounding municipalities on the
level of transfers a given municipality receives.
In Figure C.3 I plot the marginal effect of PT vote in the second round of elections across
the level of surrounding PT vote in the left-side plot, and the marginal effect of surrounding PT
presidential vote across a municipality’s PT vote on the right-side plot. These results come from
Model 9 in Chapter 4. The results are very similar to Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4; incumbents move
from targeting islands of support in off-election years to a very broad-based strategy in municipal
election years, one that does not appear to be conditioned by surrounding municipalities.
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Figure C.1: Some support for targeting islands over strongholds: Second round vote results
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Figure C.2: Local-level partisanship does not affect spatial opportunism: Second round vote results
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Figure C.3: Shift from favoring islands to broad-based support in municipal election years: Second
round vote results
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